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are rarely self-executing, but derive much of their impact from the uses others than legislators make of them,”
but suggesting that Professor Gray “exaggerates the role of judges” when he argues that all law is judge made
law).
2 Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 562
(1989) (using Professor Stanley Fish’s proposition as a starting point); see also id. at 561 n.1, 562 n.8 (citing
works by Professor Fish).
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I. INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETIVE CONFLICT AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE @
The Supreme Court has issued forty-eight bankruptcy decisions in the two
decades since the Bankruptcy Code3 became law. 4  In at least thirty of these cases, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to mediate conflicts among the circuit courts of appeal.5
                                                
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became effective on October 1, 1979.  See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).  It has been
amended numerous times since its enactment.  See The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3114 (1986); Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy
Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (1988); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992);
Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (1992); Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994); ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995), and other minor amendments.
The Bankruptcy Code superseded the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  See Bankruptcy Act of
1898 (act July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544), as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938 (ch. 575, 52 stat.
840) (repealed 1979) (hereinafter, the “Bankruptcy Act”).
4 See Appendix I: The Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Code Decisions (Listed by Term 1981-1998)
[hereinafter, “Appendix I”], post.
After the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Court issued opinions in three Bankruptcy Act cases.
See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48 (1979); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).  This article does not discuss these cases.
This article omits decisions that arose from Bankruptcy Code cases that did not involve questions
of bankruptcy law, see, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998) (clarifying the removal
issues raised in Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981)), and cases in which the Court
simply vacated and remanded or dismissed as moot a Bankruptcy Code decision, see, e.g., Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating judgment and remanding for
reconsideration in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); In re Bonner Mall Partnership,
513 U.S. 18 (1994) (denying vacatur and dismissing the appeal as moot).
5 See Appendix II: Bankruptcy Code Circuit Court Splits Resolved by the Supreme Court [hereinafter,
“Appendix II”], post.  A study of the circuit court bankruptcy opinions underlying the Supreme Court
bankruptcy decisions would be a useful means of enhancing interpreters’ understanding of bankruptcy
interpretation because it would reveal the extent to which splits among the circuits arose from the use of
divergent interpretive methods.  Patterson v. Shumate , 504 U.S. 753 (1992), is a classic example of a case
in which divergent methods (plain text versus legislative history) led to splits in the lower courts.  It would
also be particularly interesting to consider the extent to which the Supreme Court resolved such splits
through a unanimous opinion.  A study of the circuit court splits is, however, well beyond the scope of this
article.
Studies examining the effectiveness of competing interpretive models are also critical.  For
example, in a recent study, Professor Daniel Bussel concluded that textualist decisions were overruled by
4Although the Court resolved the specific questions presented in each, or at least
most,6 of these cases, critics have long complained that the Court has not consistently
applied a coherent interpretive method in Bankruptcy Code cases.7  Bankruptcy experts
contend that the Court’s use of divergent, and/or inappropriate, interpretive methods
undermines predictability and stability, increases costs, ignores congressional intent,
impairs bankruptcy law by preventing the Court from developing a coherent bankruptcy
policy and jurisprudence, leaves the lower courts with inadequate guidance concerning
how to interpret the Bankruptcy Code, and contributes to confusion and split decisions
among the lower courts.8
These problems are particularly troubling in the bankruptcy context because the
Bankruptcy Code’s commercial and remedial provisions affect society in pervasive and
important ways.
As a commercial statute, the Bankruptcy Code serves as the backdrop for
planning and negotiation in a wide variety of non-bankruptcy commercial transactions
involving both businesses and consumers.  These transactions, which include financing,
corporate restructuring, consumer credit, acquisitions, mergers, workouts, sales,
investments, and many other types of transactions, involve incalculable amounts of money,
                                                                                                                                                
legislative action more often than non-textualist decisions.  See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. – (forthcoming April 2000).
6 In Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, Ltd., 526 U.S. 434, 119
S. Ct. 1411 (1999), and Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988), for example, the Court
held that the debtors’ proposed contributions to their plans of reorganization did not constitute “new value.”
The Court declined, however, to determine whether the judicially-developed “new value” exception to the
“absolute priority” rule had survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.  See infra notes 236-48, 520-
53 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 301-38 (1994); Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent:
Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1988); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence
Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1,
6, 109-11 (1996); Bruce A. Markell, Conspiracy, Literalism, and Ennui at the Supreme Court: An
Examination of Bankruptcy Cases Decided From 1990 to 1993 , 41 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 174, 181-83
(1994); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The
Bankruptcy Code Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 879-85 (1991); Charles
Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 570-75 (1988);
Adam J. Weinsch, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79
GEO. L.J. 1831, 1854-62 (1991).
8 See generally Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court’s Methodology for
Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 212-15 (1993); Carlos J. Cuevas,
Public Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 645 (1996); Kelch, supra  note 7, at 291, 301-
38; Klee & Merola, supra  note 7; Eric W. Lam, The Limit and Inconsistency of Application of the Plain
Meaning Rule to Selected Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 111
(1996); Lawless, supra  note 7, at 100-07; Markell, supra  note 7, at 181-83; Tabb & Lawless, supra  note 7,
at 881-85; Tabb, supra  note 7, at 570-75.
See also  Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1285 (5th Cir. 1991) (Jones, J., dissenting on rehearing) (quoted infra text
accompanying note 761).
5goods, and services.9  Uncertainty increases the risks and costs of commercial transactions
for borrowers and lenders, buyers and sellers, creditors and debtors, businesses and
consumers.
The Bankruptcy Code is also an important remedial statute.10  The Bankruptcy
Code’s broad relief chapters apply to a wide variety of debtors, from impoverished
individuals, to multi-million and -billion dollar businesses, to municipalities.11  For example,
in each of the past three years, over one million debtors have filed for bankruptcy
protection.12  Each year, bankruptcy filings also affect tens of millions of non-debtors.13
                                                
9 See, e.g., E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 7 (1993).
10 Concerns over the proper scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s remedial provisions have spurred recent
amendments, see, e.g., the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994),
comprehensive congressionally-mandated study of the Bankruptcy Code, see Report of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission (October 20, 1997), and recent, hotly contested bankruptcy reform
legislation, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th  Cong. (1999); Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1998, H.R. 3150, 105th  Cong. (1998).
For an overview of the debate concerning the continued viability of chapter 11, see Michael Bradley
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11 , 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (discussing the
debate concerning the continued viability of chapter 11); G. Eric Brunstead, Jr., et al. , Review of the Proposals
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies: Part One, 53 BUS. LAW.
1381 (1998); Kenneth Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 551
(1995); Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 AM BANKR. L.J. 573 (1995); Elizabeth
Warren, The Untenable Case For Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992).
11 Chapter 7 relief (liquidation) is available to individuals and businesses; chapter 9 relief (adjustment of
debts of a municipality) is available to certain insolvent municipalities; chapter 11 relief (reorganization) is
available to individuals and businesses but is used primarily by businesses; chapter 12 relief (adjustment of
debts of a family farmer with regular annual income) is available only to family farmers; and chapter 13
relief (adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income) is available only to individuals who earn a
regular income and whose debts fall within specific limits.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
For empirical data concerning individuals who have filed for bankruptcy relief, see Karen Gross, Re-
Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1505 (1990); TERESA
SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989);
Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 195 (1987); Teresa Sullivan, et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of
Consumer Bankrupts, 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (1994); Teresa Sullivan, et al., The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Experience from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 801 (1994).  For select empirical data concerning business bankruptcy filings, see Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11 (1991).  For a discussion of bankruptcy’s impact on the community, see
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997).
12 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts , In June, Total Bankruptcies Filed Decline Again,
Personal Bankruptcies Fall for First Time in 5 Years (Aug. 6 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/new.html>.
For example, in the year ended June 30, 1999, 1,352,030 individuals and 39,934 businesses filed bankruptcy
cases.  The 1,391,964 aggregate filings represent a 2.6 % decrease over the aggregate 1998 filings
(1,429,451 filings) and a 62.2 % increase over the aggregate 1995 filings (858,104 filings).  Non-business
filings rose dramatically between 1995 and 1998 (from 806,816 to 1,379,249), and then declined by 2 % in
1999.  The year ended June 30, 1999 reflects a dramatic decrease in business filings in comparison with
recent years (50,202 filings in 1998, 53,993 filings in 1997, 52,938 filings in 1996, and 51,288 filings in
1995).  Id.
6These non-debtors include not only individuals, businesses, and governmental entities that
hold claims against individual and business debtors, but also the employees, retirees,
customers, and stockholders of business debtors.
Bankruptcy also affects society in less direct ways.  For example, the failure of a
major employer may significantly impair a community’s social services and tax base.
Similarly, large numbers of financially distressed individuals may severely strain social
services.  When interpretive disputes lead to litigation in bankruptcy cases, everyone suffers.
The cost of litigation may spell the difference between liquidation and reorganization.
Every dollar spent litigating is a dollar removed from an asset base that is already inadequate
to satisfy claims.14
Although the costs of uncertainty may be particularly high in bankruptcy cases,
interpretive uncertainty is by no means unique to bankruptcy.  For the past twenty years,
a virulent debate over interpretive method has plagued courts, interpreters, and scholars
in virtually every field of law governed by statutes.15  This debate raises important and
extraordinarily intractable questions concerning the proper relationship between courts
and legislatures; the motives of legislators, judges, and interpreters; the determinacy of
language; that nature of interpretation; the role of intrinsic values (such as predictability,
stability over time, and coherence throughout the law); and the very objectives of
interpretation (which may include legislative intent, statutory purpose, linguistic
meaning, best results, or a shared understanding between the drafter and interpreter).16
Disputes over these fundamentals have led scholars to advocate a variety of
divergent interpretive models.17  Moreover, scholars cannot even reach accord on the end
goal.  Even as some struggle to prove the superiority of their preferred interpretive
models,18 others contend that the goal of defining one, consistent, comprehensive, and
uniformly applicable interpretive method is unrealistic and unachievable.19
                                                                                                                                                
13 If each of the 1.3 million bankruptcy cases filed during the year ended June 30, 1999 affected only 20
creditors (or other non-debtors), these cases together would have affected 26 million non-debtors.  Some of
these creditors (such as institutional lenders) will, of course, have been affected by multiple bankruptcy
filings.
14 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 409 (1993) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“An entity in bankruptcy can ill afford to waste resources on litigation; every dollar spent on
lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see.”).
15 See generally Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Legal-
System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEG. J. 233, 234 nn.1-2 (1997) (collecting authorities).
16 See generally Gebbia-Pinetti, supra  note 15, at 271-76, 280-88, 291-302.
17 See infra  Part II.
18 See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999) (advocating the use of legislative history to
enforce the expectation of public justification of legislation); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (advocating dynamic interpretation); David A. Forkner & Kent
Kostka, Unanimously Weaving a Tangled Web: Walters, Robinson, Title VII, and the Need For Holistic
Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 161 (1999) (advocating holistic interpretation); Earl M.
Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach,
63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988) (advocating a modified form of intentionalism); William D. Popkin, The
Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988) (advocating collaborative
7Perhaps the only certainty is that interpretive theory is in a time of turbulent
upheaval and transition.  Scholars of interpretive theory will likely not achieve consensus
for years, if ever.  In the meantime, today’s interpreters face a formidable challenge.  We
must determine how to preserve the greatest possible degree of interpretive certainty
despite the fact that eminent scholars and jurists urge us to employ incompatible
interpretive methods.
If we hope to identify an effective interpretive model for this time of transition,
we must consider and attempt to reconcile the empirical, practical, and theoretical aspects
of Bankruptcy Code interpretation.
First, empirical studies are the only way to discern current interpretive practice in
bankruptcy cases.  A study of the Supreme Court’s interpretive practices is critical
because the lower courts look to the Court for direction concerning interpretive method,
and the Court is the ultimate arbiter of cases in which the lower courts have split.  When
the circuit courts reach conflicting holdings because they have applied conflicting
interpretive methods (such as textual meaning versus congressional intent as discerned in
pre-Code practice or legislative history), the Court’s resolution of the split is a comment
on interpretive method.  Predicting the Court’s holding in the next bankruptcy case (and,
consequently, understanding which lower court decisions are at risk of being overruled)
depends more on understanding the Court’s patterns of reasoning than on knowing the
substantive holdings of each Supreme Court bankruptcy decision.  Consequently,
interpreters should carefully consider the Court’s rationale, which is inextricably
interwoven with the Court’s interpretive method.
This article studies the Court’s interpretive methods.  Studies of lower court
bankruptcy decisions might also provide valuable information concerning interpretive
method, particularly if such studies examine whether conflicting decisions arise from
conflicting interpretive methods, whether appellate courts and bankruptcy courts apply
divergent interpretive methods, and whether textual or non-textual decisions are more
frequently overruled by higher courts or legislative action.
In a time of interpretive consensus, interpreters might have achieved certainty by
applying the method that conformed to current practice.  In this time of interpretive
upheaval, however, an empirical analysis is unlikely to reveal a single, universally
accepted and applied interpretive method.  Moreover, an empirical analysis cannot per se
ensure interpreters that the Court’s current methods are practically or theoretically
optimal, or even legitimate.  Nevertheless, an empirical study is critical, for two reasons.
First, it is the only way to determine whether the Court’s opinions reveal either a
consistent interpretive method or consistent patterns of interpretation, including patterns
of agreement and disagreement among the Justices.  Only by identifying these patterns
can interpreters begin to predict the Court’s approach in future cases.  Second, an
empirical study will establish a foundation of current practice that interpreters can test
                                                                                                                                                
interpretation); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (advocating comprehensive rationality); ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (advocating textualism).
19 See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES (1980); see also Gebbia-Pinetti, supra  note 15, at 294-97 & n.174 (collecting authorities).
8against practically and theoretically ideal interpretive models.  Simply stated, if the Court
is issuing “bad” decisions in bankruptcy cases, an empirical study may reveal why.
Second, as a practical matter, interpreters should consider which interpretive
method would be most appropriate for a statute that has the unique nature and mix of
characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code.  Of course, interpreters cannot achieve certainty
simply by adopting the practically optimal approach, unless that approach happens to
conform to current interpretive practice.  Only a practical inquiry, however, will reveal
whether the Court’s current interpretive method is well-suited to the Bankruptcy Code.
Moreover, only a practical inquiry will reveal whether any of the competing interpretive
models that theorists claim are optimal, in the abstract, would work well in the specific
context of the Bankruptcy Code.
Third, a theoretical analysis is necessary to determine whether either the Court’s
current interpretive methods, or an interpretive model that appears to be well-suited to the
characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code, satisfies the fundamental objectives of statutory
interpretation and the mandates of interpretive theory.  Theory alone will not permit
interpreters to predict consequences if the courts do not, in fact, apply the theoretically
optimal approach.  Nevertheless, theory is the only basis for testing the validity of current
interpretive methods and practically desirable interpretive methods.
Interpreters operating during today’s period of interpretive discord must begin by
understanding current interpretive practices, identifying practically desirable interpretive
methods, and determining whether a single, optimal interpretive model is theoretically
possible.  They must then determine whether current interpretive practices and desirable
interpretive practices can be reconciled.  If these divergent practices cannot be reconciled,
interpreters must determine whether it is possible to move incrementally toward an
interpretive ideal while hewing closely enough to current practice to maintain certainty.
The empirical, practical, and theoretical study necessary to answer these questions
cannot be accomplished within the confines of a single law review article.  This article
embodies the first, fundamental step of the requisite inquiry, which is a comprehensive,
empirical analysis of the interpretive methods the Supreme Court has employed in its
Bankruptcy Code decisions.  A separate work will consider how the results of this
empirical study comport with the practical and theoretical components of Bankruptcy
Code interpretation. 20
Part II of this article briefly identifies the essential components of interpretive
method.  These components include interpretive objectives, sources, and guides.  This
section is designed to provide context for an empirical study of the Supreme Court’s
interpretive approach.
Part III examines the interpretive methods the Court has employed in each of its
Bankruptcy Code decisions.  This study differs in three ways from other studies that have
undertaken empirical analyses of limited numbers of the Court’s bankruptcy decisions.
First, it focuses exclusively on interpretive method.  Second, it comprehensively
examines all of the Court’s Bankruptcy Code decisions.21  Third, it examines the Court’s
                                                
20 See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Toward a Method and Theory of Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code
(working title, in progress).
21 Cf. sources cited infra note 683.
9majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in order to determine the import of
interpretive disputes among the Justices.  It does not simply on the interpretive methods
the Court has used in its majority opinions.22
This article hypothesizes that interpreters can best understand the Court’s
bankruptcy jurisprudence23 by examining areas of agreement and disagreement among
the Justices in bankruptcy cases.
For example, if substantive bankruptcy policy is the linchpin of the Court’s
bankruptcy jurisprudence, then one would expect the Court to issue unanimous opinions
when the Justices agree on substantive bankruptcy policy and to issue divided opinions
when the Justices disagree on substantive bankruptcy policy.  One would also expect
disputes among the Justices, as revealed in separate concurring and dissenting opinions,
to turn on matters of bankruptcy policy.
In contrast, to the extent that interpretive method is the linchpin of the Court’s
bankruptcy jurisprudence, one would expect that disputes among the Justices concerning
the choice and application of interpretive method would lead to separate opinions.
Finally, if other considerations affect the Justices’ approach to bankruptcy
jurisprudence, if the Court balances interpretive method and substantive results, or if
some Justices decide bankruptcy cases based upon substantive bankruptcy policy while
others decide bankruptcy cases based upon interpretive method, one would expect the
Justices’ separate opinions to reflect these considerations.  In other words, an
examination of the reasons the Justices agree and disagree with each other may reveal
more about the Justices’ vision for the Bankruptcy Code than an examination of either the
substantive results in bankruptcy cases, alone, or the interpretive methods the Court has
used in its majority opinions, alone.
To test this hypothesis and determine the extent to which interpretive method
drives the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence, Part III analyzes separately the Court’s
unanimous, unanimous with concurrence, minor split, and major split bankruptcy
decisions.  Part IV summarizes the results and elaborates the implications of this
empirical study.  Among the observations that Part IV discusses are the following:
*In one-half of the Court’s Bankruptcy Code decisions, all Justices agreed
on the result.
*Nevertheless, in more than two-thirds of the Court’s Bankruptcy Code
cases, one or more Justices wrote separate opinions.
*The Justices generally decided bankruptcy cases based upon principles of
statutory interpretation rather than, for example, based upon substantive
bankruptcy policy.
                                                
22 Cf. sources cited supra notes 7-8, infra notes 672-83.
23 In this context, “jurisprudence” is not limited to judicial development of substantive legal doctrine, but
also includes interpretive patterns that help the observer understand the Court’s past decisions and predict
the Court’s future decisions.  The latter is sometimes labeled “legisprudence.”
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*Nevertheless, even the Court’s unanimous cases did not consistently
employ one, single interpretive method.  The Court’s unanimous opinions
do not reveal any obvious criteria for choosing among these divergent
methods.
*Disputes among the Justices over interpretive method led to a substantial
majority of the Justices’ separate opinions.  These separate opinions reveal
two significant patterns of discord.  First, particular Justices disagreed
strongly and consistently with other Justices concerning interpretive
method.  Second, these disputes centered upon two prominent components
of bankruptcy interpretation – the plain meaning canon and the pre-Code
practice canon.
*The overwhelming majority of cases in which the Justices disagreed with
each other for reasons unrelated to interpretive method involved either
constitutional, or quasi-constitutional, questions or tensions between the
Bankruptcy Code and other applicable non-bankruptcy law.  An
inordinately large percentage of the Court’s major splits arose from
constitutional questions.  A substantial number of the cases involving
tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and other law caused disputes
among the Justices concerning how to reconcile the Bankruptcy Code’s
plain language, pre-Code law, and a “canon” of deference to important
federal or state laws or governmental interests.
Part IV elaborates these and other observations and considers how bankruptcy
judges, practitioners, and scholars might approach bankruptcy cases in light of these
results.  Seven Appendices present compilations of this study’s data.24 Finally, Part V
summarizes my conclusions and makes recommendations for further study.
II. MECHANICS OF INTERPRETATION
The modern interpretive debate is characterized by a dizzying array of competing
interpretive theories and models.  Some of the more commonly discussed models include
                                                
24 See Appendix I: The Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Code Decisions (Listed by Term 1981-1998)
[hereinafter, “Appendix I”]; Appendix II: Bankruptcy Code Circuit Court Splits Resolved by the Supreme
Court [hereinafter, “Appendix II]; Appendix III: Splits in Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Cases
[hereinafter, “Appendix III”]; Appendix IV: Distribution of Justices’ Opinions in Supreme Court
Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix IV”]; Appendix V: Supreme Court Justices’ Dissent and
Divergence Rates in Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix V”]; Appendix VI: Distribution of
Textual, Non-Textual, and Pre-Code Practice Opinions in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Code Cases
[hereinafter, “Appendix VI”]; Appendix VII: Supreme Court Justices’ Rates of Joining Textual and Non-
Textual Opinions in Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix VII”], post.
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textualism, originalism, intentionalism, purposivism, pragmatism, legal process, holistic
interpretation, dynamic interpretation, and integrity in interpretation. 25
Competing views of interpretative theory, political theory, legal theory, and
practical reasoning drive these models.26  The complexity of these underlying
philosophical motivations leads to multiple shades, variations, and combinations within
each of these general models and frequent overlap among these models.  Consequently, a
particular interpreter’s approach may fit within more than one of these categories.27
Despite the complexities and nuances of interpretive theory, the mechanics of
interpretation are relatively simple.  Three primary components define every interpretive
model.  These are the (i) interpreter’s goals or objectives, (ii) sources the interpreter
consults, and (iii) interpretive guides the interpreter employs to understand the
relationships among these sources and to wield these sources in a way that achieves the
interpreter’s objective.  The theoretical or philosophical criteria that drive the different
interpretive models direct interpreters to pursue different objectives, consult different
sources, and apply different interpretive guides.
Part II briefly identifies the primary mechanical components of interpretation in
order to provide the reader with some context for this article’s examination of the Court’s
interpretive methods.
A. Interpreters’ Objectives
When an interpreter applies a statute, she typically has in mind a particular
objective that defines her task.  She may seek to determine and implement the
legislature’s actual, subjective intent (intentionalist), the statute’s objective purpose
(purposive), the text’s meaning (textualist, formalist), or the best result (consequentialist).
Alternatively, she may view interpretation not as a search for a specific objective, but
rather, as a dialogue through which the drafter and interpreter achieve a common
understanding.28
Within each of these categories of inquiry, the interpreter’s approach will depend
upon the breadth and temporal focus of her inquiry.  First, an interpreter might focus on
                                                
25 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra  note 18 (analyzing divergent interpretive methods); see also  sources cited
supra  notes 15, 18, 19; Gebbia-Pinetti, supra  note 15 (distinguishing textualism, intentionalism,
purposivism, originalism, and various forms of dynamic interpretation); KENT GREENAWALT ,
LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 5 (1999) (mentioning textualism,
intentionalism, purposivism, legal process, pragmatism, and integrity).
26 See, e.g., Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 15 (extensively analyzing the theoretical foundations of competing
interpretive models); GREENAWALT , supra  note 25, at 10-11.
27 For example, Justice Thomas’s interpretive method might be characterized as textualist, originalist, and
linguistically holistic.  Justice Stevens’s approach might be characterized as intentionalist or purposive,
dynamic, substantively holistic, and perhaps pragmatic.
28 See generally Gebbia-Pinetti, supra  note 15 at 271-76, 280-88, 291-302 (for a discussion of different
interpretive objectives).
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the intent, purpose, or meaning of the statute as a whole (holistic), or of only one
particular phrase or section of the statute (narrow or non-holistic).29  Second, the
interpreter may seek to implement the original intent, purpose, or meaning (originalist) or
she may view the original intent, purpose, or meaning in light of the contexts that
surrounded the enactment of the statute and the manner in which those contexts have
changed since the statute was enacted (dynamic).30
Although there are exceptions and gradations, intentionalists generally tend to
apply originalist interpretation.  Consequentialists are dynamic.  Textualists typically
claim to be originalist, but when they apply a current rather than original meaning, they
are dynamic.  Purposivists tend to search for the statute’s original purpose, but their
efforts to discern how that purpose applies in the current day often appear to be dynamic.
Interpreters may apply both non-holistic and holistic interpretation in either an originalist
or dynamic manner.31
In most of the Court’s Bankruptcy Code cases, the Court either expressly or
impliedly searches for legislative intent.32  In some of these cases, however, the Court’s
reference to subjective legislative “intent” seems to refer, more objectively, to the
purposes of the statute.33  A full examination of the Court’s interpretive objective in
bankruptcy cases is beyond the scope of this article.
B. Sources
Interpreters may consult a variety of sources in their efforts to implement the
legislature’s intent, statute’s purpose, text’s meaning, best result, or other objective.  This
section categorizes interpretive sources according to the following criteria.  First, sources
may have existed before the enactment of the statute (historic), may have been created
contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute (contemporaneous), or may have been
created after the statute was enacted (subsequent).  Second, in each of these three
categories, sources may be either internal or external to the statute.  Finally, external
                                                
29 See generally Forkner & Kostka, supra  note 18 (discussing holistic and non-holistic interpretation).
30 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra  note 18 (contrasting originalist and dynamic interpretation).
31 See generally sources cited supra  notes 28-30.
32 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1998); Fidelity Financial Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522
U.S. 211, 215-21 (1998); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6, 523, 526 (1984); United
States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1996); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 282-83, 287-88 (1991);
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343, 350-52 (1985); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205, 208, 209 (1983).
33 See, e.g., infra  text accompanying notes 147-49.
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sources may be closely and integrally related to the statute (intrinsic) or only remotely
related to the statute (extrinsic).34
The purpose of this list is simply to identify sources that interpreters might
consult and to categorize those sources in a way that may be helpful as readers consider
the interpretive methods the Court has applied in bankruptcy cases.  This list is not
designed as a comprehensive review or as a commentary on the legitimacy of these
sources.35
1. Internal sources
Internal to the statute and contemporaneous with the provision being applied:
(1) Text: language of the particular provision
(2) Definitions: statutory definitions of terms and phrases
(3) Formalist holistic (or structural) analysis: use of the term or phrase in other
sections of the statute
(4) Substantive holistic (or structural) analysis: substantive effect of the provision
and of related provisions
(5) Overarching substantive holistic (or structural) analysis: the substantive effect,
design, object, or policy of the statute as a whole.36  The Court has recognized two
overarching policies that animate the Bankruptcy Code: (a) the rehabilitation of
debtors, and (b) the maximization of value and fair and equitable treatment of
similarly situated creditors.37
Internal to the statute and historic in relation to the provision being applied:38
                                                
34 The distinction between a “source” and an interpretive guide is not definite.  For example, a dictionary
could be considered a “source” or an interpretive guide that assists the interpreter in applying the text.
Similarly, although legislative history is often viewed as a source, it could be deemed an interpretive guide.
For simplicity, this article includes all of these materials as sources.
35 For other lists of interpretive sources, see generally SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§
27.01-27.04 (4th ed. 1991).
36 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-88 & n.13 (1991); see also infra  text and accompanying
notes 147-49; infra  Part IV.A.1.c.3.
37 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998) (citing the fresh start policy); Union Bank v.
Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160-62 (1991) (citing the equitable distribution policy, and deter a race to the
courthouse policy); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (citing the equitable
distribution policy); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (citing the reorganization
policy); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 (citing the fresh start policy); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 351-54 (1985) (citing the maximization of value policy); United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1983) (citing the reorganization policy); Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing the fresh start policy).
38 These sources might be considered external, because they are no longer part of the statute, but are
nevertheless intrinsic to the statute.  The distinction is not important for purposes of this article.
14
(6) Prior law (i.e., the Bankruptcy Act)
(7) Prior versions of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., how the provision in question
altered an earlier version of the provision)
Internal to the statute and subsequent to the provision being applied:
(8) Amendments made to the provision after the provision was enacted
(9) Amendments made to other provisions that affect or are related to the
provision
2. Sources that are external but intrinsic to the statute
External, intrinsic, and contemporaneous with the provision being applied:
(10) Legislative history of the enactment (committee reports, floor statements,
speeches, debates)
External, intrinsic, and historic in relation to the provision being applied:
(11) Legislative history of Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Act predecessors to
the provision
(12) Judicial precedents interpreting and pre-Code judicial doctrines elaborating
the Bankruptcy Act predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code provision
(13) Judicial precedents interpreting and judicial doctrines elaborating prior
versions of the Bankruptcy Code provision
(14) Legislative history of prior, proposed bills that were not enacted
External, intrinsic, and subsequent to the provision being applied:
(15) Legislative history of subsequently enacted amendments
(16) Proposed amendments rejected after the provision was enacted
(17) Legislative history of subsequent, proposed bills that were not enacted
(18) Judicial precedent interpreting the provision
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3. Sources that are external and extrinsic to the statute
External, extrinsic, and contemporaneous with the provision being applied:
(19) Dictionaries and similar textual aids dated contemporaneous with the statute
(20) Contemporaneous non-bankruptcy statutes, their text, structure, and policy
(21) Other contemporaneous non-statutory law (its substance and policy)
(22) Public debate, popular press, scholarly writings, other commentary
contemporaneous with the enactment of the provision
External, extrinsic, and historic in relation to the provision being applied:
(23) Dictionaries and similar textual aids dated prior to the statute
(24) Non-bankruptcy statutes (their text, structure, policy) that pre-date the
Bankruptcy Code provision
(25) Other non-statutory law (its substance and policy) that pre-dates the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code provision
(26) Public debate, popular press, scholarly writings, other commentary that pre-
dates the enactment of the provision
External, extrinsic, subsequent to the provision being applied:
(27) Dictionaries and similar textual aids dated later than the statute
(28) Non-bankruptcy statutes (their text, structure, policy) that were enacted after
the Bankruptcy Code provision
(29) Other non-statutory law (its substance and policy) that was developed after
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code provision
(30) Public debate, popular press, scholarly writings, other commentary
subsequent to the enactment of the provision
(31) Changes in social and legal contexts; changes in the legislature
(32) Consequences in the case and projected consequences in subsequent cases
Three observations concerning these sources are appropriate.  First, for purposes
of this article, it will rarely be necessary to elaborate the nuances of the competing
interpretive models except to differentiate textual from non-textual interpretation. 39  This
distinction, however, is far from simple.  Different commentators hold different views
concerning what constitutes textual interpretation.40  For purposes of this article, the
Court’s interpretation will be deemed “textual” only if the Court consults no sources
                                                
39 See Appendix VI: Distribution of Textual, Non-Textual, and Pre-Code Practice Opinions in the Supreme
Court’s Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix VI”], post; see also infra Parts IV.A.1.c.2, IV.A.2.
40 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 50, 672-83.
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other than those listed above as sources (1) (text), (2) (textual definitions), (3) (formalist
holistic analysis), and (19), (23) and (27) (dictionaries).41  If the Court considers any
other source, for any reason, even simply to confirm textual meaning, the analysis is not
purely textual.
Second, although any consideration of post-enactment sources, including
subsequent amendments and subsequently enacted, related laws is considered dynamic,
the preceding list reveals a rich variety of dynamic sources, many of which courts consult
regularly.  The more controversial uses of dynamic interpretation involve importing
broader changes in the social fabric and self-consciously protecting interests not
protected by the legislature.
Third, “history” encompasses a broad array of sources other than “legislative
history.”  Many of these sources, such as prior law and judicial interpretations of prior
law, are intrinsic to the historical development of the doctrines embodied in the current
Bankruptcy Code.
C. Interpretive Canons, Guides, and Aids
Interpretive canons, guides, and aids are tools or criteria that interpreters use to
determine which sources to consult, how to construe those sources, the import, meaning
and relationships among interpretive sources, and how to wield those sources to achieve
the interpretive objective.
Courts employ an enormous variety of interpretive canons, guides, and aids.42
For simplicity, the article will refer to all of these devices as “canons.”  For purposes of
this article, the reader should simply be alert to four distinct categories of interpretive
canons that appear with some regularity in the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy cases.
First, textual guides include general rules of grammar and linguistic
construction. 43 Other, more specific, textual canons direct the interpreter when to
consider only the text and when to look beyond the text.44
Second, structural or holistic canons encourage the interpreter to consider the
statute’s words in the context of other components of the statute, including the use of the
                                                
41 See infra  Parts IV.A.1.c.2, IV.A.2.
42 For classic discussions of interpretive canons, see generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at § 45.13, 76-
78; REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 227-37 (1975); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863
(1930).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-45 (1989) (applying rules of
grammar); infra notes 629-57 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1992);
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241-43; see also  Dewsnup v. Timm, 502
U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra Parts IV.A.1.c.2, IV.A.2.
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same or similar words and phrases elsewhere in the statute (linguistic or textual), and the
structure, design, object, policy, or purpose of the statute (substantive).45
Third, pre-Code canons instruct the interpreter to consider or defer to pre-Code
law or pre-Code judicial interpretations, practices, and doctrines, in certain
circumstances.46
Fourth, the Court occasionally has applied other, bankruptcy-specific canons.47
Bankruptcy-specific canons include, for example, suggestions that interpreters defer to
important state, federal, or governmental interests,48 or that interpreters construe
discharge exceptions narrowly in favor of the debtor.49
Part III examines the interpretive methods the Supreme Court has employed in its
Bankruptcy Code decisions.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Overview
This article separately analyzes the Court’s unanimous (Part B), unanimous with
concurrence (Part C), minor split (Part D), and major split (Part E) Bankruptcy Code
decisions.
For purposes of this article, a decision is “unanimous” only if the Justices agreed
on a single opinion, and no Justice wrote a separate concurring or dissenting opinion.  In
“unanimous with concurrence” cases, one or more Justices wrote concurring opinions.
Together, the unanimous decisions and unanimous with concurrence decisions are
referred to as the “non-split decisions.”
                                                
45 See, e.g., Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 n.13 (1991); United Sav. Ass’n
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
46 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539
(1996); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20; Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552,
563 (1990); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 251-54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380; Midlantic
Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 47 (1986); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208 (1983); cf. Dewsnup, 502 U.S.
at 433-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240-41.
47 The Court also applied constitutional canons in one case that raised constitutional questions in a
bankruptcy context.  See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78-80 (1982); infra notes 270-
71 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 499-501; Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44-49; cf. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 23-46
(distinguishing the case at bar from cases in which such interests were at stake); see also infra Parts
IV.A.1.c, IV.A.1.d.
49 See, e.g., Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
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The cases in which the Justices did not agree on the result (the “split decisions”)
are separated into “minor split” and “major split” decisions.  Major splits occurred when
at least three Justices dissented.  Minor splits occurred when one or two Justices
dissented.
Where appropriate, the analysis separates cases decided prior to the 1986 Term
from cases decided in the 1986 and subsequent Terms.  This division is designed to
isolate and consider the extent to which the addition of Justice Scalia (whose iconoclastic
interpretive methods are legendary) 50 to the Court in 1986 may have affected the Court’s
interpretive splits.
The first of the Court’s forty-eight Bankruptcy Code cases came before the Court
during the 1981 Term. 51  Appendix I, post, reveals that the number of Supreme Court
bankruptcy cases increased dramatically from the 1981 through 1985 period to the 1986
through 1998 period.52
Despite this increase, however, the raw numbers show little distinction between
either the non-split decisions and the split decisions or the pre-Justice Scalia period
decisions and the Justice Scalia period decisions.  Appendix III, post, reveals that the
Court decided one-half of its forty-eight aggregate bankruptcy cases by split decisions,
and one-half by non-split decisions.53  The allocation between split and non-split
                                                
50 See generally William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William D.
Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1133 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court’s
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM.
U. L. REV. 277 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
51 See Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Appendix I, post.
52 See Appendix I, post.  During the 1981 through 1985 Terms, the Court decided eight bankruptcy cases in
five years, which is 1.6 cases per year.  During the 1986 through 1998 terms, the Court decided 40
bankruptcy cases in 13 years, which is 3.076 cases per year.  Any suggested reasons for this increase would
be speculative absent an empirical study that goes well beyond the scope of this article. Factors relevant to
such a study might include the dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings during this period, frequency of
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, time required for cases to rise from the bankruptcy courts to the
Supreme Court, nature of the questions presented, reasons the Court has accepted bankruptcy cases, and
whether the Court’s case load has increased correspondingly in other areas of law.
53 See Appendix III: Splits in Supreme Court Bankruptcy Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix III”], post.
Appendix III does reveal a significant increase in unanimous as compared to concurrence decisions from
the pre-Justice Scalia era to the Justice Scalia era, and an increase in the number of minor as compared to
major splits from the pre-Justice Scalia era to the Justice Scalia era.  Before Justice Scalia joined the Court,
one-half (2 cases) of the four non-split decisions were unanimous and one-half (2 cases) included a
concurrence.  After Justice Scalia joined the Court, 62½% (thirteen cases) of the twenty non-split decisions
were unanimous, and 37½% (seven cases) included a concurrence.  Similarly, before Justice Scalia joined
the Court, 25% (1 case) of the four split decisions were minor splits and 75% (three cases) were major
splits.  After Justice Scalia joined the Court, however, 70% (fourteen cases) of the twenty non-split
decisions were minor splits, and 30% (six cases) were major splits.  Id.  The implications, if any, of this
shift are unclear, particularly in light of the small numbers of bankruptcy cases decided in pre-Justice Scalia
era.
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decisions did not change when Justice Scalia joined the Court.  One-half of the eight
cases decided during the 1981 through 1985 Terms were split; one-half were not split.
One-half of the forty cases decided during the 1986 through 1989 terms were split; one-
half were not split.54
The simple statistics, however, reveal nothing about the reasons the Justices
agreed and disagreed with each other in bankruptcy cases.  The following analysis
examines the areas of accord and discord among the Justices in order to discern the role
and significance of interpretive method in the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence.  Because
this analysis focuses on interpretive method rather than substantive law, the facts and
holdings are explained only in sufficient detail for the reader to understand the Court’s
interpretive method.55
B. The Unanimous Decisions
1. Overview
During the 1981 through 1998 Terms, the Supreme Court issued fifteen
unanimous Bankruptcy Code opinions.56  In these cases, each Justice agreed not only
with the Court’s result, but also (presumably) with the Court’s reasoning, including its
interpretive method.  At the least, no Justice disagreed strongly enough with the Court’s
reasoning to write a separate concurrence.
This Part concludes that the Court has not applied one, identical interpretive
approach in its unanimous bankruptcy cases.  These cases do, however, provide
interpreters with useful information concerning the components of the Court’s
interpretative approach.
2. Unanimous decisions in the 1981 through 1985 Terms
                                                
54 See Appendix III, post.
55 This analysis focuses on whether Justices wrote separate opinions because of methodological
disagreements.  Consequently, it elaborates the Court’s general interpretive approach in each case, rather
than each interpretive nuance.  This analysis is not designed to provide a critical analysis of the cases, their
results, or the methods the Court has used to interpret the Bankruptcy Code.
For other, and, in some instances, more detailed, analyses of limited groups of these cases, see
Lowell P. Botrell, The Supreme Court and the “Plain Meaning” of the Bankruptcy Code: A Review of
Recent And Pending Supreme Court Decisions, 69 N.D. L. REV. 155 (1993); Carlos Cuevas, The Rehnquist
Court, Strict Statutory Construction, and The Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435 (1994);
Rasmussen, supra note 50; sources cited supra notes 7, 8, 50, infra notes 672-83.
56 See Appendix III, post; see also infra  notes 57, 72-84.
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The Court issued two unanimous decisions during the 1981 through 1985
Terms.57 In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,58 the Court
authorized the bankruptcy trustee to waive the corporate debtor’s attorney-client privilege
with respect to communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy case.59
In United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,60 the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code
required the Internal Revenue Service to turn over to the bankruptcy estate property
seized prior to the filing of the debtor’s chapter 11 case.61
In a third case, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,62 the Court unanimously held that
the Bankruptcy Code authorized a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to reject a union
contract, if certain conditions were satisfied.63 The Bildisco Court split five-to-four,
however, on whether the debtor-in-possession committed an unfair labor practice when it
unilaterally modified the contract after the debtor filed bankruptcy but before it rejected
the contract.64
Weintraub, Whiting Pools, and the unanimous portion of Bildisco all sought to
implement legislative intent or statutory purpose, as revealed in the statutory text and
legislative history. 65  Each decision also drew upon some aspect of bankruptcy policy.  In
                                                
57 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).  Both of these cases arose from splits among the circuit courts of appeal.
See Appendix II, post.
58 Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343.  This was an eight–to-zero opinion because Justice Powell took no part in the
decision.  Id.
59 Id. at 358.
60 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198.
61 Id. at 211.  Bankruptcy Code section 542(a) obligates any entity (other than a custodian) who is in
possession, custody, or control of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease, or that the debtor may
exempt, to turn that property over to the trustee, unless the property is of inconsequential value.   See 11
U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994).  The Court concluded that the turnover provision contained no exception applicable
to either secured creditors, in general, or taxing authorities, in particular.  See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at
207, 209.
62 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).  Bildisco also arose from a circuit split.  See
Appendix II, post.
63 See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 534.  See also 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994) (governing assumption and rejection of
executory contracts, in general).  After the Bildisco decision (issued on February 22, 1984), Congress
promptly amended the Bankruptcy Code to add a specialized provision that now governs the rejection and
pre-rejection treatment of collective bargaining agreements.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994), added by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 391 (1984) (effective July 10, 1984).
64 Five Justices found no unfair practice.  See Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513.  Four Justices would have found an
unfair practice.  Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justices White, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan’s concurrence and dissent.  Id.  The split portion of Bildisco is
discussed infra at Part III.E.3.
65 See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349-50 (citing statutory text); id. at 350-52 (citing legislative history and
congressional intent); id. at 358 (citing congressional intent); Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 202-05 (citing
statutory text); id. at  205, 208, 209 (citing congressional intent, congressional purpose); id. at 204-05, 207-
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both Whiting Pools and the unanimous portion of Bildisco, the Court supported its
conclusions by reference to the Bankruptcy Code’s general policy of encouraging
reorganization. 66  The Bildisco majority also referred to the Bankruptcy Code’s equitable
policy. 67  The Weintraub Court sought to ensure that any non-bankruptcy rule it applied
in the bankruptcy context would be consistent with bankruptcy policy, including the
general policy of maximizing value for creditors.68
Only Whiting Pools, however, applied a pre-Code practice interpretive canon.
The Court stated the canon mildly69 when it noted that its holding was consistent with
judicial precedent under the Bankruptcy Act and that “[n]othing in the legislative history
evinces a congressional intent to depart from that practice.”70  In essence, the Court
presumed that Congress knew the practice under the former law and would have signaled
its intent to alter that practice.
Four aspects of the pre-Code canon, as stated and applied in Whiting Pools, are
significant.  First, the Court apparently found nothing in the text that evidenced a
congressional intent to alter pre-Code practice.  Consequently, it applied the canon solely
to consider whether the Bankruptcy Code’s legislative history evidenced a congressional
intent to change prior practice.  Second, the canon refers to judicial practice under the
Bankruptcy Act.  The Court considered whether Congress intended to alter an existing
judicial doctrine that the courts had developed to interpret the former Bankruptcy Act, but
which was not codified as part of the Bankruptcy Act.  Third, the Court applied the canon
in a supporting role, not as the core of its rationale.  Fourth, Whiting Pools was the first
Bankruptcy Code case in which the Court applied such a canon. 71  Although the Court
applied a mild form of the canon, the fact that the Court employed this canon during the
1982 Term (the second Term in which the Court considered Bankruptcy Code cases)
reflects the canon’s established pedigree.
                                                                                                                                                
09 (citing legislative history); Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 521-22 (citing statutory text); id. at 522 n.6, 523, 526
(citing legislative intent); id. at 522 n.6 (citing legislative history).  Whiting Pools also analyzed the
structure of the Bankruptcy Code.  See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203–04 (viewing the particular provision
as one of a group of provisions designed to protect secured creditors).
66 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203-04; Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527.
67 See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525, 527.
68 Weintraub reasoned that, in a corporate bankruptcy case, the person entitled to waive the privilege would
be the person whose duties most closely resembled the duties of the person entitled to waive the privilege
outside of bankruptcy, unless permitting that person to waive would interfere with or obstruct the
Bankruptcy Code’s policies or design.  See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 351-54.  Applying this caveat, the Court
considered which result would be most consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s overarching policy of
maximizing value and lesser policy of uncovering fraud.  Id.
69 Cf. cases cited supra  note 46.
70 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 208.
71 None of the earlier Bankruptcy Code cases considered pre-Code practice.  See Central Trust Co. v.
Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982); United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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In summary, in these early unanimous decisions, the Court did not rely solely on
the statutory text to interpret the Bankruptcy Code.  Rather, in each case, the Court
professed a search for congressional intent, began with the text, checked legislative
history to confirm textual meaning, and verified that its holding was consistent with the
statute’s purposes or policies.  Whiting Pools furthered bolstered its conclusions by
considering whether Congress had evinced an intent to alter pre-Code practice.
3. Unanimous decisions in the 1986 through 1998 Terms
a. Overview
During the 1986 through 1998 Terms, the Court issued thirteen unanimous
Bankruptcy Code decisions.  In chronological order, these are: United Savings Ass’n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. (per Justice Scalia, 1988),72 Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers (per Justice White, 1988),73 Langenkamp v. Culp (per curiam,
1990),74 Grogan v. Garner (per Justice Stevens, 1991),75 Johnson v. Home State Bank
(per Justice Marshall, 1991),76 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve v. MCorp
Financial, Inc. (per Justice Stevens, 1991),77 Holywell Corp. v. Smith (per Justice
Thomas, 1992),78 Rake v. Wade (per Justice Thomas, 1993),79 Citizens Bank v. Strumpf
(per Justice Scalia, 1995),80 United States v. Noland (per Justice Souter, 1996),81 Fidelity
                                                
72 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
73 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).  This was an eight-to-zero opinion because
Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.  Id.
74 Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
75 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
76 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
77 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).  This was an eight-to-
zero opinion because Justice Thomas took no part in the decision.  Id.
78 Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
79 Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
80 Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
81 United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
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Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink (per Justice Souter, 1998),82 Kawaauhau v. Geiger (per
Justice Ginsburg, 1998),83 and Cohen v. de la Cruz (per Justice O’Connor, 1998).84
Notice that eight different Justices,85 including six of the nine currently sitting
Justices,86 authored the opinions in these cases.  Justices Blackmun and Marshall, neither
of whom remains on the Court today, authored the unanimous opinions in the pre-1986
bankruptcy cases.87  Of the nine sitting Justices, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Breyer and Kennedy have not authored a unanimous opinion in a Bankruptcy Code
case.88  Consequently, these cases should, at least in theory, provide a fair cross-section
of two-thirds of the Justices’ interpretive styles.
In each of these thirteen cases except Langenkamp v. Culp,89 the Court interpreted
a provision of the Bankruptcy Code.  Langenkamp was a per curiam opinion in which the
Court addressed the circumstances in which a preference defendant is entitled to a jury
trial.90  Because Langenkamp focussed on a constitutional question, it adds little to our
analysis of the Court’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.91
The twelve remaining unanimous cases employed divergent interpretive methods.
The Court decided four of these cases by a primarily textual analysis (Holywell, MCorp,
Rake, Strumpf).  Justices Scalia (Strumpf), Stevens (MCorp), and Thomas (Rake,
Holywell) wrote these opinions.92  The Court decided four cases by text, structure, and
history (Fink, Grogan, Johnson, Kawaauhau).  Justices Ginsburg (Kawaauhau), Marshall
(Johnson), Souter (Fink), and Stevens (Grogan) wrote these opinions.93  Finally, the
                                                
82 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
83 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
84 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
85 These are Justices Ginsburg (Kawaauhau), Marshall (Johnson), O’Connor (Cohen), Scalia (Timbers,
Strumpf), Souter (Noland, Fink ), Stevens (Grogan, MCorp), Thomas (Holywell, Rake), and White (Ahlers).
86 These are Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas.
87 See supra  notes 58, 60.
88 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
In that case, the Court was unanimous on one issue but split five-to-four on the second issue.  See supra
notes 62-64 and accompanying text; infra notes 595-605 and accompanying text.  He also wrote the
majority opinion in United States v. Security Industrial Bank , 459 U.S. 70 (1982), but three Justices
concurred because they disagreed with Justice Rehnquist’s use of interpretive canons.  See infra notes 274-
81 and accompanying text.
89 Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
90 Id. (holding that an entity that files a bankruptcy claim waives it right to a jury trial in a preference action
filed against it, but that an entity that does not file a claim is entitled to a jury trial).
91 But see infra  Part IV.A.1.a (considering the implications of the Court’s constitutional Bankruptcy Code
cases).
92 See infra  Part III.B.3.b.
93 See infra  Part III.B.3.c.
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Court decided four cases by reference to pre-Code practice (Ahlers, Cohen, Noland,
Timbers).  Justices O’Connor (Cohen), Scalia (Timbers), Souter (Noland), and White
(Ahlers) wrote these opinions.94
Parts (b) through (d) elaborate the Court’s interpretive approach in each of these
cases.  Part (4) considers whether the Court’s apparently conflicting interpretive
approaches can be reconciled.
b. Unanimous opinions that consider only text
In two of the four cases in which the Court applied a primarily textual analysis,
the Court interpreted the Bankruptcy Code (Rake, Strumpf ).95  In the other two, the Court
based its holding primarily on the interpretation of another federal statute (Holywell,
MCorp).96
In Rake v. Wade,97 the Court held that a debtor must pay an oversecured creditor
pre-confirmation and post-confirmation interest on a home mortgage arrearage that the
debtor proposes to cure under a chapter 13 plan. 98  The Court began by applying a text-
oriented canon to three Bankruptcy Code sections.99  The canon provides that “[w]here
the statutory language is clear, our ‘sole function . . . is to enforce it according to its
terms.’”100
Rake’s textualist author, Justice Thomas, might indeed believe that the Court
should never look beyond the text.101  Notice, however, that the canon he employed is not
a purely “textualist” dictate that forbids the Court ever to look beyond the language.
Rather, it is a classic statement of the “plain meaning” rule, which directs the Court to
                                                                                                                                                
94 See infra  Part III.B.3.d.
95 See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
97 Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
98 Id. at 475 (requiring interest payments regardless of whether state law or the underlying contracts would
have required interest on arrearages).  Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b)(5) allows a debtor to cure certain
defaults under its plan.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1994).
99 See Rake, 508 U.S. at 467-75 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code sections 506(b) (pre-confirmation interest),
1322(b) (cure of defaults), and 1325(a)(5) (post-confirmation interest)).
100 Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters ., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)) (citations omitted).
101 Justices Thomas and Scalia each wrote six textual Bankruptcy Code opinions and joined a higher
percentage of Bankruptcy Code textual opinions (60%) than any other J ustices.  See Appendix VI:
Distribution of Textual, Non-Textual, and Pre-Code Practice Opinions in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy
Code Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix VI”], post; Appendix VII: Supreme Court Justices’ Rates of Joining
Textual and Non-Textual Opinions in Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, “Appendix VII”], post.
25
apply the language if the language is plain and unambiguous.102  This canon, which is a
common feature of most interpretative models, implies that the Court may, and indeed
perhaps must, look beyond the language, typically in a search for intent or purpose, if the
language is ambiguous.103
Consequently, Rake’s textualist approach may mean simply that all of the Justices
believed that the language was, in fact, plain, and not that all of the Justices embraced
textualism.  Indeed, note that Rake quoted the plain language canon from the Court’s
five-to-four split decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,104 in which the
dissenters vehemently disagreed with the majority’s textual analysis.105  This observation
demonstrates that the Justices do not always agree on what constitutes ambiguity or on
when the Court should look beyond the language.
In Rake, Justice Thomas supported his plain meaning analysis with a classic
textual aid: the dictionary.  He consulted a standard dictionary to discern the “natural
reading” of the phrase “provide for.”106
The Court also applied a structural or “holistic” interpretation canon borrowed
from the Court’s unanimous opinion in United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates, Ltd.107 That canon urges interpreters to examine the entire statute
because “statutory terms are often ‘clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme –
because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes [their] meaning
clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that
is compatible with the rest of the law.’”108  Notice that this canon contains both a
linguistic component (the same terminology used elsewhere) and a substantive
component (the substantive effect).  In Timbers, the Court applied this canon to compare
the substantive effect of related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.109  In Rake, in
contrast, Justice Thomas applied this canon in a narrow, textual manner to reconcile the
                                                
102 See generally DICKERSON, supra  note 42, at 229; Radin, supra note 42, at 867; GREENAWALT , supra
note 25, at 43-57.
103 For example, even in the Court’s highly textual (and highly criticized) opinion in United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1989), the Court acknowledged that, in the rare case in which the
language produces a result that is demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters, the intentions of
the drafters control.
104 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 235; see infra  notes 629-57 and accompanying text.
105 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.).
106 Rake, 508 U.S. at 473 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1053 (10th ed. 1981)).
107 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); see Rake, 508 U.S.
at 474-75 (citing Timbers); see also infra  notes 209-28 and accompanying text (discussing Timbers).
108 Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371).
109 See Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371-76; see infra  notes 209-28 and accompanying text.
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meanings of several uses of the phrase “provide for” and similar phrases throughout the
Bankruptcy Code.110
The Court relied upon its conclusion that the language was plain to dismiss
summarily the petitioner’s legislative history argument.111  It did not consider
congressional intent, statutory purpose, legislative history, or pre-Code practice.112
The Court’s other leading textualist,113 Justice Scalia, wrote the strongly textual,
unanimous opinion in Citizens Bank v. Strumpf.114  In Strumpf, the Court held that the
automatic stay did not prohibit a bank from imposing an administrative hold on the
debtor’s account and refusing to turn the account over to the debtor.115
The Court concluded that this interpretation was the “most naturally read[ing]” of
the Bankruptcy Code and that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code’s language expressly
prohibited the administrative hold.116  The Court referred to state law where relevant,117
but did not refer to congressional intent, statutory purpose, legislative history, or pre-
Code practice.118  As in Rake, all of the Justices agreed that the language was, in fact,
plain.
In each of the other two unanimous, textual decisions, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,119 and Holywell Corp. v. Smith,120 the Court
based its holding primarily on the interpretation of another federal law that interacted
with the Bankruptcy Code.
                                                
110 See Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75.  The Court also applied a canon under which the Court seeks to give
effect to every word of the statute.  Id. at 471.
111 Id. at 472-74.
112  The Court did, however, refer to the Court’s prior interpretation of the relevant Bankruptcy Code
sections.  Id. at 464.
113 See Appendix VII, post.
114 Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
115 Id. at 20-21.
116 Id. at 18-21 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code sections 362 (automatic stay), 553 (setoff), and 542
(turnover)).
117 Id. at 18-19 (referring to state law to determine what constitutes a setoff, and when a right of setoff
exists).
118 If the Court had considered the substantive effect of the Bankruptcy Code sections that affect entities
holding property subject to a right of setoff, the Court might have noted that the debtor could not compel
the bank to turn over funds in the account unless the debtor provided the bank with adequate protection of
its interest in the funds.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(c)(2), 363(d), 363(e), 553(a) (1994).
119 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
120 Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
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In MCorp,121 the Court held that the automatic stay did not authorize the
bankruptcy court to enjoin the Federal Reserve from prosecuting an administrative
enforcement proceeding against the debtor, which was a bank holding company. 122  The
Court based its holding on the language of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act,123
the language of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, 124 and an explanation of an earlier
Supreme Court case upon which the circuit court had erroneously relied.125  Justice
Stevens, who is not known as a textualist and who generally consults legislative history
to confirm textual meaning,126 wrote MCorp.
In Holywell Corp. v. Smith,127 the debtors’ confirmed chapter 11 plan had
assigned property to a trust.  The Court required the trustee to file tax returns and pay
taxes that the debtors would have been required to file and pay if the property had not
been assigned to the trust.128  Although the Court based its decision primarily on the
Internal Revenue Code,129 it also considered the Bankruptcy Code section that elaborates
the effects of confirmation. 130  In its brief discussion of that provision, the Court relied
solely on the statute’s language.131  Justice Thomas, a textualist, wrote Holywell.
Because MCorp and Holywell focussed primarily on non-bankruptcy law, they
add little to our understanding of the Court’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
Notice, however, that in each of these cases, the Court undertook a non-bankruptcy-
centric analysis.  In other words, it first considered how other federal law applied, then
considered whether the Bankruptcy Code altered the application of that other federal law.
In each case, the Court held, essentially, that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code barred the
federal government from enforcing its rights under another federal law.  Although the
Court did not suggest that the Bankruptcy Code is subordinate to other federal law, these
                                                
121 MCorp , 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
122 Id. at 41.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994) (embodying the automatic stay).
123 Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1046, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. II
1997); see  MCorp , 502 U.S. at 36-39.
124 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994); see MCorp , 502 U.S. at 39-42 (considering the interaction among different
subsections of section 362).
125 See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); MCorp , 502 U.S. at 42-44.
126 See, e.g., Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
infra notes 327-28; Appendix VII, post (reflecting that Justice Stevens joined textual opinions in only 15%
of the cases in which he participated).
127 Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
128 Id. at 58.
129 I.R.C. § 6012 (b)(3) (1988).  The Court considered language, a dictionary definition, and federal
regulations when it interpreted the IRC.  See Holywell, 503 U.S. at 52-58.
130 See Holywell, 503 U.S. at 58-59; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994).
131 See Holywell, 503 U.S. at 58-59.
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cases are consistent with a pattern of cases in which the Court has deferred to “important
governmental interests” in the bankruptcy context.132
Despite these four text-based opinions, two-thirds of the Court’s unanimous
bankruptcy decisions issued during and after the 1986 Term looked beyond the statutory
language.  Subparts (c) and (d) examine these non-textual opinions.
c. Unanimous opinions that consider text, structure, and history
In four post-1986 unanimous decisions, the Court considered the Bankruptcy
Code’s text, structure, and history.  The Court decided Grogan v. Garner (per Justice
Stevens)133 and Johnson v. Home State Bank (per Justice Marshall)134 in 1991, after
Justice Scalia joined the Court but before Justice Thomas joined the Court.  The Court
decided Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink (per Justice Souter)135 and Kawaauhau v.
Geiger (per Justice Ginsburg)136 in 1998, during the Court’s most recent Term.
None of the authors of these opinions is generally regarded as a textualist.137
Despite Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s reputations as textualists, Justice Scalia joined all
four of these opinions and Justice Thomas joined the two opinions that were issued after
he joined the Court.  Presumably, even these textualist Justices agreed that the language
was sufficiently ambiguous to merit consideration of other, non-textual sources.
In Grogan v. Garner,138 the Court was required to determine what standard of
proof (“clear and convincing” or “preponderance”) applied to a creditor’s non-
dischargeability complaint.139
Justice Stevens examined the text and the legislative history, but determined that
neither expressly provided a standard of proof for dischargeability actions.140  Faced with
                                                
132 See, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-49 (1986); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1986); cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
243-49 (1989) (distinguishing the case at bar from cases in which important state or federal interests were
at stake); see also infra  Part IV.A.1.d.
133 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
134 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
135 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
136 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
137 See generally Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post note.  Justice Souter, however, joined textualist
opinions in 50% of the cases in which he participated, which is a higher percentage than any Justice other
than Justices Thomas and Scalia.  See Appendix VII, post.
138 Grogan, 498 U.S. 279.
139 Id. at 285; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994) (setting forth bases upon which particular claims are non-
dischargeable in individual debtors’ bankruptcy cases).
140 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.
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a gap, both the lower court and the Supreme Court reasoned from silence, bankruptcy
policy, and negative inferences.  The Supreme Court, however, relied more heavily on a
substantive, structural analysis of the Bankruptcy Code than had the lower court.
First, the circuit court had reasoned that prior law had required a higher standard,
at least in fraud cases, and that Congress’s silence suggested that Congress was not likely
to have intended to change existing law. 141  In contrast, the Supreme Court rejected pre-
Code practice because, when Congress added fraud as a basis for nondischargeability, the
courts were split over which common law evidentiary standard applied.142  The Court
then inferred143 from Congress’s silence that Congress probably had not “intended to
require a special, heightened standard of proof.”144
At first glance, this aspect of Grogan may seem to be inconsistent with the cases
in which the Court deferred to pre-Code judicial practice.145  Grogan, however, may
simply suggest that the Court will rely upon pre-Code judicial practices only if those
practices were well-established before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.  Absent a well-
established practice, the Court may have deemed it inappropriate to presume that
Congress knew of the practice and intended to incorporate the practice into the
Bankruptcy Code.146
Second, the Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Code’s structure supported the
Court’s inference.  Two holistic interpretation canons guided the Court’s structural
analysis.  First, “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to
the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute
as a whole.”147  Second, “[i]n determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to
the particular statutory language but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its
object and policy.”148  Three important observations flow from these canons.
                                                                                                                                                
141 See In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579, 582 (1989); see also Grogan, 498 U.S. at 282-83.
142 See Grogan, 489 U.S. at 288-90.
143 Id. at 287-88 (reasoning that (1) the absence of any suggestion that different standards apply to different
discharge exceptions “implies” that Congress intended the same standard for all of the exceptions, and (2)
because it is clear that preponderance is sufficient to establish some exceptions, “it is fair to infer  that
Congress intended the ordinary preponderance standard to govern the applicability of all the discharge
exceptions” (emphasis added)).
144 Id. at 286.
145 See supra note 46; infra Parts IV.A.1.c.4, IV.A.1.d.
146 Cf., e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 231-
34).  See also  supra  note 145.
The Grogan Court also may have found that its structural analysis obviated the need to consult
pre-Code practice.  See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
147 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 n.13 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)).
148 Id. (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)).
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First, these canons view “policy” as an essential embodiment of the statute’s
object and design, which is discerned through a substantive, holistic analysis of the
statute.  Policy is not an external source that stands in contraposition to the text.149  This
approach is consistent with a purposive, legal process analysis.
Second, although the Grogan Court was required to fill a statutory gap, these
canons do not expressly require the Court to find a gap or even an ambiguity before the
Court undertakes a holistic analysis of the statute’s design, object, and policy.
Third, the holistic analysis these canons recommend is broader and less linguistic
that the holistic analysis suggested by the canon the Court applied in Rake v. Wade.150
The Court first applied these canons to analyze the Bankruptcy Code’s structure.
The Court reasoned that, because the exceptions to discharge are all in the same
Bankruptcy Code section and nothing in that section indicates that any one exception is
subject to a special standard, each exception must carry the same standard.151
The Court then applied these canons to analyze the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes.
The circuit court had reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of giving debtors a
“fresh start” justified a higher evidentiary standard in dischargeability matters.152  The
Supreme Court countered that an unencumbered fresh start is available only to the
“honest but unfortunate debtor.”153  By implication, the fresh start is not available to a
dishonest debtor who has committed fraud.  The Court discerned in the Bankruptcy
Code’s general history, rather than in specific legislative history, a “policy” of preventing
discharge of all fraud judgments.  The Court reasoned that it should follow this policy
absent a clear congressional expression of a change in policy. 154 It concluded that a lower
burden of proof would be consistent with this policy. 155  Notice how this reasoning
parallels the canon of deference to pre-Code laws or practices.
As in Grogan, the Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger156 relied upon the Bankruptcy
Code’s text, structure, and history to resolve a dischargeability question.  While the
Grogan Court considered a gap in the statute, however, the Kawaauhau Court considered
the meaning of an undefined term (“willful”).
                                                
149 See supra  Parts II.B, II.C; infra Part IV.A.1.c.3.
150 Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993); supra  notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
151 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287-88; see also supra  note 143.
152 See In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579, 582 (1989) (reasoning that the Bankruptcy Code’s “fresh start” policy
warranted a standard that favored the debtor); see also Grogan , 498 U.S. at 282-83.
153 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
154 Id. at 290.
155 Id.
156 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
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In Kawaauhau, the Court held that a personal injury, medical malpractice claim
arising from the debtor’s reckless or negligent conduct was not a claim arising from
“willful and malicious injury by the debtor.”157
The Court referred to both a dictionary158 and legislative history159 to determine
the meaning of the term “willful.”  The Court compared these definitions to the statutory
language, and concluded that Congress might have worded the statute differently if it had
meant to include reckless or negligent injuries.160  The Court added that interpreting the
willful and malicious injury exception broadly to include negligent injuries would render
other discharge exceptions superfluous.161  The Court reasoned that a broad interpretation
“would be incompatible with the ‘well-known’ guide that exceptions to discharge ‘should
be confined to those plainly expressed.’”162  Here, the Court employed as an “interpretive
guide” the well-recognized “policy” that discharge exceptions should be narrowly
construed in favor of the debtor.163  This policy, which derives from and implements the
fresh start policy, is not expressly stated in the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, the Kawaauhau Court declined to adopt a substantive policy that was not
expressed in the Bankruptcy Code.  The creditor argued that the Court should not allow a
reckless or uninsured debtor to discharge a malpractice judgment,164 but the Court
deferred this policy question to Congress.165
Similarly, in Johnson v. Home State Bank,166 the Court relied upon the
Bankruptcy Code’s text, history, and structure, and rejected an invitation to create
bankruptcy policy.  Johnson had filed a chapter 7 case, in which he had discharged his
personal liability on his farm mortgage debt.  He then filed a chapter 13 case, in which he
sought to pay the in rem mortgage under a five-year plan.  The creditor argued that,
                                                
157 Id. at 59; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994) (setting forth the willful and malicious injury discharge
exception).
158 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61 n.3 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (5th ed. 1979)).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.  The Court also confined the holding of an earlier Supreme Court case that seemed to support the
creditor’s argument.  Id. at 61-64.
162 Id. at 62. (citation omitted).
163 See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY  ¶ 523.05c, 523-20 (15th ed. rev. 1996); 1 GINSBURG &
MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY, PART XI, § 11.06[6], 11-57 (1996 & 1998 Supp.).
In Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), in contrast, the Court did not consider whether this
policy might have warranted a higher evidentiary standard in nondischargeability actions.  See supra  notes
152-55 and accompanying text; see also infra  note 138 and accompanying text (offering a suggestion why
the Court applied this policy in Kawaauhau  but not in Grogan).
164 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 64.
165 Id.
166 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
32
because the debtor’s personal liability had been discharged, the mortgage was not a
“claim” subject to treatment under chapter 13.167  The Court disagreed.
The Court viewed the question as “a straightforward issue of statutory
construction to be resolved by reference to ‘the text, history, and purpose’ of the
Bankruptcy Code.”168  The Court relied upon (i) the broad definition of “claim” in the
text of the Bankruptcy Code,169 (ii) the broad definition of “claim” in the text, legislative
history, and construction of the former Bankruptcy Act, (iii) Bankruptcy Code legislative
history that suggested that Congress had intended to expand the Bankruptcy Act’s already
broad definition of “claim,” and (iv) other legislative history that confirmed the broad
meaning of “claim.”170
Although the Court did not cite a pre-Code canon, note the similarity between the
Court’s broad use of history and the use of a pre-Code canon.  In Johnson, the Court
consulted the Bankruptcy Act and judicial precedent interpreting the Bankruptcy Act to
shed light upon the Bankruptcy Code.  Under a pre-Code canon, the Court consults
judicial practice under the Bankruptcy Act.  In each case, the Court is seeking to
determine whether Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, intended to depart from
prior practice.  Part of this analysis requires the Court to determine whether Congress was
aware of the existing practice.  In referring to history, the Court assumes that Congress
was aware of prior statutory provisions.  In referring to pre-Code practice, the Court
assumes that Congress also was aware of established judicial interpretations of these
provisions and of established judicial doctrines that developed in the absence of express
statutory provisions.
Finally, although Johnson seemed to present a narrow question concerning the
meaning of the term “claim,” it also presented a broader question concerning the
propriety of a so-called chapter 20 case.171  The creditor argued that the debtor was using
an improper serial filing to evade the limits of chapter 7 and chapter 13.172  The Court
applied a structural analysis to reject this appeal to the presumed purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code.  It reasoned that Congress had specifically prohibited other types of
serial filings, but had not categorically prohibited the filing of a chapter 7 case followed
by a chapter 13 case.173
                                                
167 Id. at 83-88.
168 Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
169 Id. at 83-85; see  11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994) (defining “claim”).
170 Johnson, 501 U.S. at 85-87.
171 Bankruptcy practitioners have coined the term “chapter 20 case” to refer to a serial filing in which the
debtor first files a chapter 7 case to discharge the majority of his debts, and then files a chapter 13 case to
restructure payments on nondischargeable debts or to discharge additional debts that were not
dischargeable in chapter 7.
172 See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 79.
173 Id. at 87-88.  The Court left open the possibility that such a plan might violate chapter 13’s good faith or
feasibility requirements.  Id. at 88.
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Finally, in Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink174 the debtor filed a preference
action to avoid a late-perfected security interest.  The Court held that, in order to escape
avoidance, a security interest must be perfected within the Bankruptcy Code’s twenty-day
grace period, not the longer state law grace period.175
The Court based its holding upon congressional intent,176 which it discerned in the
“text, structure, and history of the preference provisions.”177  First, the text expressly
provided a specific grace period.178  Second, the structure of the Bankruptcy Code
suggested, by negative implication, that Congress did not intend to allow state law
relation-back provisions to govern this preference defense.179  Third, the creditor’s
reliance upon “an isolated piece of legislative history” was misplaced because the
creditor had misinterpreted the legislative history and the legislative history was
inconsistent with the text and the broader history. 180  Fourth, the Court relied upon
“broader statutory history,” including the preference rules and defenses under the former
Bankruptcy Act, the subsequent development of those rules and defenses, and the
circumstances surrounding the 1994 Bankruptcy Code amendments.181  Again, the
Court’s consideration of broad statutory history, including prior practice under the
Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Code predecessor provisions, is similar to reliance upon
a pre-Code practice canon.
In all four of these cases, the Court consulted the text, structure, and history of the
statute.  None of these cases, however, contained an extensive analysis of legislative
history. 182  Instead, the Court consulted the Bankruptcy Code’s broad “history,” including
prior Bankruptcy Act provisions, case precedent interpreting the Bankruptcy Act
provisions, changes the Bankruptcy Code had made to the Bankruptcy Act rules, and
changes that amendments to the Bankruptcy Code made to earlier versions of the
                                                
174 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
175 Id. at 221; see 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1994) (prohibiting the trustee from avoiding a purchase money
security interest that was perfected within 20 days after the debtor received possession of the collateral).
The state law applicable in Fink  contained a “relation back” provision that deemed a purchase money
security interest to have been perfected on the date of its creation if the creditor acted to perfect its interest
before or within 30 days after the interest was created.  The creditor had acted to perfect its interest more
than 20 days after the debtor acquired possession of the goods but less than 30 days after the interest had
been created.  See Fink , 522 U.S. at 212.
176 See Fink , 522 U.S. at 215-21 (referring to what Congress intended or understood).
177 Id. at 221.
178 Id. at 214.
179 Id. at 216.
180 Id. at 218-21.
181 Id. at 217-21.  The 1994 amendments extended the grace period from 10 days to 20 days.  See the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 (enacted on Oct. 22, 1994).
182 In Kawaauhau  v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 n.3 (1998), the Court consulted the legislative history to
define the term “willful.”  See supra  note 159 and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy Code.  Although none of these cases applied a pre-Code canon, three of the
cases (Grogan, Johnson, and Fink) applied analogous reasoning when they considered
whether Congress had intended to change prior practices.183
d. Unanimous opinions that consider pre-Code practice
In the four remaining unanimous decisions, the Court expressly relied upon pre-
Code practice.  The Court decided two of these cases based upon text, structure, history,
and pre-Code practice (Cohen v. de la Cruz,184 United Savings Association v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.185), and two based primarily upon an analysis of pre-Code
practice (Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,186 United States v. Noland187).
As in Kawaauhau v. Geiger188 and Grogan v. Garner,189 the Court in Cohen v. de
la Cruz190 interpreted the Bankruptcy Code’s non-dischargeability provisions.  The Court
held that the fraud exception prevented discharge of all damages assessed on account of
the debtor’s fraud, including treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.191
The Court relied upon the “text of § 523(a)(2)(A), the meaning of parallel
provisions in the statute, the historical pedigree of the fraud exception, and the general
policy underlying the exceptions to discharge”192 to discern congressional intent.193  Pre-
Code practice came into consideration as part of the fraud exception’s history.
Justice O’Connor established the context by identifying the overarching purposes
and policies of the Bankruptcy Code.  The non-dischargeability provisions, she noted,
                                                
183 In Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), the Court concluded that the pre-Code practice was not well-
established, see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; in Johnson v. Home State Bank , 501 U.S. 78
(1991), the Court noted that Congress had expanded the Bankruptcy Act’s already broad definition of
“claim,” see  supra  note 170 and accompanying text; in Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink , 522 U.S. 211
(1998), the Court compared the current preference provisions to the provisions under the former
Bankruptcy Act, see supra  notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
184 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
185 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
186 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
187 United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
188 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); see supra  notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
189 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); see supra  notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
190 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
191 Id. at 223.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 221-22.
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were a component of the “basic policy animating the Code of affording relief only to an
‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”194
Turning to the text, the Court reasoned that the “most straightforward reading”195
of the statutory language required that all damages be included.196  The Court referred to
a standard dictionary and a law dictionary (textual aids) to confirm its definitions.197
The Court supported this textual interpretation with a holistic, textual analysis that
compared the use of the phrase “debt . . . for” in the fraud exception to the use of that
same phrase in the other dischargeability exceptions.198  The Court reasoned that, because
the phrase served the same function in each subsection, the “presumption that equivalent
words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the same statute . . . has particular
resonance here.”199
Up to this point, the Court’s consideration of text and structure had a strongly
textual emphasis.  As in Johnson v. Home State Bank and Grogan v. Garner, however,
the Court reinforced its textual analysis with an analysis of the statute’s broad history. 200
Unlike Johnson and Grogan, however, the Court in Cohen expressly applied a pre-Code
canon.  Under this canon, the Court “will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past
bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.”201
The Court considered, as part of the fraud exception’s broad history, the pre-Code
judicial construction of the fraud exception and the similarity between the Bankruptcy
Code exception and the Bankruptcy Act exception. 202  As in Fidelity Financial Services,
                                                
194 Id. at 217.  Cf. supra  text accompanying notes 152-55 (discussing Grogan’s reference to
dischargeability policy); text accompanying notes 162-63 (discussing Kawaauhau’s reference to
dischargeability policy).
195 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218.
196 Id.  The Bankruptcy Code excludes from discharge any “debt -- for money, property, services, or an
extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud.”  11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A) (1994).  Such debts will be discharged, however, unless the creditor files a timely complaint
to determine dischargeability.  Id. at § 523(c)(1).
197 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 220.
198 Id. at 217-20.
199 Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
200 Id. at 219-21; cf. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1991); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 286-90 (1991); see supra  notes 141-46, 154-55, 170 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of
Johnson and Grogan).
201 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221 (quoting Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563
(1990) (internal quotations omitted)).
Although a 1984 amendment had modified the fraud exception, this amendment did not deter the
Court from relying upon pre-Code practice because the legislative history noted that the amendment had
effected only a stylistic change.  Id.
202 Id.
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Inc. v. Fink, the Court rejected the debtor’s appeal to statements in the narrow legislative
history of the section. 203
Finally, the Court returned to the policy considerations with which it had begun
its discussion.  The Court concluded that the debtor’s construction of the fraud exception
was contrary to the congressional policy of compensating a creditor fully for its loss or
injury, and of protecting the victim rather than giving the debtor a fresh start.204  Recall
the Court’s similar, creditor-oriented reasoning in Grogan v. Garner.205  In contrast, the
Kawaauhau v. Geiger Court applied a debtor-oriented “policy” of construing discharge
exceptions narrowly in favor of the debtor.206  Neither Grogan nor Cohen v. de la Cruz207
mentioned this policy, perhaps because both Grogan and Cohen involved the debtor’s
fraud.  Both cases noted that the discharge was designed for the “honest but unfortunate”
debtor, not for the dishonest (fraudulent) debtor.208  Kawaauhau, in contrast, involved no
question of fraud or dishonesty.
The Court applied a similar text, structure, history, and pre-Code canon analysis
in United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.209 The Court
held that an under-secured creditor was not entitled to “lost opportunity costs” as
adequate protection for the delay in foreclosure caused by the automatic stay. 210  The case
turned on whether such costs were included in the creditor’s “interest in property,” as that
phrase was used in the Bankruptcy Code.211
Justice Scalia began by examining the text.  He noted that the phrase in question,
“viewed in the isolated context of § 362(d)(1)” might include the right to foreclose.212
Nevertheless, in an often-quoted passage, he noted that:
[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.  A provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme – because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a
                                                
203 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211, 218-21 (1998); supra  note 180; Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-
22.
204 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-23.
205 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287; supra  note 153 and accompanying text.
206 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998); supra  note 162 and accompanying text.
207 Cohen, 523 U.S. 213.
208 See supra  notes 153, 194.
209 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
210 Id.  See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994) (elaborating examples of adequate protection); id. § 362(d)(1) (relief
from the automatic stay).
211 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (entitling a creditor to relief from the stay if the creditor’s interest in property is
not adequately protected); see Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370-71.
212 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371.
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context that makes its meaning clear, . . . or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with
the rest of the law. . . .213
As previously noted, this holistic/structural interpretive canon contains both a
linguistic component (the same terminology used elsewhere) and a substantive
component (the substantive effect of the language).214  In contrast to the Court’s
linguistic, holistic interpretation in Rake v. Wade,215 and despite Justice Scalia’s textualist
reputation, the Timbers Court engaged in an admirable exercise of substantive, holistic
interpretation.  First, the Court recognized that:
[s]ection 362(d)(1) is only one of a series of provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code dealing with the rights of secured creditors.  The language in those
other provisions, and the substantive dispositions that they effect, persuade
us that the “interest in property” protected by § 362(d)(1) does not include
a secured party’s right to immediate foreclosure.216
The Court based this conclusion on its analysis of the substantive effect of
several other Bankruptcy Code provisions that govern secured creditors’ rights,
principally including section 506.217  For example, the Court dismissed one
possible interpretation of section 506 as unsupported by legislative intent 218 and
inconsistent with legislative history. 219  The Court then stated that:
[e]ven more important for our purposes than § 506’s use of terminology is
its substantive effect of denying undersecured creditors postpetition
interest on their claims – just as it denies oversecured creditors
                                                
213 Id. (citations omitted).
214 See supra  notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993)).
Compare the more substantive textual holistic canons the Court employed in Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 288 n.13 (1991).  See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
215 Rake, 508 U.S. 464.  See supra  notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
216 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added).
217 Id. at 371-76 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code sections 506 (determination of secured claims and
allowance of certain interest on oversecured claims), 552 (post-petition effect of pre-petition security
interest), and 362 (automatic stay and grounds for relief from the stay)).  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 506, 553
(1994).
218 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372 (“No one suggests this was intended.”).
219 Id.  Justice Scalia consulted the legislative history of section 506 to confirm his interpretation despite his
reputation for spurning references to legislative history and despite his criticism of legislative history later
in this same opinion.  See infra note 225.
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postpetition interest to the extent that such interest, when added to the
principal amount of the claim, will exceed the value of the collateral. 220
The Court then moved beyond the text and structure and applied a pre-Code
interpretive canon.  The Court noted that section 506(b)’s denial of post-petition interest
to undersecured creditors merely codified pre-Code law. 221  The Court reasoned that “a
major change in the existing rules would not likely have been made without specific
provision in the text of the statute, . . . [and] it is most improbable that it would have been
made without even any mention in the legislative history.”222  The creditor’s alternate
interpretation, therefore, was “implausible even in the abstract, but even more so in light
of the historical principles of bankruptcy law.”223
In this iteration of the pre-Code canon, Justice Scalia implied that Congress
should signal its intent to alter existing practice in the text of the Bankruptcy Code, but
that Congress might evidence its intent in the legislative history. 224  According to Justice
Scalia, however, generalizations in legislative history, “are inadequate to overcome the
plain textual indication . . . . ”225  Because the text seemed to be clear, and was consistent
with the pre-Code rule, the Court followed the pre-Code rule.
Timbers, which was the first bankruptcy opinion that Justice Scalia wrote, does
not comport with the commonly held view of Justice Scalia as a formalistic wordsmith.
Despite the Justices’ lack of bankruptcy expertise and despite their apparent discomfort
                                                
220 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added).  The Court interpreted section 506 to mean that the
undersecured creditor was not entitled to post-petition interest at the end of the case or during the pendency
of the case.  Id. at 373.
The Court applied a similar substantive inquiry when it concluded that the creditor’s reading was
“structurally inconsistent with” Bankruptcy Code section 552, which governs the post-petition effect of a
pre-petition security interest.  Id. at 374.  Section 552 states the general rule that a pre-petition security
interest does not reach property the debtor acquires post-petition, unless that property is the proceeds of the
creditor’s pre-petition collateral.  See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
The Court also applied a structural analysis when it concluded that allowing interest would “make
nonsense of 362(d)(2).”  See Timbers , 484 U.S. at 374.
The Court applied structural and pragmatic reasoning when it commented that it would be
“incomprehensible why Congress would want to favor undersecured creditors with interest if they move for
it under 362(d)(1) at the inception of the reorganization process – thereby probably pushing the estate into
liquidation – but not if they forebear and seek it only at the completion of the reorganization.” Id. at 374.
Similarly, “petitioner offers no reason why Congress would want to provide relief for such an obstreperous
and thoroughly unharmed creditor.” Id. at 375.
221 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 373; see also id. at 379 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code generally continues pre-
Code law); id. at 380-81 (comparing the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions to similar provisions
of the former Bankruptcy Act); cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989)
(reasoning that the Bankruptcy Code significantly changed bankruptcy law).
222 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380.
223 Id. at 373.
224 Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992) (reviewing legislative history for evidence of a
congressional intent to change pre-Code practice) (quoted infra at text accompanying note 488).
225 Id. at 380 (dismissing legislative history “[i]f it is at all relevant”).
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with the Bankruptcy Code, the Timbers opinion embodies a thoughtful understanding of
the substantive effect of related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Timbers Court
clearly benefited from a superb Fifth Circuit opinion and briefs written by some of the
country’s leading bankruptcy scholars and practitioners.226  In contrast, in more recent
cases, Justice Scalia has castigated the Court for relying on pre-Code practice.227  It is not
clear whether Justice Scalia saw some distinction between Timbers and these later cases,
whether he has changed his method over time, or whether he simply has applied
inconsistent interpretive methods.228
In the two remaining unanimous opinions, the Court relied even more heavily on
pre-Code practice than it had in Cohen and Timbers.  Both of these cases involved
judicial doctrines that had been developed under the Bankruptcy Act.
In United States v. Noland,229 the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code did not
allow the courts categorically to subordinate tax penalty priority claims.  Justice Souter
began not by analyzing the statutory text but by considering the pre-Code judicial
development of the doctrine of equitable subordination. 230  He applied a pre-Code canon
under which “[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent
specific.  The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of
bankruptcy codifications.”231  In the absence of any indication that Congress intended to
change pre-Code practice, the Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Code’s undefined
reference to “principles of equitable subordination”232 must have been designed to
embody the pre-Code doctrine.233
Legislative history stating that Congress intended to embrace the existing doctrine
and leave its continued development to case law bolstered the Court’s deference to pre-
Code practice.234  A conflicting legislative statement was not authoritative, however,
because it was not an accurate statement of pre-Code law. 235
                                                
226 See infra  note 822.
227 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, __ U.S. __, 119
S. Ct. 1411,1426 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-434
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted infra at text accompanying note 504).
228 See generally infra  Part IV.A.1.c.2.
229 United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
230 Id. at 538-39.
231 Id. at 539 (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envt’l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986)).  The Court consulted pre-Code practice in a search for congressional intent.  Id. at 539, 540.
232 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1994).
233 See Noland , 517 U.S. at 539.
234 Id.  The Court reasoned that Congress’s grant of a general power of equitable subordination allows the
courts to apply equitable principles to subordinate particular claims, but that Congress’s specific policy
decision to grant priority status to certain tax penalties precludes the courts from subordinating those claims
based solely on the fact that they are in the category of priority tax penalty claims.  Id. at 540–41.  “More
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In the final unanimous case, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,236 the Court
considered whether the pre-Code, judicially developed “new value” exception to the
judicially developed “absolute priority” doctrine retained its viability after the
Bankruptcy Code codified a modified absolute priority rule that did not contain an
express new value exception. 237
After stating the Bankruptcy Code rule,238 the Ahlers Court reviewed the history
of the judicially developed absolute priority rule under the former Bankruptcy Act.239
                                                                                                                                                
fundamentally, statements in legislative history cannot be read to convert statutory leeway for judicial
development of a rule on particularized exceptions into delegated authority to revise statutory
categorization, untethered to any obligation to preserve the coherence of substantive congressional
judgments.”  Id. at 542.  See also id. at 543 (noting that Congress could have made but chose not to make
that categorical determination).
235 Id. at 542; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (declining to rely on a pre-Code practice that
was not well-established under pre-Code law); see supra  notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
236 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
237 The most often-cited articulation of the elements of the new value exception is contained in dicta in the
well-known Bankruptcy Act case, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).  The
exception requires that the old equity contribute “new capital in money or money’s worth, reasonably
equivalent to the property’s value, and necessary for successful reorganization.”  Los Angeles Lumber, 308
U.S. at 118; accord Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 201; Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle
St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1416 (1999).
In recent years, bankruptcy scholars and commentators have argued that “new value” should be
viewed as a “corollary” rather than an “exception” to the absolute priority rule.  This view is based largely
on the argument that a debtor who contributes money or money’s worth that is at least equivalent in value
to the property or interest that the debtor receives, receives property “on account of” his new contribution,
not “on account of” his old equity interest.  One difficulty with this analysis is that old equity holders are
often given the exclusive right to make such a contribution.  A divided Court recently held that such an
exclusive right, in and of itself, constituted value to the equity holders. See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. 1411
(discussed infra at notes 520-53 and accompanying text).
For a discussion of the absolute priority rule and its new value exception/corollary, see generally
Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualization of the Absolute Priority Rule and Its New Value
Exception , 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1445 (1993); John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87
MICH. L. REV. 963 (1989); G. Eric Brunstead, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the
Broader Implications of the Supreme Court’s Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership, 54 BUS. LAW. 1475 (1999); 7 COLLIER, supra note 163, ¶ 1129.04[4][a], 1129-82 to 1129-
126.3; ¶ 1129.LH[4][a] 1129-187 to 1129-201 (15th ed. rev. 1996); Richard E. Coulson, “New Value” and
the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11 Cramdowns, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 220 (1994); Kenneth
N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990); Bruce Markell, Owners, Auctions and Absolute
Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009
(1987); Linda J. Rusch, The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11
Reorganizations: What Should the Rule Be?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1311 (1992);  Ronald Trost et al., Survey of
the New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule and the Preliminary Problem of Classification ,
SD24 ALI-ABA 401 (1998); Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9
(1992); James J. White, Absolute Priority and New Value, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1991).
238 See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 201 n.1; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994) (stating the conditions under which a
plan is “fair and equitable” to a dissenting class).
239 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 202.
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That rule essentially required that creditors be paid in full before equity holders would be
entitled to receive any distribution. 240  The Court then discussed Bankruptcy Act case law
precedent that allowed equity holders to retain interests in a reorganized debtor in
exchange for “new value.”241
The Court expressly declined to determine whether the new value exception (or
corollary) had survived the codification of a modified absolute priority rule in the
Bankruptcy Code.242  It held, however, that even if the new value exception had survived,
the debtors’ promise to contribute future “labor, experience, and expertise”243 to the
reorganization effort would be inadequate because the Court had found a virtually
identical contribution to be inadequate in a case interpreting the Bankruptcy Act rule.244
In essence, the Ahlers Court engaged in a common-law-type analysis in which it
compared the facts of the case at bar to the facts of the leading pre-Code case.245  To
justify using pre-Code case law to interpret the Bankruptcy Code, the Court reviewed the
Bankruptcy Code’s history and confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code had not liberalized
the pre-Code doctrine.246
The Court rejected the debtor’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s equitable
powers permitted the Court to effectuate a result that was in the best interests of all
                                                                                                                                                
240 See generally sources cited supra  note 237.
241 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203.
242 Id. at 203 n.3.
The Bankruptcy Code rule is a modified absolute priority rule because it does not absolutely
prohibit equity from retaining an interest.  The rule prohibits pre-petition equity holders from receiving or
retaining property under a chapter 11 plan “on account of” their prior interests if (i) a senior class of claims
rejects the plan, and (ii) the members of that senior class receive less than full payment on their claims.  See
11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(1), 1129(2)(B)(i), (ii), 1129(a)(8) (1994).  Equity can retain an interest even if a
senior class is not paid in full if the senior class accepts the plan and the plan satisfies the other
requirements for confirmation.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a), (a)(8) (1994).  The rule does not mention the
rights of equity holders who contribute new value contributions.
243 Bankruptcy practitioners refer to this type of contribution as “sweat equity.”
244 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206-07; see Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
245 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 204-05.
246 Id. at 205-06 (noting that, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it rejected a proposed
“liberalization” of the absolute priority rule that would have allowed equity holders to retain an interest in
exchange for a contribution similar to the contribution found to be inadequate in Los Angeles Lumber); see
also id. at 206 (noting that the legislative history stated that section 1129 codified the absolute priority
rule).
The Court also turned to legislative history to determine whether the equity holder’s retention of
ownership would deprive creditors of “property.” Id. at 207-08.  Although the Bankruptcy Code does not
define the term “property,” the legislative history suggests that “property” has a broad meaning.  Id. at 208-
09 (also reasoning that the company’s equity must have some value, otherwise the old equity holders would
not be litigating to retain ownership).
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creditors and the debtors.247  The Court also declined to implement a result that would
foster Congress’s broad policy of assisting family farmers in financial distress.248
4. Summary of unanimous decisions
The Court’s unanimous Bankruptcy Code opinions seem to apply three distinct
interpretive methods: text only; text, structure, and history; and pre-Code practice, with
or without reference to text, structure, and history.
It is not surprising that the Court’s most prominent textualists, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, wrote three of the Court’s four unanimous textual opinions.249  Nevertheless,
non-textualist Justices joined these opinions, apparently because they agreed that the
language was so plain that there was no need to consult sources other than the text.
The Court’s unanimous opinions do not, however, provide any definitive
guidance concerning when the Court will consider the statutory language to be plain.  For
example, in cases where the Bankruptcy Code clearly contains a gap, undefined term, or
ambiguity, such as Weintraub, Grogan, Kawaauhau, and Noland, the Court’s reliance on
sources other than the language is understandable.  It is not immediately clear, however,
why the Court considered structure, history and/or pre-Code practice to confirm an
apparently clear meaning in Johnson, Fink, and Whiting Pools, but declined to consult
these sources to confirm an apparently clear textual meaning in Rake and Strumpf.
Similarly, no obvious reason explains why the Court consulted only text,
structure, and history in some cases, but added pre-Code practice in other cases.  The
Court’s review of the Bankruptcy Code’s “broad history,” including provisions of the
former Bankruptcy Act and judicial interpretations of the Bankruptcy Act, is similar to
the Court’s review of “pre-Code” law and judicial practices.  Although some of the cases
in which the Court applied the pre-Code canon involved judicially developed doctrines
rather than prior statutory provisions (Timbers, Noland), this postulate is not true of all of
the Court’s pre-Code canon cases (Cohen, Ahlers).  It is unclear, therefore, whether broad
history and pre-Code practice are distinct concepts or merely gradations of the same
continuum.
Several possible explanations exist for the Court’s use of different interpretive
methods:
                                                
247 Id. at 206 (“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
248 Id. at 209-11.  Making it easier for family farmers to retain their farms in chapter 11 cases, the Court
reasoned, would be contrary to Congress’s expectations in enacting chapter 12.  See Family Farmers
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3105-3114 (creating chapter 12); Ahlers, 485
U.S. at 210.  The legislative history of chapter 12 noted that chapter 12 was designed to make it easier for
family farmers to retain their farms, because it was difficult for family farmers to retain their farms in
chapter 11 cases.  See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 210-11.  The Court declined, therefore, to misconstrue chapter 11
in order to help family farmers.  Id. at 209.  Note that this reasoning considers the views of a current
Congress – which is an interpretive strategy of dynamic interpreters.  Originalist interpreters consider only
what the original enacting legislature intended, not what the current legislature might desire.
249 See infra  Parts IV.A.1.c.2, IV.A.2; Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
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1) Perhaps the Court does not care about interpretive method, but uses
whatever method allows it to achieve a desirable substantive result.250
2) Perhaps the author of each opinion chooses his or her preferred
interpretive method, and other Justices join the opinion if they agree with
the substantive results, without regard to the interpretive method.
3) Perhaps the Court, as a body, applies some not immediately apparent
criteria, rules, or guidelines to determine when to consider only the
statutory text, when to consult the text, structure, and history, and when to
consult pre-Code practice.
4) Perhaps different Justices employ different criteria to determine when
to apply these apparently diverse interpretive methods.
If either of the first two explanations are accurate, then critics are correct to
lament a lack of clear direction concerning how the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy
Code.  In the first case, interpreters cannot predict results unless they understand the
criteria the Court applies to determine what is a desirable substantive result (and, perhaps,
understand the Justices’ personal agendas).  In the second case, interpreters cannot
predict results unless each Justice applies a consistent interpretive approach, interpreters
know in advance which Justice will author each opinion, and interpreters know what
interpretive approach that each Justice generally employs.  Moreover, in either case,
interpreters will be unable to predict how lower courts will interpret the Bankruptcy Code
because the Supreme Court’s random choice of interpretive method leaves the lower
courts with inadequate guidance.
If either of the first two explanations are correct, however, we would not expect to
find Justices writing separate concurring opinions based upon methodological disputes.
Consequently, if we do find methodological disputes raised in separate concurring
opinions, we must conclude that at least some of the Justices care about the interpretative
method the Court has employed in those cases as much as or more than they care about
the results in those cases.
If the fourth explanation is correct, then we should expect to see the Justices
writing separate opinions to voice their methodological disputes.  If the third explanation
is correct, we might hope that the Court would elaborate on its methods in cases we have
not yet examined.
Legal scholars (or at least those versed in hermeneutics) understand that
interpretation is a fluid process in which meaning is not fully developed until a statute is
applied, in context, by an interpreter.  We also suspect that there may never be one
definitive set of interpretive rules.  We nevertheless refuse to believe that results are
random and completely unpredictable.  We cling to the belief that courts, or at least
individual Justices, apply coherent criteria when they interpret statutes.
                                                
250 Cynics might suggest that the Justices, or the Court, might employ whatever method enables them to
achieve a result that is consistent with their own personal biases or political aims.
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Assume for a moment, therefore, that either the third or fourth explanation is
accurate; that is, there are some criteria that distinguish the Court’s three apparently
divergent interpretive methods, even though the Justices may not be in accord concerning
those criteria.  Can we define a set of guidelines that would explain the divergent
methods in the Court’s unanimous opinions?  Suppose we make the following somewhat
imprecise observations concerning the Court’s unanimous opinions:
Tentative general observation: The Bankruptcy Code’s text, structure, and
history assist the Court in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.251
Corollary 1 concerning the text: The court need not, or perhaps should not,
or perhaps may not, consider the statute’s structure and history if the text
is “clear,” or perhaps “plain,” or perhaps “unambiguous,” or perhaps not
the product of an obvious “scrivener’s error.”  This corollary reveals three
criteria that are unclear from an examination of only the Court’s
unanimous cases.  First, is the rule permissive (need not or should not look
beyond the text) or prohibitive (may not look beyond the text)?  Second,
what level of textual indeterminacy is required to trigger an examination
of the sources other than the text?  Third, what does it mean for text to be
plain, clear, or unambiguous?
Corollary 2 concerning statutory structure: When the Court considers the
structure of the Bankruptcy Code, it may, or perhaps should, or perhaps
must, undertake a linguistic holistic analysis and a substantive holistic
analysis.  In a linguistic holistic analysis, the Court considers the meaning
of the same term or phrase used throughout the Bankruptcy Code.  In a
substantive holistic analysis, the Court considers the substantive effect or
function of the applicable provision and related provisions.  In a
substantive holistic analysis, the Court might also consider the broad
statutory design, object, purpose or policy.  This corollary leaves open
questions concerning (i) whether a structural analysis is required,
permitted, or encouraged, and (ii) what criteria, if any, guide the Court’s
decision to employ a linguistic versus a substantive holistic analysis.
Corollary 3 concerning statutory history: History includes both legislative
history and broader statutory history.  This broader history includes prior
practice, including prior codifications and well-established judicial
practices and interpretations.252  When the Court considers the statutory
history, it may, or perhaps must, or perhaps should, consider the statute’s
                                                
251 This observation obviates questions concerning whether the Court’s interpretive objective is textual
meaning, congressional intent, statutory purpose, or something else.
252 This approach is analogous to common law analysis, in which the courts trace the development of a
doctrine over time through case law.
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broader history.  The line between broad history and pre-Code practice is
indefinite.  Although the Court spurns isolated and general statements in
the legislative history, none of these cases presents an in-depth analysis of
legislative history.  Therefore, the weight and import of legislative history
is unclear.
These observations explain the Court’s unanimous decisions, but leave
important questions open concerning the Court’s choice of interpretive method.
By examining the cases in which the Justices wrote separate opinions, we can
determine whether (i) those opinions confirm these basic observations, (ii)
disputes among the Justices arise from the use of different interpretive methods,
and (iii) disputes among the Justices center upon the questions left open in the
foregoing general observations about the Court’s interpretive method.253
Section C reviews the Court’s unanimous with concurrence decisions.
C. The Unanimous with Concurrence Decisions
1. Overview
In nine Bankruptcy Code cases decided during the 1981 through 1998 Terms, all
of the Justices agreed on the result, but one or more Justices wrote a separate concurring
opinion. 254  In chronological order these are: United States v. Security Industrial Bank,255
Ohio v. Kovacs,256 Begier v. Internal Revenue Service,257 Farrey v. Sanderfoot,258 Union
                                                
253 This article does not consider whether the justices or other interpreters could actually apply these rules
in each case and achieve undeniably predictable results. There are many reasons to doubt interpreters’
ability to achieve unbiased, neutral and certain interpretation.  Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether the
Justices appear to follow certain criteria and, if so, whether we can identify those criteria and apply them to
predict the results in future cases.
254 See Appendix III, post.
255 United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
256 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
257 Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
258 Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
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Bank v. Wolas,259 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,260 Patterson v. Shumate,261
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank,262 and Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca.263
The Court decided two of these cases before Justice Scalia joined the Court.264  In
these two cases, the Justices who wrote or joined a concurrence did so for reasons other
than disagreement with the majority’s statutory interpretation methods.265  In contrast, in
all but one of the seven cases decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court, disputes
concerning interpretive method were at the heart of the disagreements among the
majority Justices and the concurring Justices.266
2. Concurring decisions in the 1981 through 1985 Terms
During the 1981 through 1985 Terms, the Court issued only two Bankruptcy
Code decisions in which the result was unanimous but one or more Justices wrote or
joined a separate concurring opinion. 267
First, in Ohio v. Kovacs,268 the Court held that a debtor’s obligation under an
injunction that required the debtor to clean up a hazardous waste site was a “debt” that
was dischargeable in the debtor’s bankruptcy case.269  In an opinion written by Justice
White, the majority implemented congressional intent, which it discerned from the
Bankruptcy Code’s text, structure, and legislative history. 270  In this pre-Justice Scalia
and pre-Justice Thomas opinion, none of the Justices objected to the Court’s reference to
legislative history.
                                                
259 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
260 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
261 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
262 Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
263 Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
264 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982);
see also Part III.C.2; Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
265 See infra notes 71-273, 280-81 and accompanying text.
266 See infra  Part III.C.3.
267 See Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274; Security Indus. Bank , 459 U.S. 70.
268 Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274.
269 Id. at 282-83; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1994) (defining “debt”).
270 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279 (citing congressional intent); id. at 278 (citing language of the applicable
provision); id. at 279 (citing language of other Bankruptcy Code provisions); id. at 279 n.3, 280 & nn.6-8
(citing legislative history).
47
Justice O’Connor joined the majority, but wrote a separate concurrence271 “to
address the petitioner’s concern that the Court’s action will impede States in enforcing
their environmental laws” and explain why the majority’s holding was not hostile to state
enforcement of environmental laws.272  She did not challenge the majority’s interpretive
method.  Query whether Justice O’Connor and the other Justices might have reached a
different result if they had believed that the application of the Bankruptcy Code was
detrimental to environmental law policy. 273
Second, in United States v. Security Industrial Bank,274 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for six Justices, held that the Bankruptcy Code did not permit the trustee to avoid
liens that were perfected before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.275  The Court
reasoned that retroactive application might violate the Fifth Amendment.276  In order to
avoid the constitutional question, the Court relied upon two “canons” of construction.
The first urges the Court to read a statute to avoid a constitutional question, if such a
reading is “fairly possible.”277  The second favors prospective application of a statute
absent a clear indication that the legislature intended that the statute be applied
retroactively.278  In applying these two canons, the Court found no clear expression that
Congress intended the applicable Bankruptcy Code section to apply retroactively.279
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, three concurring Justices agreed that
Supreme Court precedent mandated the result.280  Absent that precedent, however, they
would have concluded that the section did apply retroactively and that retroactive
application did not violate the Fifth Amendment.281
                                                
271 See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
272 Id.
273 See infra Part IV.A.1.c.3; Part IV.A.1.d.
274 United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
275 Id. at 81-82; see  11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994) (permitting the debtor to avoid certain pre-petition liens).
276 Security Indus. Bank , 459 U.S. at 81-82; see  U.S. CONST . amend. V.
277 Security Indus. Bank , 459 U.S. at 78 (stating the “cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the constitutional question may be avoided”
(citations and internal quotations omitted)).
278 Id. at 79-80 (stating that the “first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed
to the future, not to the past. . . . [and that] a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which
interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless such be ‘the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and
the manifest intention of the legislature’” (citations omitted)).
279 Id. at 81-82.
280 Id. at 82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun’s
concurrence.  Id.
281 Id. at 83-85.  Although the concurring justices disagreed with the majority’s use of canons, these were
constitutional canons, not bankruptcy law statutory interpretation canons.  Cf. id. at 81 (drawing from
earlier Supreme Court cases the “principle of statutory construction” that “[n]o bankruptcy law shall be
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The separate opinions in Kovacs and Security Industrial do not embody disputes
concerning the method the majority used to interpret the Bankruptcy Code.  Kovacs is
consistent with the observation that the Court considers the Bankruptcy Code’s text,
structure, and history.  Security Industrial is a constitutional case, which adds little to our
understanding of how the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy Code.
3. Concurring decisions in the 1986 through 1998 Terms
During the 1986 through 1998 terms, the Court issued seven bankruptcy opinions
in which all of the Justices agreed with the result, but one or more Justices wrote or
joined a separate concurrence.282
a. Single Justice concurrence decisions
In four of these cases, a single Justice concurred: Begier v. Internal Revenue
Service,283 Union Bank v. Wolas,284 Patterson v. Shumate,285 and Nobleman v. American
Savings Bank.286  In three of these cases, Justice Scalia was the lone concurring Justice
(Begier, Wolas, and Patterson).  In the fourth, Justice Stevens was the lone concurring
Justice (Nobleman).
In all four of these cases, the concurring Justice wrote separately solely to criticize
the majority’s interpretive method.  In both Begier and Wolas, Justice Scalia wrote
separately to castigate the Court for considering legislative history. 287  In Nobleman, in
contrast, Justice Stevens wrote separately to complain of the Court’s failure to consult
legislative history to confirm the textual meaning.288  In Patterson, Justice Scalia wrote
separately to praise the Court for using a “holistic,” textual interpretation and to criticize
the Court for having failed to do so in another case decided earlier in the same Term.289
                                                                                                                                                
construed to eliminate property rights which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of an
explicit command from Congress”).
282 See infra notes 283-86, 329-31; Appendix III, post.
283 Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
284 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
285 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
286 Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
287 See infra notes 297-99, 304-05 and accompanying text.
288 See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
289 See infra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
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In Begier v. Internal Revenue Service,290 the Court held that the trustee could not
recover as preferential transfers certain of the debtor’s pre-petition tax payments because
the payments had been made from funds held in trust for the Internal Revenue Service.291
The Court relied upon the language of the Bankruptcy Code,292 the language of relevant
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,293 the history of the Bankruptcy Code,
including the legislative history and the broader history of how the Bankruptcy Code had
modified pre-Code law, 294 and the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code.295
The Court interpreted these sources in the context of the preference provisions’ role in
furthering the overarching bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution among creditors.296
The Court’s approach is consistent with the observation that the Court will consider the
statute’s text, structure, and history.
Justice Scalia, concurring, 297 excoriated the Court for relying upon legislative
history. 298  He argued that “[i]f the Court had applied to the text of the statute the
standard tools of legal reasoning, instead of scouring the legislative history for some
scrap that is on point . . . , it would have reached the same result it does today . . . .”299
Justice Scalia did not, however, clearly state a “test” for when, if ever, the Court might
consider legislative history.  He also did not expressly object to the Court’s references to
the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes and overarching policies.
In Union Bank v. Wolas,300 Justice Stevens, writing for eight Justices, held that
the “ordinary course” of business preference defense applied to payments on long-term
debts as well as short-term debts.  Although the Court reasoned that the text of the
                                                
290 Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
291 Id. at 60-67.
292 Id. at 56 n.1, 59.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994) (defining property of the bankruptcy estate); id. § 547
(authorizing the trustee to recover preferential transfers).
293 Begier, 496 U.S. at 60-61.
294 Id. at 57, 59 n.3, 63-67.
295 Id. at 61.
296 Id. at 58.  For example, the Court defined “property of the debtor” by reference to the purposes
underlying the preference provisions and by analogy to the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “property of
the estate.” Id.
297 See Begier, 496 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
298 Id. at 67-70.
299 Id. at 70.
300 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).  See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (setting forth the
elements of a preferential transfer); id. § 547(c) (creating exceptions); id. § 547(c)(4) (embodying the
ordinary course exception).
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Bankruptcy Code led clearly to this result,301 the Court did not stop with the text.  It also
considered the legislative history and bankruptcy policy.
As for legislative history, however, the Court noted that “[g]iven the clarity of the
statutory text, respondent’s burden of persuading us that Congress intended to create or to
preserve a special rule for long-term debt is exceptionally heavy.”302  The respondent
failed to meet this burden.
As for policy, the Court considered how the rule it announced would foster the
fundamental bankruptcy policies served by the preference rules, which include providing
equitable distribution among similarly situated creditors, and deterring a race to the
courthouse.303
Justice Scalia concurred, including in the portions of the opinion that
“respond[ed] persuasively to legislative-history and policy arguments made by
respondent.”304  He argued, however, that “[s]ince there was here no contention of a
‘scrivener’s error’ producing an absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have
made this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable.”305
Wolas reveals a clash between the majority’s test for looking beyond the plain
text (may look beyond the text but with an exceptionally heavy burden to overcome plain
meaning), and Justice Scalia’s test (do not look beyond the text absent a scrivener’s error
that produces an absurd result).  It also reflects a dispute between Justice Scalia and the
other Justices concerning what it means for the text to be plain.
Patterson v. Shumate306 applied the Wolas test307 to determine what weight the
Court should accord to legislative history when the text appears to be plain.
In Patterson, the Court was asked to determine whether the bankruptcy estate
included the debtor’s interest in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) qualified pension plan. 308  The issue arose because the Bankruptcy Code
excludes from the debtor’s estate the debtor’s interest in a trust that contains a transfer
restriction enforceable under “applicable non-bankruptcy law.”309  The Court held that
                                                
301 See Wolas, 502 U.S. at 152, 154-56.
302 Id. at 155-56; see also id. at 156-60 (analyzing legislative history).
303 Id. at 160-62.
304 Id. at 163 (Scalia, J., concurring).
305 Id.
306 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
307 See Wolas, 502 U.S. at 155-56; supra  text accompanying note 302 (quoting Wolas); Patterson, 504 U.S.
at 760.
308 Patterson, 504 U.S. 753.
309 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994).  For a general discussion of the treatment of pension plans in
bankruptcy, see 4 COLLIER, supra  note 163, ¶ 541.11[7], 541-54.9 to 541-54.11; Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden
in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355 (1999); 1 GINSBURG & MARTIN ON
BANKRUPTCY, § 5.02[G] at 5-17 to 5-18 (4th ed. 1996 & 1997 Supp.); Mary Ann Jackson, Patterson v.
Shumate: What Happens to Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy?, 47 ARK. L. REV. 449 (1994); Michael Sabino
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the phrase “applicable non-bankruptcy law” included both state spendthrift trust law,
which the legislative history expressly mentioned,310 and federal law, such as ERISA,
which the legislative history did not expressly mention. 311
Justice Blackmun, writing for eight Justices, began by stating that “the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA is our determinant.”312  In an exemplary
use of holistic, textual interpretation, he considered not only the language of the
applicable Bankruptcy Code section, but also the uses of the phrases “state law” and
“applicable non-bankruptcy law” throughout the Bankruptcy Code.313
With respect to the legislative history’s reference to state spendthrift trust law,
Justice Blackmun quoted Wolas314 for the proposition that, because the text was clear, the
petitioner carried an “exceptionally heavy” burden to convince the Court the Congress
intended a result other than the result that followed from the plain language.315
Finally, the Court explained why its holding was consistent with both the
Bankruptcy Code’s policy of broadly including assets in the estate, and ERISA’s policies
of fully protecting pension benefits and providing uniform national treatment of pension
benefits.316  Once again, the Court supported an apparently clear textual statement with
references to broad statutory design. 317  Once again, the broad design and policy
overcame a more particular statement in the legislative history.
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion, but used a concurring opinion to
comment on the Court’s interpretive method.318  Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not
criticize the Court for applying in Patterson the same interpretive canon to which Justice
Scalia had objected in Wolas.319  Instead, Justice Scalia praised the majority for using a
                                                                                                                                                
& John P. Clarke, The Last Line of Defense: The New Test for Protecting Retirement Plans From Creditors
in Bankruptcy Cases, 48 ALA. L. REV. 613 (1997).  See also Patterson, 504 U.S. at 757 n.1 (listing the
circuit courts that were split over this issue).
310 See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 761-62 & n.4; see also  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 176, 369 (1977), reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869, 6136, 6325.
311 See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 757-59.
312 Id. at 757.
313 Id. at 759; see also id. at 762-63 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the Court’s holding would
render another section of the Bankruptcy Code superfluous).
314 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1991); see supra  text accompanying note 302 (quoting
Wolas).
315 Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760.
316 Id. at 763-65.
317 Because the Court considered sources other than the text, Patterson is not classified as a “textual”
opinion for purposes of Appendices VI and VII.
318 See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
319 See supra  notes 314-15.
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“holistic” textual interpretation, in which a particular phrase means the same thing
throughout the Bankruptcy Code.320  Justice Scalia used his concurrence primarily to
castigate the Court for failing to follow this same approach in another case earlier in the
same Term (Dewsnup v. Timm).321  In one of his more biting criticisms of the Court’s
interpretive methodology, he wrote: “I trust that in our search for a neutral and rational
interpretive methodology we have now come to rest, so that the symbol of our profession
may remain the scales, not the seesaw.”322
Justice Scalia did not expressly object to the Court’s consideration of the broad
statutory design (i.e., “policy” inherent in the Bankruptcy Code’s structure).  This
suggests that Justice Scalia’s criticism in Wolas may have been addressed more to the
Court’s discussion of legislative history than to the Court’s discussion of policies and
purposes.323
Finally, in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank,324 the Court held that the
Bankruptcy Code prohibited a chapter 13 debtor from “lien-stripping” a claim secured
solely by the debtor’s principal residence.325  In a heavily textual opinion written by
Justice Thomas, the Court relied exclusively on the interplay between the language of
two relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code.326  The opinion made no reference to
legislative history or bankruptcy policy.
In his Nobleman concurrence,327 Justice Stevens appeared as the other side of
Justice Scalia’s legislative history mirror.  Justice Scalia avoids considering legislative
history whenever possible, whereas Justice Stevens prefers to consider legislative history
whenever it might be helpful, particularly if the apparently plain meaning produces an
odd result.  In his concurrence, Justice Stevens explained that the majority’s
interpretation created an apparent anomaly under which the Bankruptcy Code granted
debtors less protection for their principal residences than for their other assets.  The
legislative history resolved this anomaly because it revealed that Congress had, indeed,
intended to grant mortgage lenders favorable treatment in order to encourage them to
make home loans.328
                                                
320 Patterson, 504 U.S. at 766-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
321 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992); see infra  notes 479-507 and accompanying text; Patterson,
504 U.S. at 766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
322 Patterson, 504 U.S. at 766-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
323 See supra  note 304-05 and accompanying text.
324 Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
325 Id. at 327-32.
326 Id. at 325-32.  See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (providing generally for the strip down of undersecured
claims); id. § 1322(b)(2) (prohibiting the debtor from altering the “rights” of holders of claims secured
solely by the debtor’s principal residence).
327 See Nobleman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
328 Id.
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In summary, each of the single-Justice concurring opinions decided after Justice
Scalia joined the Court involves a dispute over interpretive method.  In three of the
majority opinions (Begier, Wolas, Patterson), the Court considered text, structure
(including policy and purpose), and history (in Begier, including a reference to pre-Code
practice).  Justice Scalia objected to the Court’s reference to legislative history in two of
these cases (Begier, Wolas), and commented on the Court’s use of a holistic analysis in
the third (Patterson).  In the fourth case (Nobleman), the Court considered only the text
and textual structure.  Justice Stevens concurred to confirm the textual meaning by
reference to legislative history.  These cases suggests that Justices Scalia and Stevens, at
least, care enough, or disagree enough, about interpretive method to write separate
opinions, even if they agree with the Court’s results.
b. Multiple Justice concurrence decisions
In the three remaining unanimous with concurrence decisions (Farrey v.
Sanderfoot,329 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,330 and Things Remembered, Inc. v.
Petrarca331), three or four Justices diverged from the majority opinion.
Two of these cases (Germain and Things Remembered) involved the interaction
between general jurisdiction statutes and bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes.  Because
neither case interpreted a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, neither adds to our
understanding of how the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy Code, itself.  Nevertheless,
these cases are consistent with the pattern of cases in which disagreements over
interpretive method have led to concurrences.  In each case, Justice Thomas wrote a
textual majority opinion.  In each case, other Justices wrote non-textual concurrences.  In
each case, the Justices disagreed over aspects of the plain meaning rule, including what it
means for language to be plain, and when the Court may or should look beyond the
language.
In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,332 the Court considered whether the
federal circuit courts of appeals have power to review interlocutory orders issued by
district courts in appeals from bankruptcy courts.  The question arose because the
bankruptcy appeals jurisdiction statute expressly grants the circuit courts power to hear
only final orders issued by bankruptcy appellate panels and by district courts sitting as
appellate courts in bankruptcy cases.333  The general jurisdiction statute grants the courts
of appeal power to hear interlocutory orders issued by the district courts, in certain
                                                
329 Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
330 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
331 Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
332 Germain, 503 U.S. 249.
333 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
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circumstances, but does not expressly refer to orders issued by district courts sitting as
appellate courts in bankruptcy cases, rather than as trial courts.334
Writing for the five-Justice majority, 335 Justice Thomas held that the bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute did not limit the courts of appeals’ power under the general
jurisdiction statute.336  The Court reasoned that the language of the general jurisdiction
statute was plain and unambiguous.337  Although the respondent argued that the
legislative history of the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute suggested a different result, the
Court refused to consider the legislative history:  “When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete’. . . .
[J]udicial inquiry into the applicability of § 1292 begins and ends with what § 1292 does
say and with what § 158(d) does not.”338
The five Justices who joined this opinion embraced a prohibitive rule (the Court
“may not” look beyond the text), and determined that this rule applied when the words
were “unambiguous.”
In two separate concurrences, four Justices disagreed with the majority’s staunch
refusal to look beyond the “plain” language.  First, Justice Stevens’s concurrence339
began with a concise, classic statement of his interpretive philosophy: “Whenever there is
some uncertainty about the meaning of a statute, it is prudent to examine its legislative
history.”340  Justice Stevens argued that, if Congress had intended to alter appellate
jurisdiction in the drastic way urged by the respondent, Congress is likely to have
indicated that purpose in the legislative history. 341  Consequently, the legislative history’s
silence on the issue supported the Court’s holding.342  In these short statements, Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority on all three elements of the plain meaning rule.
First, he rejected the prohibitive rule (may not look beyond the language), in favor of a
persuasive rule (should look beyond the language if there is some uncertainty).  Second,
by rejecting the “unambiguous” test in favor of a “some uncertainty” test, he seemed to
require a lesser degree of textual inexactitude.  In contrast, the test Justice Scalia
                                                
334 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Germain, 503 U.S. at 253.
335 Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Souter joined.  See Germain, 503 U.S. 249.
336 Id. at 250-55.
337 Id. at 251-52; 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994).
Another general jurisdiction statute grants the courts of appeals power to hear appeals of final
orders of the district courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).  The Court concluded that this statute did not
render the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute superfluous.  See Germain, 503 U.S. at 252-53.
338 Germain, 503 U.S. at 254.
339 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 255 (Stevens, J., concurring).
340 Id. (emphasis added).
341 Id. at 255-56.
342 Id.
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articulated in his Union Bank v. Wolas concurrence (do not look beyond the language
absent a scrivener’s error that produces an absurd result)343 seems to be stricter than
either Justice Stevens’s “some uncertainty” test or the Germain majority’s
“unambiguous” test.344  Justice Stevens encouraged the Court to examine sources other
than the text if the text contained “some uncertainty,” but cautioned that the parties would
have a heavy burden of demonstrating that Congress’s intent was contrary to the plain
text.  Third, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the language
was plain.  Finally, in reasoning that paralleled the pre-Code canon, Justice Stevens urged
the Court to consider not only the legislative history, but also prior practice.
Second, Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurrence that Justices White and
Blackmun joined.345  These three Justices argued that the language was not plain.  Rather,
they reasoned that the language of the general jurisdiction statute rendered the bankruptcy
jurisdiction statute largely superfluous.  Nevertheless, because they did not believe that
Congress “intended” this result, they agreed with the majority’s result.346  In this
concurrence, congressional intent trumped the apparent textual meaning.  Justices
O’Connor, White and Blackmun agreed with Justice Stevens that the language was not
plain.
Germain suggests that Justice Thomas required less clarity to deem the language
unambiguous than did the four concurring Justices.
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca347 presented a similar dispute over the
meaning of “plain” and the parameters of the plain meaning rule.  Justice Thomas,
writing for six Justices,348 held that the general federal remand statute prohibited review
of a remand order, regardless of whether the proceeding had been removed under the
general removal statute or the bankruptcy removal statute.349
In a characteristically textual opinion, Justice Thomas relied solely on the text of
the bankruptcy removal statute and the general remand statute.  He found that these
statutes comfortably co-existed in the bankruptcy context.350  He declined to rely on the
(arguably ambiguous) bankruptcy remand statute.
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurrence that Justice Stevens joined, agreed with the
result but argued that the Court should have considered the bankruptcy remand statute.
                                                
343 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); see supra  text accompanying note 305.
344 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 254; see supra  text accompanying note 338.
345 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 256 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
346 Id.
347 Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995)
348 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter joined Justice Thomas’s
majority opinion.  Id. Cf. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (per Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy,
Scalia, Souter, JJ.); see supra note 335.
349 Things Remembered, 516 U.S. 124.
350 Id. at 129.
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She reconciled the two remand statutes using dictionaries351 and substantive holistic
interpretive canons.352  She did not agree that the statutes, considered together, were
“plain.”
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, which Justice Ginsburg joined, to
clarify the effect of the holding on an earlier Supreme Court removal decision. 353
In Things Remembered and Germain, Justice Thomas applied a narrow, textual
interpretation to avoid considering sources that might have raised ambiguity.
Finally, in Farrey v. Sanderfoot,354 three Justices concurred for reasons unrelated
to interpretive method.  The Court held that a Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance provision
did not apply if the property was subject to the lien when the debtor acquired the
property.  The Court discerned this rule in the language of the Bankruptcy Code,355
supported by the purposes and legislative history of the provision in issue.356  The
decision turned on the Court’s factual finding that the lien had attached, under state law,
at the same time the debtor acquired the property. 357  This factual conclusion, and its
broader implications for subsequent cases, raised concern among the concurring
Justices.358
                                                
351 Id. at 133 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
352 Id. at 133 (consulting dictionaries); id. at 135-36 (citing canons that interpret the text in context; look to
the whole law, its object, and policy; reconcile statutes to fit harmoniously within a set of provisions;
clarify the meaning of a term by considering the statutory scheme; and consider the statute’s substantive
effect).
353 Id. at 129-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy noted that Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer , 423 U.S. 336 (1976), on which the majority had relied, had been limited by Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).  See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 129-130.
354 Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
355 Id. at 295-96; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994).
356 See Farrey, 500 U.S. at 297-99.
357 Id. at 299-301.  A divorce decree had granted the ex-husband the marital home, subject to a lien that
secured the ex-husband’s obligation to pay certain monies to his ex-wife.  The Court concluded that the
divorce decree had extinguished the ex-husband’s property rights and created new property rights.  Id.
358 Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, which Justice Souter joined.  See Farrey, 500 U.S. at
301-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  They argued that, if the debtor had not conceded that his interest in the
property arose at the same time the lien attached, the Court might have concluded that the debtor had held
an interest in the property before the lien attached.  Under the majority’s holding, if the debtor had a
property interest under state law before the lien attached, the Bankruptcy Code would have allowed the
debtor to avoid the lien.  The concurring justices lamented that this result would be contrary to fairness,
common sense, and the policies recognized by the Court in the majority opinion.  They suggested that
congressional action might be necessary to avoid this result.  Id.
Similarly, although Justice Scalia did not write a separate opinion, he declined to join in the one
paragraph in which the Court presented a hypothetical case under which the debtor might have held an
interest in the property, under state law, before the lien attached.  Id. at 300 n.4.
57
In summary, in two of the three multiple Justice concurrence cases, interpretive
disputes led to separate opinions.  In these concurrences, five separate Justices (Justices
Blackmun, Ginsburg, O’Connor, Stevens, and White) objected to Justice Thomas’s
narrow, textual interpretation.
4. Summary of the unanimous with concurrence decisions
In all but three of the Court’s nine unanimous with concurrence decisions,
Justices wrote separately because they disagreed with the majority’s interpretive method.
Two of these three cases were decided before Justice Scalia joined the Court.
One, Security Industrial, involved a constitutional question; the other, Kovacs, involved a
tension between bankruptcy law and environmental law.  The third case, Farrey, decided
after Justice Scalia joined the Court, involved the application of state law.  These cases
do not yet reveal any pattern.
The six cases in which Justices disagreed over interpretive method were all
decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court (Begier, Wolas, Patterson, Nobleman,
Germain, Things Remembered).  All but one, Begier, were decided after Justice Thomas
joined the Court.  Three were textual opinions written by Justice Thomas, which spurred
non-textual concurrences (Nobleman, Germain, Things Remembered).  Two were non-
textual opinions to which Justice Scalia wrote textual concurrences (Begier, Wolas).  The
sixth was a quasi-textual opinion to which Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence praising the
Court’s holistic textualism (Patterson).  It seems clear from these cases that Justices
Scalia’s and Thomas’s interpretive methods have adversely affected the Court’s ability to
reach consensus in bankruptcy cases.
One might argue that the disputes among the Justices in these cases have not
undermined certainty because these disputes merely led to concurring opinions, rather
than to disagreements over the results in these cases.  These disputes, however, give the
lower courts inconsistent signals concerning how to interpret the Bankruptcy Code.
Moreover, Parts C (minor splits) and D (major splits) demonstrate that the Justices
frequently have written dissents in Bankruptcy Code cases because disputes over
interpretive method caused the Justices to reach different results.
D. The Minor Split Decisions
1. Overview
This article separates the minor splits and major splits simply to determine
whether any pattern emerges that distinguishes those cases in which three or four Justices
disagreed with the result from those cases in which only one of two Justices disagreed
with the result.
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The minor splits show a continuing pattern of divergent opinions arising from
interpretive disputes, particularly between Justice Stevens, on the one hand, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, on the other.  Other patterns also begin to emerge, including disputes
arising in cases in which the Bankruptcy Code is in tension with other law.
2. Minor split decisions in the 1981 through 1985 Terms
Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Committee of Geiger Enterprises, Inc.359
is the only Bankruptcy Code decision of the pre-Justice Scalia era that the Court decided
by a minor split.
In a per curiam opinion expressing the views of seven Justices,360 the Court held
that a debtor could not dismiss a case filed under the former Bankruptcy Act in order to
file a case under the new Bankruptcy Code.  The Court based its holding on the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code.361
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and
if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body
which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.362
Although the Court wrote a primarily textual opinion, and applied a textual canon,
the Court, nevertheless, consulted legislative history.  It noted that the legislative history
supported the Court’s interpretation of the plain meaning.  The Court did not, however,
engage in a detailed analysis of the legislative history. 363
Justice Stevens dissented, in an opinion that Justice Marshall joined.364  The
dissenters spurned the majority’s search for “meaning” in favor of a search for
congressional intent.365  Justice Stevens discerned Congress’s intent in the purpose and
                                                
359 Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982).
360 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, O’Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and White joined
the majority opinion.  See Geiger, 454 U.S. at 355-60.
361 See Geiger, 454 U.S. at 357 & n.1, 359-60; see also  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2683 (1978); 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  Because Geiger consulted legislative
history only in passing, it is included as a “textual” opinion in Appendices VI and VII.
362 Geiger, 454 U.S. at 359-60 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
363 Id. at 355-56.
364 Id.  at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
365 Id. at 360, 363.
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spirit of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Act.366  He supported his understanding of
Congress’s intent through a plausible reading of the statute’s language.367  Finally, the
dissent criticized the Court for accepting the case on an interlocutory appeal when the
Court could have mooted the issue by denying certiorari. 368
Geiger is a good example of a case in which the Justices split (even before Justice
Scalia joined the Court) in an interpretive dispute over the statute’s letter versus its
presumed purpose and spirit.  The dissenters discerned congressional intent by
reconciling all of the sources that shed light on the statute’s meaning rather than by
relying primarily, or exclusively, on the text.
3. Minor split decisions in the 1986 through 1998 terms
In fifteen Bankruptcy Code cases decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court,
one or two Justices dissented.  In chronological order, these cases are Kelly v.
Robinson369 (seven-to-two, Justices Marshall and Stevens dissenting), Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport370 (seven-to-two, Justices Blackmun and
O’Connor dissenting), United States v. Energy Resources Co.371 (eight-to-one, Justice
Blackmun dissenting), Owen v. Owen372 (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting), Toibb
v. Radloff373 (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting), Dewsnup v. Timm374 (six-to-two,
Justices Scalia and Souter dissenting), United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.375 (seven-to-
two, Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissenting), Barnhill v. Johnson376 (seven-to-two,
Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissenting), Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz377 (eight-to-one,
Justice Stevens dissenting), Celotex Corp. v. Edwards378 (seven-to-two, Justices Stevens
                                                
366 Id. at 360-61.
367 Id. at 361-63.
368 Id. at 363.
369 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
370 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
371 United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
372 Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
373 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
374 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
375 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
376 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
377 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
378 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
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and Ginsburg dissenting), Field v. Mans379 (seven-to-two, Justices Breyer and Scalia
dissenting, and Justice Ginsburg joining the majority but also writing a separate
concurrence), United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.380 (eight-to-
one, Justice Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part), Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash381 (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting and Justice Scalia joining the
majority but declining to join in one footnote), and Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership382 (six-to-one-to-two,
Justice Stevens dissenting, and Justices Thomas and Scalia concurring).
To determine whether these dissents embody any patterns of disputes among the
Justices, including patterns of disputes concerning interpretive method, this section
separates the dissents according to their authors.  Part (a) discusses Justice Stevens’s
dissents, Part (b) discusses Justices Marshall’s and Blackmun’s dissents, Part (c)
discusses Justices Thomas’s, Scalia’s, and Breyer’s dissents, and Part (d) discusses a case
in which Justice Stevens dissented and Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred.
Notice that only six Justices wrote dissents in these fifteen minor split cases.383
Of these, only four, Justices Breyer, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas, remain on the Court
today.  The analysis below reveals that most of Justices Scalia’s, Stevens’s, and
Thomas’s dissents arose from disagreements among these three Justices over interpretive
method.384  Not surprisingly, Justices Scalia and Thomas prefer textual interpretive
methods whereas Justice Stevens prefers more flexible interpretive methods.385
a. Justice Stevens’s dissents
Justice Stevens dissented in nine of the fifteen minor splits during the 1986
through 1998 Terms.  He wrote the dissents in the following eight cases: Owen v.
Owen,386 Toibb v. Radloff,387 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,388 (joined by Justice
                                                                                                                                                
379 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
380 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
381 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
382 Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
383 These are Justices Blackmun, Breyer, Marshall, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas.
384 See infra notes Part III.D.3.a, c, d.
385 Id.; see also infra  Part IV.A.2.
386 Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
387 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
388 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
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Blackmun), Barnhill v. Johnson,389 (joined by Justice Blackmun), Taylor v. Freeland &
Kronz,390 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,391 (joined by Justice Ginsburg), Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash,392 and Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.393  In the ninth case, Kelly v.
Robinson,394 Justice Stevens joined a dissent that Justice Marshall wrote.  Kelly is
discussed in Part (b) together with Justices Marshall’s and Blackmun’s other dissents.
In six of the eight dissents that he wrote, Justice Stevens disagreed with the
majority over interpretive method.395  The two remaining cases each involved some
disagreement over interpretive method; however, these cases are better understood as
disputes concerning constitutional or quasi-constitutional issues that simply happened to
arise in the bankruptcy context.396
In five of the six cases involving Bankruptcy Code interpretation disputes, the
majority relied primarily on the text of the Bankruptcy Code.  These are Owen v.
Owen,397 Barnhill v. Johnson,398 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,399 Toibb v. Radloff,400 and
                                                
389 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
390 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
391 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
392 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
393 Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
394 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
395 See infra notes 397-408, 520-53 and accompanying text.
396 See infra notes 409-18 and accompanying text.
397 Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (holding that Bankruptcy Code section 522(f) allows the debtor to
avoid a judicial lien that impairs the debtor’s state law exemptions, even though the state law defines
exemptions to exclude property subject to such a lien); id. at 311 (“this meaning is more consonant with the
text . . . .”).  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994) (permitting the debtor to avoid certain liens that impair the
debtor’s exemptions); id. § 522(b) (authorizing individual debtors to exempt certain property from their
bankruptcy estates).
The majority rejected an appeal to policy.  It stated that the opt-out policy did not impel the Court
to “create a distinction [between federal and state exemptions] that the words of the statute do not contain.”
Owen, 500 U.S. at 313; see  11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994) (providing debtors with a choice between state and
federal exemptions unless the debtor’s state has “opted out” of the federal exemption scheme and limited
its residents to the state law exemptions).  The Court also suggested that the opt-out policy was limited by
the Bankruptcy Code’s policies.  See Owen, 500 U.S. at 313.
398 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992) (holding that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code’s
preferential transfer recovery provisions, a transfer by check is made when the debtor’s bank honors the
check rather than when the debtor delivers the check to the payee); id. at 397-98 (reasoning that the
Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “transfer” turns on the meaning of “property” which is determined by state
law); see 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (establishing rules for the avoidance of preferential transfers).
399 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (holding that a chapter 7 trustee may not challenge a
debtor’s exemptions after the period for objecting has expired if the trustee never sought an extension of
time to file an objection, even if the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the exemption); id. at 643-
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Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash.401  In each of these cases, Justice Stevens would
have reached a different result by applying an interpretive method that relied less
exclusively on the text and more flexibly on other sources.  Specifically, Justice Stevens
would have relied on (i) the text viewed in the context of the function of the Bankruptcy
Code sections in issue (Owens);402 (ii) the text, holistic interpretive canons, consistency
with commercial practice, and legislative history (Barnhill);403 (iii) policy, equity, and the
common law, supported by the text (Taylor);404 (iv) a holistic reading of the Bankruptcy
Code, supported by the legislative history (Toibb);405 and (v) the text, supported by the
                                                                                                                                                
45 (applying a textual analysis); see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994) (establishing exemptions rules); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4003(b) (West 1999) (fixing time for filing objections to exemptions).
400 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (holding that an individual not engaged in business may file for
relief under chapter 11); id. at 160 (reasoning that “the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code disposes of
the question before us”); id. at 166 (reasoning that “[t]he plain language of the Bankruptcy Code permits
individual debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11.  Although the structure and
legislative history of Chapter 11 indicate that this Chapter was intended primarily for the use of business
debtors, the Code contains no ‘ongoing business’ requirement for Chapter 11 reorganization, and we find
no basis for imposing one.”).  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1994) (establishing eligibility requirements for
chapter 11).
The Court also rejected an appeal to policy considerations and warnings of dire consequences that
would follow from allowing individuals to file chapter 11.  Toibb, 501 U.S. at 163-65.
401 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 959-63 (1997) (holding that, when a chapter 13
debtor proposes to retain property under the cramdown provision, the value of the collateral is the price a
willing buyer would pay to obtain similar property from the seller).  See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994)
(providing for cramdown against secured claims).
402 See Owen, 500 U.S. at 314-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
403 See Barnhill, 503 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (arguing that a transfer by
check occurs on the date of delivery, provided that the check is honored within 10 days thereafter); id. at
403-04 (reasoning from consistency with commercial practice); id. at 404-06 (reasoning from the text); id.
at 406 (reasoning that the result is consistent with legislative history and with the canon of construction
under which the same term is presumed to have the same meaning in different sections of the statute).
404 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the limitation period for objecting to
the debtor’s exemptions should be tolled if the debtor has no colorable basis for claiming an exemption); id.
at 646-50 (reasoning from equitable tolling, equitable considerations, common law); id. at 650-51
(reasoning from the text); id. at 651-52 (appealing to the Court’s “power to reach a just result despite the
‘plain meaning’;” arguing that the Court should “be guided by common law principles;” and concluding
that “it is a mistake to adopt a ‘strict letter’ approach . . . when justice requires a more searching inquiry”
(citations omitted)).
405 See Toibb, 501 U.S. at 166 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the history and structure of the
Bankruptcy Code suggest that individual debtors not engaged in business should not be allowed to file for
relief under chapter 11); id. at 166-67 (arguing that, while “[t]he Court’s reading of the statute is plausible. .
. . [w]hen the statute is read as a whole, . . . it seems quite clear that Congress did not intend to authorize a
‘reorganization’ of the affairs of an individual consumer debtor”); id. at 167 (arguing that “the word ‘only’
[in Bankruptcy Code section 109(d)] introduces sufficient ambiguity to justify a careful examination of
other provisions of the Act, as well as the legislative history”); id. at 167-69 (considering repeated
references to the debtor’s business in other sections of chapter 11 and its legislative history); id. at 168-69
(comparing chapter 11 and chapter 13); id. at 170 (reasoning based upon “read[ing] the statute as a
whole”).
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context of the entire Bankruptcy Code, and a comparison of similar substantive
bankruptcy concepts in different Bankruptcy Code chapters (Rash).406
These cases demonstrate Justice Stevens’s standard approach of reviewing all
relevant sources of meaning and determining congressional intent through the best
justification of these sources, rather than giving primacy to one source, such as the text.
In the majority opinions, the Court generally deferred to the text because the text was
clear.  Two of the majority opinions employed a textual canon that prohibited the Court
from consulting legislative history because the text was unambiguous.407
The sixth Justice Stevens dissent, in Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership,408 will be discussed in Part (d).
This discussion will allow the reader to review Justices’ Thomas’s and Scalia’s dissents
in Part (c) and then compare Justice Stevens’s dissent in LaSalle to Justice Thomas’s and
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in LaSalle.
The two remaining minor split cases in which Justice Stevens wrote a dissent
involve interpretive disputes; however, they are best understood not as Bankruptcy Code
interpretive disputes but as constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions that simply
happened to arise in the bankruptcy context.
The seventh case, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.409 presented a quasi-
constitutional question that is clearly explained as a part of the Court’s sovereign
immunity jurisprudence.410  The majority’s reading of the text in Nordic Village was
heavily influenced by a judicially created rule applied exclusively to sovereign immunity
cases.  This rule requires that Congress make an “unequivocal statement” in order to
waive the federal government’s immunity from suit.411  The Court held that the statement
in the Bankruptcy Code was not sufficiently unequivocal. 412
                                                                                                                                                
406 See Rash , 520 U.S. at 966 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[a]lthough the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §
506(a) is not entirely clear, I think its text points to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in this
case”); id. at 967 (reasoning from text, context, purpose, coherent use of section 506(a) throughout the
Bankruptcy Code, economic reality, consequences, and “consist[ency] with the larger statutory scheme”).
407 See Barnhill, 503 U.S. at 401-02 (reasoning that “appeals to statutory history are well taken only to
resolve ‘statutory ambiguity,’” and that the legislative history did not support the petitioner’s argument in
any event); Toibb, 501 U.S. at 162 (rejecting an appeal to legislative history because  “[w]here, as here, the
resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear. . . . although a
court appropriately may refer to a statute’s legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity, there is no
need to do so here.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).  Cf. Rash , 520 U.S. at 963 n.4 (giving no
weight to legislative history because the history was “unedifying, offering snippets that might support
either standard of valuation”).
408 Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
409 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (per Scalia, J.).
410 See also  Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989) (concerning
abrogation of state sovereign immunity); see infra  notes 570-78 and accompanying text. See also  sources
cited infra at note 574.  Nordic and Hoffman are quasi-constitutional because they apply to the Bankruptcy
Code a strict interpretive test reserved for statutes purporting to waive or abrogate sovereign immunity.
411 See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 33-37.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, disagreed.413  He argued that the
Court’s result was not only unjust, but also unnecessary because the text plainly provided
a waiver and the legislative history suggested that Congress had intended to effect a
waiver.414  The dissent also castigated the majority for insisting that Congress make a
“clear statement” in order to waive sovereign immunity. 415
The eighth, and final, Justice Stevens dissent occurred in Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards.416  In Celotex, the Court held that creditors could not collaterally attack a
bankruptcy court injunction that prohibited the creditors from executing upon a bond
issued by the debtor’s surety. 417  The dissent argued that the non-Article III bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction to enjoin an Article III court.  Even if bankruptcy courts did
have such jurisdiction, the dissent argued, the injunction should have been voided
because it had only a frivolous pretense to validity. 418  Celotex raised a constitutional
question - not a question of statutory interpretation.
b. Justices Blackmun’s and Marshall’s dissents
Justices Stevens’s, Blackmun’s, and Marshall’s dissents overlap.  Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Stevens’ dissent in Barnhill v. Johnson. 419  Justice Blackmun
wrote the dissent in two other minor split decisions, namely Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare v. Davenport420 and United States v. Energy Resources Co.421  In another
                                                                                                                                                
412 Id. at 39; see 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (entitled “waiver of sovereign immunity”).
413 See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
414 Id. at 39-41.
415 Id. at 45.
416 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
417 Id. at 313.
418 See Celotex, 514 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 313-30.  See also
U.S. CONST . art. III.
419 See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 403 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).
Justice Blackmun also joined Justices Stevens’s dissent in Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).  Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’ dissent in Celotex, 514 U.S.
at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).  Those cases did not involve statutory interpretation
disputes, however.
420 Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.).  Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens are not always in accord.  In Davenport, for example, Justice Blackmun dissented
from Justice Marshall’s majority opinion.  In Toibb v. Radloff , 501 U.S. 157 (1998), Justice Stevens
dissented from Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion.
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minor split decision, Kelly v. Robinson,422 Justice Marshall wrote the dissent, which
Justice Stevens joined.423  Part (b) discusses Justices Marshall’s and Blackmun’s dissents
in Kelly, Davenport, and Energy Resources.
Kelly424 and Davenport425 considered the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of
criminal restitution obligations.426
In Kelly, the Court held that a state criminal restitution obligation imposed as a
condition of probation was not dischargeable in an individual’s chapter 7 case.427  The
Court concluded that such an obligation fits within the exception to discharge for fines
and penalties that are payable to or for the benefit of the government and that are not
“compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”428  In dictum, the Court also suggested that,
even if this exception to discharge did not apply, a restitution penalty might be
enforceable notwithstanding the bankruptcy case because the Court had “serious doubts
whether Congress intended to make criminal penalties ‘debts’”429 under the Bankruptcy
Code.430
The Court based its holding on the “language . . . in light of the history of
bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the interests of the
States in unfettered administration of their criminal justice systems.”431  Faced with a
                                                                                                                                                
421 United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 551 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (without
opinion).
422 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
423 Id. at 53 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
424 Id.  Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, which Justices Blackmun, Brennan, O’Connor,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White joined.  Id.  Justice Marshall wrote the dissent, which Justice Stevens joined.
Id. at 53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
425 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).  Justice Marshall (who had
written the dissent in Kelly) wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Brennan, Scalia, Stevens, Kennedy, and White joined.  Id.  Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, which
Justice O’Connor joined.  Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
426  See generally 8 COLLIER, supra  note 163, ¶¶ 1328.02[2], at 1328-6 to 1328-8, 1328.02[3][f], 1328-15 to
1328-17 (15th ed. rev. 1999) (discussing criminal restitution debts in bankruptcy); John P. Hennigan, Jr.,
Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Law in the Federal System, 19 CONN. L. REV. 89 (1986).
427 See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43-53.
428 Id. at 50-53; see  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1994) (excluding from discharge certain penalties payable to a
governmental unit).
429 Id. at 50.
430 Id. at 43-50 (dictum).
431 Id. at 43-44.  See also id. at 43 (arguing that “the text is only the starting point . . . ‘ . . . we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy’” (citations omitted)); id. at 49 (noting that “the States’ interest in administering their
criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations
that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief. [citation omitted] . . . [and that] [t]his
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perceived tension between bankruptcy law and states’ interests, the Court heavily favored
the states’ interests.  The Court reasoned that the bankruptcy courts had always deferred
to state criminal proceedings and judgments, both under the Bankruptcy Code and prior
law, even where that deference seemed inconsistent with the bankruptcy law’s plain
language.432
The Court applied a pre-Code canon to justify its reliance on prior practice.  This
canon states that “‘if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.  The Court has followed this rule
with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.’”433
Kelly embodies the Court’s broadest application of the pre-Code canon.  In Kelly,
the Court applied the canon not simply to embrace a judicial interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Act,434 nor simply to trace the historical development of a Bankruptcy Code
concept.435  Instead, the Court applied the canon broadly to comment on the historical
relationship between the Bankruptcy Code and state criminal law, and to incorporate into
the federal Bankruptcy Code an implied principle of deference to an important state
interest, despite the Supremacy Clause.436
The dissenters (Justices Marshall and Stevens) argued that, according to the
language and history of the Bankruptcy Code, restitution claims were indeed “debts”
under the Bankruptcy Code.437  They also argued that, on its face, the discharge
exception, upon which the Court relied, did not apply to restitution obligations.438  The
dissenters expressed sympathy for the policy interests that drove the Court’s reasoning,
but argued that separation of powers prohibited the Court from pre-empting
congressional action in favor of the Court’s own view of good policy. 439
Finally, the Kelly dissenters warned that the restitution issue was likely to arise
again because the discharge exception upon which the Court had relied in Kelly applies
                                                                                                                                                
reflection of our federalism also must influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case.”);
id. at 53 (reasoning that, “[i]n light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform construction of the old
Act over three-quarters of a century, and the absence of  any significant evidence that Congress intended to
change the law in this area, we believe this result best effectuates the will of Congress.”).
432 Id. at 44-49.
433 Id. at 47 (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986));  see also supra  note 431.
434 Cf. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 538-43 (1996) (applying a pre-Code canon to determine the
scope of the equitable subordination power); Midlantic Nat’l Bank , 474 U.S. at 499-505 (applying a pre-
Code canon to determine the scope of the abandonment power).
435 Cf. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs .,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 373-80 (1988).
436 U.S. CONST . art. VI; see infra  Parts IV.A.1.c.4; IV.A.1.d.
437 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53, 56-58 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
438 Id. at 54-56 (reasoning that such obligations are, in fact, compensation for actual pecuniary loss).
439 Id. at 58-59.
67
only in chapter 7 cases.  A chapter 13 case would force the Court to revisit the dicta in
which the Court had suggested that restitution obligations might not be “debts.”440
Four years after Kelly, the Court was required to revisit the restitution question in
a chapter 13 case, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport.441  In
Davenport, the Court abandoned the Kelly dicta.442  Instead, the Court relied upon the
language and structure of the Bankruptcy Code to hold that criminal restitution
obligations do, indeed, constitute “debts” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.443
Because the discharge exception upon which the Court had relied in Kelly does not apply
in chapter 13 cases, the Court held that restitution debts are dischargeable in chapter 13
cases.444
The Court embraced the same pre-Code practice canon that it had applied in
Kelly: “We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a
clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.”445  Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code did, indeed, clearly evince
Congress’s intent to change prior practice.  The Court reasoned that concerns for the
administration of states’ criminal justice systems could not justify rewriting the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code in order to defer to state criminal law. 446
Justice Blackmun’s dissent, which Justice O’Connor joined, heartily embraced
Kelly’s states’ rights dicta and concluded that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the
discharge of criminal restitution obligations in chapter 13 cases.447  Both Justices had
joined the majority opinion in Kelly.
The dissent’s attempt to justify its deference to state law despite the Bankruptcy
Code’s plain language provides a fascinating reconciliation of the Court’s prior decisions
and a revealing insight into the interpretive method that at least two Justices consider
proper for the Bankruptcy Code.  The dissent lamented the majority’s approach, stating:
                                                
440 Id. at 59 n.6.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994) (discharging individual chapter 13 debtors from certain
debts that are not dischargeable in chapter 7 cases).
441 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
442 Id. at 557 (referring to Kelly’s discussion of whether restitution obligations are debts as dicta).
443 Id. at 555, 557-60 (analyzing the relevant provision’s language and history to determine the meaning of
“debt”); id. at 560-63 (analyzing the structure of the Bankruptcy Code, including other Bankruptcy Code
sections and their history); see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1994) (defining “debt”).
444 See Davenport, 495 U.S. at 562-63.
445 Id. at 563.
446 Id. at 563-64.
447 Id.  at 564, 574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.).  Justice Marshall, who wrote the
dissent in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), and objected to the Court’s dicta in that case, wrote the
majority opinion in Davenport.  Justice Stevens, who joined Justice Marshall’s dissent in Kelly, also joined
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Davenport.  Five justices, however, namely Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Brennan, Scalia, and White, joined the majority opinions in both Kelly and Davenport .
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This Court carefully has set forth a method for statutory analysis of the
Bankruptcy Code. . . . When analyzing a bankruptcy statute, the Court, of
course, looks to its plain language.  But the Court has warned against an
overly literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.  “‘[W]e must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”  The strict
language of the Bankruptcy Code does not control, even if the statutory
language has a “plain” meaning, if the application of that language ‘will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters’. . .
. To determine the drafters’ intent, the Court presumes that Congress
intended to keep continuity between pre-Code judicial practice and the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. . . . For me, the statutory
language, the consistent authority treating criminal sanctions as
nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the absence of any
legislative history suggesting that the Code was intended to change that
established principle, and the strong policy of deference to state criminal
judgments all compel the conclusion that a restitution order is not a
dischargeable debt.448
This statement raises three critical issues concerning the plain meaning canon and
the relationship between that canon and the pre-Code practice canon.  First, in the unique
context of the Bankruptcy Code, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor would have required
very little evidence of “ambiguity” before looking beyond the text.  Indeed, they
suggested that the Court should be chary of accepting a textual interpretation that fails to
reconcile the statute’s language with the statute’s structure, object, policy, and history.
Second, in this iteration of the pre-Code canon, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor seemed
to suggest that, if Congress intends to alter pre-Code practice, it will do more than
indicate its intent in the text.  It will also confirm, through statements in the legislative
history, that it knew it was making a change and that it intended to make that change.  In
contrast, for the majority, a clear statement in the text was adequate evidence of
Congress’s intent to change pre-Code practice.  Third, like the Kelly majority, the
Davenport dissent linked the pre-Code canon with deference to state criminal processes.
The Kelly majority and the Davenport dissent did not go so far as to suggest, in
contravention of the Supremacy Clause, that federal bankruptcy law is subordinate to
state criminal law.  Rather, they suggested that the history and practice of federal
bankruptcy law, itself, embodied a principle of deference.449
A similar question of deference to important governmental interests arose,
although more subtly, in United States v. Energy Resources Co.450 The Court held that
the bankruptcy court has authority to order the Internal Revenue Service to treat tax
                                                
448 Davenport, 495 U.S at 565 (citations omitted); see also id. at 555-74 (applying this interpretive method).
449 See infra Part IV.A.1.d.
450 United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
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payments made by a chapter 11 debtor as trust fund payments.451  The Court found that
this power was consistent with the bankruptcy courts’ broad equitable powers to adjust
debtor-creditor relationships, and that this power did not conflict with other laws
protecting important governmental interests.452  The latter part of this reasoning implies
that the Court might have balked if the exercise of this power had conflicted with
important governmental interests.453  The Court also noted that the bankruptcy court had
the power to designate trust fund taxes if the court concluded that such an order was
necessary for the success of the reorganization. 454
Justice Blackmun dissented.455  Because Justice Blackmun did not write an
opinion, it is difficult to classify the nature of his disagreement with the majority.  The
dissent appears, however, to be consistent with Justice Blackmun’s view that bankruptcy
law should defer to important governmental interests.  This speculation follows from the
fact that Justice Blackmun joined the states’ rights oriented Kelly majority and wrote the
states’ rights-oriented Davenport dissent.  Each of these opinions required that the Court
read the Bankruptcy Code to defer to state governmental interests.  By dissenting in
Energy Resources, Justice Blackmun recorded his opposition to the Court’s refusal to
defer to the federal government’s interest in designating the treatment of tax payments.
Because the Court issued Energy Resources and Davenport on the same day, 456 Justice
Blackmun may have had inadequate time to write a separate opinion in Energy
Resources, and may have believed that his opinion in Davenport adequately conveyed his
views concerning the Bankruptcy Code’s deference to important governmental interests.
Kelly, Davenport, and Energy Resources introduce questions concerning the
manner in which the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy Code when the Bankruptcy
Code interacts with important state and federal governmental interests.  We shall see this
pattern arise again in the major splits.457
c. Justices Scalia’s, Thomas’s and Breyer’s dissents
                                                
451 Id.
452 Id. at 549-51; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (granting bankruptcy courts broad equitable
powers).
453 See infra  Part IV.A.1.d.
454 Energy Resources, 495 U.S. at 551.
455 Id.  (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
456 Both cases were decided on May 29, 1990.  See Energy Resources, 495 U.S. 545; Pennsylvania Dep’t of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
457 See infra Part III.E.3.
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Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer dissented in three minor split cases.  In
United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,458 Justice Scalia declined
to join a portion of the majority opinion, 459 and Justice Thomas concurred, in part, and
dissented, in part.460  In Dewsnup v. Timm,461 Justice Scalia dissented.462  In Field v.
Mans,463 Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which Justice Scalia joined.464  In Field, Justice
Ginsburg joined the majority but also wrote a concurrence.465
In CF&I Fabricators,466 the Court held that (i) for purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code’s priority scheme, certain payments required under the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC”) in connection with pension plan funding deficiencies were penalties rather than
priority excise taxes, and (ii) the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the courts categorically
to subordinate all such penalty obligations.467
In the absence of any clear textual guidance,468 Justice Souter based his analysis
primarily on Supreme Court Bankruptcy Act precedents, which required the courts to
apply a “functional analysis” to determine whether an exaction was a “tax” for
Bankruptcy Code priority purposes.469  In an unusual twist on the pre-Code canon, he
noted that “Congress could, of course, have intended a different interpretive method for
reading terms used in the Bankruptcy Code it created in 1978.  But if it had so intended
we would expect some statutory indication . . . .”470  The Court relied upon its
                                                
458 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
459 Id. at 215 n.†; infra note 473 and accompanying text.
460 See CF&I Fabricators, Inc., 518 U.S. at 229 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
infra notes 474-75 and accompanying text.
461 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
462 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra notes 490-507 and accompanying text.
463 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
464 See Field, 516 U.S. at 79 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); infra notes 517-19 and
accompanying text.
465 See Field, 516 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); infra note 516 and accompanying text.
466 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
467 Id.
468 Id. at 219-20 (noting the absence of any express reference to the IRC provisions in the Bankruptcy Code
priority section).
469 Id. at 220-22, 222 n.6; see also id. at 224-25 (applying the functional analysis to conclude that the
exaction was a penalty rather than a tax); id. at 225-26 (analyzing the legislative history of the IRC to
bolster this conclusion).
470 Id. at 221; see also id. at 222-24 (concluding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code or IRC reflected such an intent).
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Bankruptcy Code precedent, United States v. Noland,471 to conclude that the bankruptcy
court could not categorically subordinate tax penalties.472
Justice Scalia, true to his textualist leanings, declined to join the portion of the
majority opinion that discussed the IRC’s legislative history. 473  He did not, however,
object to the Court’s examination of other sources beyond the text.  Presumably, he
concurred in this examination because he agreed that the text was ambiguous.
Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.474  He argued that, if
Congress imposes a “tax” that is generally considered to be an excise tax, then it is an
excise tax for Bankruptcy Code priority purposes.  Although the bankruptcy court can
apply a functional analysis to determine whether a statutory obligation that a state calls a
“tax” is a “tax” for federal Bankruptcy Code priority purposes, the bankruptcy court must
view any “tax” that Congress imposes in a federal statute as a “tax” for bankruptcy
purposes.475
Second, in Dewsnup v. Timm,476 as in Kelly v. Robinson477 and Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport,478 the Justices split again over the scope,
application, and interaction between the plain-meaning rule and the pre-Code practice
canon.
In Dewsnup, the Court considered the interplay between Bankruptcy Code
subsections 506(a) and (d).479  Under section 506(a), a secured creditor’s “allowed
secured claim” is equal to the lesser of the amount of the claim or the value of the
collateral.480  Consequently, if an “undersecured” creditor holds a claim for one million
dollars, but the collateral is worth only seven hundred thousand dollars, the creditor will
have an allowed secured claim of seven hundred thousand dollars and an unsecured claim
                                                
471 United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); see supra  notes 229-235 and accompanying text.
472 See CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 228-29; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994) (providing for
equitable subordination).
473 See CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 215 n .†, 225-26.
474  Id. at 229 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
475 Id. at 229-30.
476 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).  This was a six-to-two decision because Justice Thomas took
no part in the consideration of the case.  Id.
477 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); see supra notes 427-40 and accompanying text.
478 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); see supra  notes 441-49 and
accompanying text.
479 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (1994); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17.
480 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).  This shorthand statement of the effect of section 506(a) applies if the
debtor is the sole owner of the collateral and the claim is a recourse claim.  Section 1111(b)(1)(A) creates
essentially the same result for non-recourse claims.  Id. § 1111(b)(1)(A).
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of three hundred thousand dollars.  The creditor in Dewsnup held such an undersecured
claim.481
Section 506(d) allows a debtor to avoid a lien to the extent that the lien secures a
claim that is not an “allowed secured claim.”482  This section allows the debtor to avoid a
lien when the underlying claim has been found to be invalid.  The debtor argued that
section 506(d) also allowed the Court to “strip down” an undersecured creditor’s lien to
the judicially determined value of the property. 483  Avoiding the lien would make it easier
for the debtor to confirm a plan of reorganization over the creditor’s objection.
The Court denied the strip down, even though only the “secured” portion of the
claim was an “allowed secured claim” under section 506(a).484  The Court reached this
result by declining to apply section 506(a)’s definition of “allowed secured claim” to
section 506(d).  Instead, the Court concluded that the debtor could not avoid the lien if
the creditor’s claim was both “allowed” (i.e., was a valid claim not subject to
disallowance or avoidance) and “secured” (i.e., any portion of the allowed claim was
secured by any of the debtor’s property).485
The Court reasoned that the divergent views espoused by the parties and amici
demonstrated that the language was ambiguous.486  The Court then rejected the “words
have the same meaning throughout the statute” canon in favor of a pre-Code practice
canon.
Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with
petitioner that the words allowed secured claim must take the same
meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a).  But, given the ambiguity in the text,
we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart from the pre-Code
rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.487
In perhaps the strongest statement yet of the Court’s pre-Code practice canon, the
Court explained that:
[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write “on a
clean slate.” [citations omitted]  Furthermore, this Court has been reluctant
to accept arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the
particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major change
in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in
                                                
481 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
482 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1994).
483 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
484 Id. at 417; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
485 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418.
486 Id. at 416.
487 Id. at 417.
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the legislative history.  [citations omitted]  Of course, where the language
is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling.
But, given the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to
grant a debtor the broad new remedy . . . without the new remedy’s being
mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of Congress is
not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to basic bankruptcy
principles.488
Notice the similarity between this iteration of the manner in which the Court will
reconcile the text and pre-Code practice and the interpretive philosophy stated in the
Davenport dissent.489  Not surprisingly, the same Justice, Justice Blackmun, wrote both.
Because Justice Blackmun is no longer on the Court, the continued viability of his
flexible test is unclear. Only four of the Justices who joined Justice Blackmun’s majority
opinion in Dewsnup remain on the Court today.  These are Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Stevens.  Justices Blackmun and White, who also
joined the Dewsnup majority, have been replaced by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.
Justice Scalia answered with a stinging dissent, which Justice Souter joined.490
The dissenters castigated the majority for “replac[ing] what Congress said with what it
thinks Congress ought to have said – and in the process disregard[ing], and hence
impair[ing] for future use, well-established principles of statutory construction.”491
Similarly, the dissent complained that:
[t]he principal harm caused by today’s decision is not the misinterpretation
of § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. . . . The greater and more enduring
damage of today’s opinion consists in its destruction of predictability, in
the Bankruptcy Code and elsewhere.  By disregarding well-established
and oft-repeated principles of statutory construction, it renders those
principles less secure and the certainty they are designed to achieve less
attainable.  When a seemingly clear provision can be pronounced
ambiguous sans textual and structural analysis, and when the assumption
of uniform meaning is replaced by ‘one-subsection-at-a-time’
interpretation, innumerable statutory texts become worth litigating. 492
In this concise statement of his interpretive philosophy, Justice Scalia objected to
three aspects of the Court’s interpretive method.  He argued that the Court manufactured
                                                
488 Id. at 419-20.
489 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see supra  text accompanying note 448.
490 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
491 Id.
492 Id. at 435.
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an ambiguity, failed to apply holistic textualism, and improperly considered pre-Code
practice and legislative history.
First, the dissent undertook a natural or plain meaning reading.  According to the
dissent, section 506(d) “[r]ead naturally and in accordance with other provisions of the
statute” “unambiguously provides” that the lien is avoidable.493  Disagreement among
self-interested litigants cannot create an ambiguity494 because “[t]his mode of analysis
makes every litigated statute ambiguous.”495
Second, the dissent applied a holistic textual analysis.  The dissent argued that the
phrase “allowed secured claim,” used in section 506(d) “obviously bears” the meaning
set forth in section 506(a) and “inevitably means” the same thing when that phrase is
used throughout the Bankruptcy Code.496  In a “clear and unmistakable pattern of usage,”
the Bankruptcy Code is similarly consistent in its use of the phrases “allowed unsecured
claim” and “allowed claim.”497  The dissent argued that “the normal rule of statutory
construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning . . . . must surely apply, a fortiori, to use of identical words in the
same section of the same enactment.”498  According to the dissent, the majority replaced
this “normal and sensible” rule with a “one-section-at-a time” approach. 499
Third, the dissent challenged the majority’s application of the pre-Code canon. 500
The dissent did not absolutely prohibit all uses of the pre-Code canon, but it articulated a
narrower canon under which the Court may consult pre-Code practice only if the statute
contains a gap or true ambiguity.  The dissent acknowledged that:
[w]e have, of course, often consulted pre-Code behavior in the course of
interpreting gaps in the express coverage of the Code, or genuinely
ambiguous provisions.  And we have often said in such cases that, absent a
textual footing, we will not presume a departure from longstanding pre-
Code practice [citing Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
                                                
493 Id. at 420; see also id. at 425-27 (arguing that the majority’s reading created redundancy in § 506(d) was
not consistent with a “natural reading,” “natural meaning,” or “straightforward reading,” and created a
practical absurdity).
494 Id. at 422-23.
495 Id. at 432.
496 Id. at 421.
497 Id. at 422.
498 Id. (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted); cf. Patterson v. Shumate,
504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s approach in Dewsnup).
499 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 423.
500 Id. at 432-35.
75
of Environmental Protection,501 and Kelly v. Robinson502].  But we have
never held pre-Code practice to be determinative in the face of what we
have here: contradictory statutory text.  To the contrary, where “the
statutory language plainly reveals Congress’ intent” to alter pre-Code
regimes [citing Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v.
Davenport503], we have simply enforced the new Code according to its
terms, without insisting upon “at least some discussion [of the change
from prior law] in the legislative history,” . . . . Congress’ careful
reexamination and entire rewriting of those provisions supports the
conclusion that, regardless of whether pre-Code practice is retained or
abandoned, the text means precisely what it says.504
Finally, in an innocuous but intriguing comment, the dissent quoted from United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.505  The dissent noted that, in Ron Pair, “[h]aving
found a ‘natural interpretation of the statutory language [that] does not conflict with any
significant state or federal interest, nor with any other aspect of the Code,’ . . . we deemed
the pre-Code practice to be irrelevant.”506  This passage suggests that Justice Scalia might
allow language, textual canons, and structure to be overridden when the Bankruptcy Code
clashes with some important state or federal interest.507
Finally, in Field v. Mans,508 the Justices disagreed not on interpretive method, but
on the application of the law to the facts.
The circuit courts of appeal were split over the level of reliance required under the
fraud exception to discharge.509  As in Grogan v. Garner,510 the statute contained a gap –
                                                
501 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); see infra  notes
583-94 and accompanying text.
502 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1986); see supra  notes 427-40 and accompanying text.
503 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 553 (1990); see supra  notes 441-49
and accompanying text.
504 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
505 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), which is one of the Court’s most highly
criticized five-to-four opinions, is discussed infra at notes 629-52 and accompanying text.
506 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 434-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
507 Indeed, this result is essentially what occurred in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), in
which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer
provisions could not be used to set aside a non-collusive foreclosure sale that had been conducted in
accordance with state law.  See infra  notes 606-24 and accompanying text.
508 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
509 Id. at 59.
510 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); see discussion supra  text accompanying note 140.
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it did not expressly state what type of reliance was required.511  The Court held that the
exception required “justifiable reliance,” which it defined as being a lower standard than
“reasonable reliance,” but a higher standard than “actual reliance.”512  The Court
reasoned that, when Congress uses a term that had a settled meaning under the common
law (i.e., the term “fraud”), Congress intends to incorporate the common law meaning. 513
The Court concluded that, under the common law in effect in 1978 (when the relevant
provision was enacted), a party was required to show justifiable reliance in order to prove
fraud.514  In essence, the Court defined a Bankruptcy Code term by reference to its
established pre-Code, common law meaning.515
Justice Ginsburg joined the majority and agreed with its reasoning, but wrote
separately solely to highlight the need to determine causation on remand.516
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Scalia.517  The dissenters agreed that
justifiable reliance was the proper standard.518  They argued, however, that the
bankruptcy court had, in fact, applied a justifiable reliance standard, even though it had
used the phrase “reasonable reliance.”519
The questions raised in Kelly, Davenport, and Dewsnup concerning the scope of
and relationship between the plain meaning rule and the pre-Code canon arose again in
the final minor split.
d. Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s concurrence with Justice
Stevens’s dissent
                                                
511 Field, 516 U.S. at 63 & n.4, 69-70; see also  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1994) (setting forth the fraud
exception).
512 Field, 516 U.S. at 59.
513 Id. at 69, 73.
514 Id. at 64, 69-72; see also id. 64-66 (considering the fraud exception’s history).
515 The creditor argued that the existence of other provisions that required reasonable reliance suggested
that the fraud exception required only actual reliance.  The Court disagreed, reasoning that negative
pregnant structural arguments such as these were at their weakest when the result was at odds with textual
pointers such as the use of a common law term.  Id. at 75-76.
516 Field, 516 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
517 Id. at 79.
518 Id. at 79-80.
519 Id. at 80-82; see also id. at 82-84 (arguing that the bankruptcy court’s use of the phrase “reasonable
reliance” should not have warranted reversal because no one had used the phrase “justifiable reliance” in
the lower court arguments, the term “justifiable” would not have been obvious to a bankruptcy judge, and
remand would create unnecessary expense and delay).
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Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assoc. v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership,520 was the final minor split of the 1986 through 1998 Terms.  LaSalle, which
is the Court’s most recent Bankruptcy Code decision, represents a culmination of the
Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence, in several ways.
First, the separate opinions are based upon disputes concerning interpretive
method.  Second, these disputes relate to the major interpretive elements that have caused
rifts among the Justices in other cases, including what constitutes plain meaning, when
the Court may consider legislative history (if ever), and what role pre-Code law and
practice should play in Bankruptcy Code interpretation.  Third, the Justices who have
carried the banner for more formalistic interpretation (Justices Scalia and Thomas) and
more flexible interpretation (Justice Stevens), concurred and dissented in LaSalle.
Fourth, LaSalle raised a hotly contested issue that has widely split the circuit courts of
appeal521 and that has come before the Court three times without a definitive
resolution. 522
In LaSalle, the Court once again considered, and once again refused to determine,
whether the so-called new value corollary (or exception) to the absolute priority rule had
survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.523
Because the Bankruptcy Code’s language was “inexact,” the Court did not rely
solely upon the text.524  The Court, nevertheless, declined to rely upon an out of context
reading of seemingly absolute statements in legislative history. 525  Instead, the majority
examined the pre-Code judicial development of the absolute priority rule and the new
value corollary. 526  It characterized the corollary as an “observation” that the Court had
made in dictum in a pre-Code case.527  LaSalle, in its own dictum, seemed to embrace
this “observation” when it stated that:
                                                
520 Bank of America Nat’l Trust. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
521 See, e.g., id. at 1416; see also  sources cited supra  at note 237.
522 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (discussed supra at notes 236-48 and
accompanying text); In re  Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom, U.S.
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 510 U.S. 1039, motion to vacate denied and appeal
dismissed as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
523 See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1422-24 (concluding that it was unnecessary to decide whether the new value
exception remained viable because the elements of any such exception had not been satisfied); see also
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (same; discussed supra  at notes 236-48 and accompanying text); 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(B) (1994) (setting forth the conditions under which a plan will be “fair and equitable” to a
dissenting class of unsecured claims).
524  See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1417.
525 Id. at 1421 n.25.
526 Id. at 1417.
527 Id. at 1417-18.  See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 116 (1939).
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[t]he upshot is that this history does nothing to disparage the possibility
apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority rule now on the
books as subsection [1129] (b)(2)(B)(ii) may carry a new value corollary.
Although there is no literal reference to new value in the phrase on
account of such junior claim, the phrase could arguably carry such an
implication in modifying the prohibition against receipt by junior
claimants of any interest under a plan while a senior class of
nonconsenting creditors goes less than fully paid.528
This passage suggests that, when old equity receives property in exchange for a
new contribution, it does not violate the absolute priority rule because old equity does not
receive property “on account of” its prior equity interest.529  The Court found that this
interpretation, which was suggested by the text, context, and practical considerations,530
was consistent with Bankruptcy Code policy because it read section 1129 “as intended to
reconcile the two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going
concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors . . . .”531
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that old equity would be receiving property
“on account of” its old interest if it received the exclusive opportunity to acquire the new
ownership interest.532  Stated simply, the opportunity to acquire ownership is valuable
“property,” similar to a purchase option, for which someone might pay.  Even if the
ownership is acquired for market value (like an option exercised at market value), the
exclusive right to buy has value.
Because the old equity holders in LaSalle had, in fact, been given the exclusive
opportunity to acquire the new equity interest, the Court concluded that the plan did not
satisfy the elements of any new value corollary that might have survived the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code.533  The Court declined to offer suggestions on the type of
marketing or bidding that would meet the requisite opportunity for competition. 534
Justice Thomas, in a concurrence that Justice Scalia joined, agreed that the plan
should not be confirmed.535  These two formalist Justices wrote separately, however, to
                                                
528 LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1419.
529 Id. at 1416.
530 Id. at 1413.  The Court mentioned that a huge tax liability would be imposed if anyone other than the
former partners acquired the property, but the Court did not take this into consideration in its analysis.  Id.
at 1415 n.11.
531 Id. at 1413.
532 Id. at 1422.
533 Id. at 1411.
534 Id. at 1424.
535 See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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object to the Court’s “approach to interpretation.”536  They advocated textual
interpretation in place of the Court’s more flexible reliance on history and pre-Code
practice.
First, they argued that the Bankruptcy Code’s text does not expressly authorize
pre-petition equity holders to receive or retain property in exchange for an infusion of
new value.537  Rather, it provides that a plan is fair and equitable if either the objecting
senior class is paid in full or no junior class retains any property “on account of” its
junior interest.538  After consulting two dictionaries, the concurring Justices concluded
that the “common understanding” of the phrase “on account of” denoted some type of
causal relationship between the junior interest and the property retained.539  Applying this
definition, they concluded that the equity holders undoubtedly received property on
account of their prior interests.540
Second, they launched a more general criticism in which they complained that:
[t]he majority also underestimates the need for a clear method for
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.  It extensively surveys pre-Code
practice and legislative history, . . . but fails to explain the relevance of
these sources to the interpretive question apart from the conclusory
assertion that the Code’s language is “inexact” and the history is “helpful.”
. . . This sort of approach to interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code repeats
a methodological error committed by this Court in Dewsnup v. Timm.541
Dewsnup’s approach to statutory interpretation enables litigants to
undermine the Code by creating “ambiguous” statutory language and then
cramming into the Code any good idea that can be garnered from pre-
Code practice or legislative history. 542
The concurrence argued that the Court should not refer to pre-Code practice
unless the statute truly is ambiguous.543  Even then, the concurring Justices suggested that
                                                
536 Id.
537 Id. at 1424.
538 Id.
539 Id. at 1424 (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 13 (2d ed. 1987) (defining
“by reason of” and “because of”) and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 13
(1976) (defining “for the sake of,” “by reason of,” and “because of”)).
540 Id. at 1424 (concluding that the plan violated the fair and equitable requirement because a rejecting
senior class was not paid in full but a junior class would receive property on account of its interest).
541 Id. at 1425 (citations omitted).
542 Id.
543 Id. at 1425 (acknowledging that the Court had found ambiguity in Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), but suggesting that instances of ambiguity were rare:
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the Court should not engraft onto the Bankruptcy Code concepts developed in a pre-Code
era because the Bankruptcy Code had substantially changed pre-Code law. 544
Recall that Justice Scalia raised three principal complaints in his Dewsnup v.
Timm545 dissent.  First, he complained that the Court had creating ambiguity where none
existed.  Second, he argued that the Court should have applied a holistic, textual analysis.
Third, he complained that the Court had rejected the plain meaning in favor of pre-Code
practice.546  Justice Scalia had agreed, in his Dewsnup dissent, that the Court could
consider pre-Code practice if the Bankruptcy Code’s language was ambiguous.547  When
Justices Scalia and Thomas, in LaSalle, criticized the Court for applying a method like
the one the Court had applied in Dewsnup, they were complaining that the Court found
ambiguity where there was none.  In LaSalle, however, the dissenters read the language
narrowly to avoid finding ambiguity.  This observation suggests that Justices Scalia and
Thomas embrace a more formalistic view of what it means for the language to be plain. 548
In striking contrast, Justice Stevens’s LaSalle dissent reflects impatience with the
Court’s continued refusal to resolve the new value question. 549  First, he argued that the
Court should have held, rather than merely observed in dictum, that the holder of a junior
interest does not receive property “on account of” his prior interest when he receives
property based upon adequate new value.550  To Justice Stevens, this result was obvious
because the Court had unequivocally accepted the new value corollary in pre-Code case
law.551
Second, Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s objections to the plan because of
lack of bidding were “unsupported by either the text of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) or
the record in this case.”552  According to Justice Stevens, the sole issue should have been
                                                                                                                                                
“Even assuming the relevance of pre-Code practice in those rare instances when the Code is truly
ambiguous . . . .”).
544 Id. at 1425 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code had made significant changes in both the substantive and
procedural laws of bankruptcy, and arguing that “[h]ence, it makes little sense to graft onto the Code
concepts that were developed during a quite different era of bankruptcy practice.”); cf. United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (making a similar argument) (quoted infra at text
accompanying note 640).
545 Id. at 420-35; see supra  notes 490-507 and accompanying text.
546 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
547 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 507.
548 Cf. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority
for engaging in a one-subsection-at-a-time analysis in Dewsnup); see infra Part IV.A.1.c.2.
549 See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
550 Id. at 1427.
551 Id. at 1426.
552 Id. at 1427.
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the fairness of the price.  If the price was fair, it should not have mattered whether the old
equity or a third party made the offer.553
LaSalle both complicates and clarifies the Court’s interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code.  It complicates the Court’s method because it creates greater
uncertainty concerning when the Court will rely upon only the text, and when it will
consider pre-Code law.  It clarifies the Court’s approach because it suggests that the
majority of the Court employs an interpretive method that is both less rigid that Justices
Thomas’s and Scalia’s formalist approach, and less dynamic that Justice Stevens’s
flexible approach.  In other words, six of the Justices are more liberal than Justices Scalia
and Thomas in their willingness to find ambiguity and to consult Bankruptcy Code
history, including pre-Code practice, to clarify that ambiguity. These same Justices,
however, are more conservative than Justice Stevens in their reluctance to embrace a
definitive rule when the facts allow them to avoid doing so.  This conclusion suggests
that the Court may have a six-Justice interpretive center, a two-Justice interpretive
“right,” and a single-Justice interpretive “left.”
4. Summary of the minor split decisions
First, the minor split decisions display a continuing strong pattern of disputes
among the Justices over interpretive method.  Consequently, interpretive method matters
to the Justices, particularly to Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas.
Second, these cases reveal more clearly the parameters of these disputes.  The
principal elements over which the Justices disagree relate to the parameters of the plain
meaning canon and the relationship between that canon and the pre-Code canon.
Third, some of these cases reveal an emerging pattern of disputes among the
Justices concerning deference to non-bankruptcy, state and federal law or important
governmental interests.
Part D considers whether these emerging patterns continue in the major split
decisions.
E. The Major Split Decisions
1. Overview
Since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Court has issued only nine major
split decisions.
                                                
553 Id. at 1430.  See also id. 1427 (arguing that, if an old equity holder receives the new equity for a bargain
price, it receives property “on account” of its old interest, but if it receives the new equity on a fair price, it
does not receive property “on account” of its old interest); id. at 1428-29 (noting that the text does not
require competitive bidding).
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The Court has decided only two bankruptcy cases by plurality decisions: Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.554 and Hoffman v. Connecticut
Department of Income Maintenance.555
The Court has issued five five-to-four split decisions:  NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco,556 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection,557 United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,558 Pioneer Investment Services
Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership,559 and BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp.560
In the two remaining major split decisions, three Justices dissented:
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,561 and California State Board of Equalization v. Sierra
Summit, Inc.562
The Court decided three of these nine cases (Marathon, Bildisco, and Midlantic)
before Justice Scalia joined the Court.  Because no obvious pattern distinguishes the
major split decisions issued before Justice Scalia joined the Court from those issued after
he joined the Court, analyzing the opinions based upon when they were decided will not
be useful.563
Similarly, there is no clear pattern that distinguishes these cases based upon which
Justices authored the majority and dissenting opinions.564
Instead, these cases reveal an interesting pattern rooted primarily in the nature of
the questions presented.  Three of the cases raise constitutional or quasi-constitutional
                                                
554 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
555 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
556 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (unanimous on one issue; five-to-four split on one
issue).
557 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
558 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
559 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
560 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, reh’g denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994).
561 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
562 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
563 The Court issued one plurality decision before Justice Scalia joined the Court (Marathon), and one after
he joined the Court (Hoffman); two five-to-four decisions before Justice Scalia joined the Court (Bildisco,
Midlantic), and three after he joined the Court (Ron Pair, Pioneer, BFP); and both six-to-three decisions
after Justice Scalia joined the Court (Granfinanciera , Sierra Summit).
564 Seven different justices wrote the majority opinions (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Powell, Scalia, Stevens, and White); nine different justices wrote the dissenting opinions (Chief
Justice Rehnquist, former Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O’Connor,
Souter, Stevens, and White); and three separate justices wrote the concurring opinions (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia).  Five of the justices who wrote majority opinions also wrote
dissents (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and White).
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questions.  Four involve tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and other law.  The
remaining two continue the pattern of cases in which the Justices split over interpretive
method.
2. The constitutional and quasi-constitutional questions
Each of the two plurality decisions (Marathon, Hoffman) and one of the two six-
to-three splits (Granfinanciera) turned on a constitutional or quasi-constitutional
question, not a bankruptcy question.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,565 the Court
considered the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Code’s original jurisdictional structure,
which granted broad powers to non-Article III judges.566  Four Justices joined the
plurality opinion, which held that the grant was overbroad.567  Two Justices joined a
concurrence.568  Three Justices joined two separate dissents.569
In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance,570 the Court
considered whether the Bankruptcy Code provided an unmistakably clear waiver of
states’ immunity from suits filed in bankruptcy courts to recover money damages and, if
so, whether Congress had constitutional power to effect such a waiver in a federal statute.
Although the four-Justice plurality opinion avoided the constitutional question by holding
that the Bankruptcy Code did not provide a clear waiver,571 all six of the concurring and
dissenting Justices would have reached the constitutional question. 572  This case, like
                                                
565 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
566 Id. at 62 (“[W]e turn to the question presented for decision: whether the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
violates the command of Art. III that the judicial power of the United States must be vested in courts whose
judges enjoy the protections and safeguards specified in that article.”).
567 See Marathon, 458 U.S. 50.  Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, which Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, and Stevens joined.  Id.
568 See Marathon, 485 U.S. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, J.).
569 See Marathon, 485 U.S. at 92 (Burger, J., dissenting); Marathon, 485 U.S. at 92 (White, J., dissenting,
joined by Burger, C.J., & Powell, J.).
570 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
571 Id. at 104.
572 See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens,
JJ.); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).
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United States v. Nordic Village,573 is best understood as a quasi-constitutional question
that arises from the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence.574
In Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,575 the Court held that the Seventh Amendment
entitles a person who has not filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate to a jury trial
when the trustee sues that person to recover an allegedly fraudulent transfer, even though
fraudulent transfer actions are “core proceedings” in bankruptcy cases.576
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and concurred in the opinion, except for
the Court’s discussion of “private rights” and “public rights” for purposes of determining
which matters Congress may assign to non-Article III tribunals.577
Three dissenting Justices argued that the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit
Congress from assigning avoidance power actions to the bankruptcy courts without
giving the defendants a right to a jury trial. 578
3. The Bankruptcy Code interaction with other law cases
                                                
573 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); see supra  notes 409-15 and accompanying
text.
574 For example, even though the plurality did not reach the constitutional question, it applied special
interpretive rules adapted for sovereign immunity cases, such as the requirement that Congress make its
intention “unmistakably clear” in the text, and the presumption that legislative history is not relevant to
determining whether Congress intended to abrogate immunity.  See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 101, 104.  For a
detailed analysis of the sovereign immunity problem in the bankruptcy context, including a discussion of
Hoffman’s  place in the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, State
Sovereign Immunity and the Bankruptcy Code, Part One, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 521 (1998); Karen M.
Gebbia-Pinetti, State Sovereign Immunity and the Bankruptcy Code, Part Two, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3
(1998).
575 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
576 Id. at 36, 49, 50-61.
577 See Granfinanciera , 492 U.S. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
578 Id., at 71 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 79-81 (arguing that the majority misinterpreted Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence by considering only the nature of the claim and not the forum in which the claim
was tried); id. at 81-82, 87-90 (arguing that the majority undermined Congress’s power to assign selected
causes of action to specialized tribunals); id. at 83 (arguing that the majority undermined the bankruptcy
scheme); id. at 84-86 (disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that fraudulent transfer actions had been
actions at law, rather than in equity, when the Seventh Amendment was enacted); Id. at 91 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.); id. at 91-92 (noting the uncertainty of the historical record concerning
whether fraudulent transfer actions were actions at law or in equity); id. at 92-95 (agreeing that the
bankruptcy court is an equitable tribunal in which a jury would dismantle the statutory scheme; arguing that
the question is whether Congress had constitutional power to assign an action to the bankruptcy court
without a right to jury trial; suggesting that the answer turns on whether the action involved a public right;
concluding that Congress’s designation of core proceedings made those actions public rights; and reasoning
that it was not beyond Congress’s power to designate fraudulent transfer actions as core proceedings).
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In three of the five-to-four split decisions (NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,579
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,580 and
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.581), and one of the six-to-three split decisions (California
State Board of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc.582), the Justices disagreed among
themselves concerning how to reconcile the Bankruptcy Code and other non-bankruptcy
law.  In each case, the split arose when one group of Justices took a bankruptcy-centric
view and the other group of Justices took a non-bankruptcy-centric view of the question
presented.
First, in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection,583 the trustee sought to abandon contaminated properties over the objection of
two state environmental protection agencies.  The agencies demanded a clean-up and
argued that abandonment would threaten the public health and safety and violate federal
environmental law. 584
The majority ruled in favor of the states in an opinion that attempted to reconcile
the Bankruptcy Code with federal environmental law and policy.  The majority relied
heavily upon a liberal application of the pre-Code interpretive canon and deference to
environmental policy.
First, the Court noted that “[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific,” and that the Court has followed this rule with
“particular care” in interpreting bankruptcy legislation. 585  The Court reasoned that the
pre-Code judicially developed abandonment doctrine was subject to well-recognized,
judicially developed limitations designed to protect important federal or state interests.586
The Court concluded that Congress had not clearly abrogated those limitations on
abandonment when it codified the abandonment power.587
This reasoning is quite similar to that employed by the Kelly v. Robinson588
majority.  In both cases, the pre-Code practice that the Court adopted embraced a policy
of deference to non-bankruptcy law that had a substantial impact on an important
governmental interest.
                                                
579 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
580 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
581 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, reh’g denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994)
582 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
583 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
584 Id. at 496-98; see 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1994) (permitting the trustee to abandon certain property).
585 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
586 Id. at 499-501.
587 Id. at 502-05.
588 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); see supra  notes 427-36 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Court acknowledged Congress’s “undisputed” concern over
hazardous waste disposal, and concluded that Congress had not intended to undermine its
goal of environmental protection when it expressly codified the abandonment power
without also expressly codifying the established common-law restrictions on
abandonment.589
The dissenters, in contrast, took a bankruptcy-centric view of the question.  They
argued that the clear text of the Bankruptcy Code allowed abandonment without
restrictions,590 the scant legislative history did not reflect a congressional intent to limit
the abandonment power,591 and the few pre-Code cases on which the majority relied did
not support the Court’s conclusion that there were broad, well-established limitations on
abandonment before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.592  The dissent further suggested
that imposing limits on the abandonment power and forcing the debtor to clean up
hazardous waste sites violated the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.593  Finally, the
dissent argued that the Court had improperly employed equitable powers to enforce its
own view of sound public policy. 594
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,595 the Court struggled to reconcile bankruptcy
policy with the policies underlying federal labor law.  In Bildisco, however, unlike
Midlantic, the Court viewed the non-bankruptcy federal law from a bankruptcy law
perspective.
Five Justices concluded that the debtor-in-possession had not committed an unfair
labor practice when it had unilaterally modified a collective bargaining agreement before
rejecting it.  The majority relied heavily on bankruptcy policy, and briefly noted that
honoring the Bankruptcy Code’s language and policies would not violate labor policy. 596
The Court reasoned that the authority to reject an executory contract was vital to
the “fundamental purpose of reorganization . . . to prevent a debtor from going into
liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”597
The Court concluded that allowing the NLRB to pursue an action for unfair labor
practices would “run directly counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
                                                
589 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506.
590 Id. at 509, 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
591 Id. at 509-10.
592 Id. at 510-13.
593 Id. at 514-15; id. at 508 (arguing that the majority’s errors arose, at least in part, from the “Court’s
failure to discuss even in passing either the nature of abandonment or its role in federal bankruptcy”).
594 Id. at 514-15.
595 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
596 Id. at 534; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994) (authorizing the debtor in possession to assume or reject
executory contracts); id. § 1113 (specifying the treatment of collective bargaining agreements; enacted after
Bildisco).
597 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528 (citing legislative history).
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and to the Code’s overall effort to give a debtor-in-possession some flexibility and
breathing space.”598
The dissent, in contrast, argued that there was an unavoidable conflict between
Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).599
Permitting a debtor in possession unilaterally to alter a collective-
bargaining agreement in order to further the goals of the Bankruptcy Code
seriously undermines the goals of the NLRA.  We thus have the duty to
decide the issue before us in a way that accommodates the policies of both
federal statutes.  That cannot properly be done, in the Court’s fashion, by
concentrating on the Bankruptcy Code alone . . . .600
Rather than beginning with the Bankruptcy Code, the dissent relied heavily on the
language and policies underlying the NLRA.  It concluded that the NLRA’s unfair labor
practice provisions applied to debtors seeking to modify union contracts in bankruptcy
cases.601  The dissent concluded that, if one were to consider only the NLRA’s language
and policy, one would necessarily conclude that it was intended to apply in a bankruptcy
case.602  The dissent then considered whether any Bankruptcy Code provisions or policies
altered this conclusion. 603
The question then is whether application of § 8(d) would so undermine the
goals of the Bankruptcy Code that, despite the deleterious effect on the
policies of the NLRA, Congress could not have intended that § 8(d)
remain applicable once a bankruptcy petition has been filed.604
Applying this labor-law-centric test, the dissent concluded that not
applying NLRA section 8(d) in bankruptcy “strikes at the very heart of the
policies underlying that section and the NLRA,” but that applying NLRA section
8(d) in bankruptcy would not “seriously impair” bankruptcy policies or debtors’
prospects for a successful reorganization. 605
                                                
598 Id. at 532 (citing legislative history).
599 Id. at 540-42; see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
600 Id. at 541.
601 Id. at 535 (Brennan J., dissenting).
602 Id. at 541-49.
603 Id. at 550-53.
604 Id. at 550.
605 Id. at 554; see also id. at 539-40 (criticizing the majority for inferring intent from the general treatment
of executory contracts and from Bankruptcy Code policies without express textual support for the
conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code rendered the NLRA inapplicable in bankruptcy).
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In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,606 the Court considered the interaction between
bankruptcy law and state foreclosure law.  Both the majority and dissent claimed the
mantle of plain language.  The majority, however, deferred strongly to states’ interests,
and the dissent appealed to structure, history, and policy to confirm its reading of the text.
The majority held that the price received in a pre-bankruptcy foreclosure sale
conducted in accordance with state law was conclusively deemed to constitute the
“reasonably equivalent value” of the property for purposes of bankruptcy fraudulent
transfer law. 607  As a result, the trustee could not avoid the sale.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began with a primarily textual analysis
that examined the three-word phrase “reasonably equivalent value.”608  The Bankruptcy
Code defined only one of these words, “value.”609  Justice Scalia reasoned that
“reasonably equivalent” could not mean “fair market” or Congress would have used the
phrase “fair market,” as it did elsewhere.610  With little textual support, he concluded that
the price received at a non-collusive foreclosure sale was “reasonably equivalent”
value.611  He did not engage in a substantive, holistic analysis of the purposes of the
fraudulent transfer provisions or their role as part of a group of provisions designed to
maximize value, equitably distribute assets, and foster rehabilitation.  In other words, his
analysis was not bankruptcy-centric.
Instead, he based his conclusion primarily on the relationship between state
foreclosure law, on the one hand, and fraudulent transfer law (including as embodied in
the Bankruptcy Code), on the other hand.  Because these two bodies of law had coexisted
for centuries, he argued that bankruptcy and fraudulent transfer law were not meant to
usurp state law foreclosure processes.612  As in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection613 and Kelly v. Robinson,614 the majority
deferred to important state interests, despite the Supremacy Clause.615
Although the BFP majority did not cite a pre-Code canon, its review of the
historic relationship between foreclosure law and fraudulent transfer law was similar to
                                                
606 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
607 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994) (authorizing the trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers made for
less than reasonably equivalent value).
608 See BFP, 511 U.S. at 535.
609 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1994) (defining “value”).
610 See BFP, 511 U.S. at 536-39.
611 Id. at 545.
612 Id. at 546.
613 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
614 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
615 See supra  notes 431-36, 585-89 and accompanying text; infra Parts IV.A.1.c.4; IV.A.1.d.
89
the review the Court undertook in Midlantic and Kelly, with the support of the pre-Code
canon.616
The dissent 617 castigated the majority for corrupting the statute’s plain language.
Justice Souter, writing for four Justices, argued that the majority’s analysis was both too
narrow and too broad.
It was too narrow because it read the text out of context.  “Closer familiarity with
the text, structure, and history of the disputed provision (and relevant amendments)
confirms the soundness of the plain reading,” the dissent argued.618  According to the
dissent, the text, viewed in light of the Bankruptcy Code’s structure, was plain.619  The
historic development of fraudulent transfer law in the bankruptcy context, particularly
including Congress’s rejection of an amendment that would have allowed avoidance of
foreclosure sales only if such sales were collusive, and Congress’s adoption of
amendments designed to include foreclosure sales, supported the textual meaning.620
Finally, bankruptcy policy supported the avoidance of foreclosure sales if the price
received was too low. 621
The majority’s analysis was too broad because it disingenuously manufactured an
ambiguity, 622 then used that ambiguity to depart from the plain meaning in order to
vindicate important state interests, despite the preemption of state law by federal law. 623
                                                
616 See supra  notes 431-36, 585-89 and accompanying text.
617 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp ., 511 U.S. 531, 549 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
618 Id. at 553.
619 Id. at 552 (arguing that the words and meaning were plain); id. at 550 n.1 (criticizing the majority for
referring to only two uses of the phrase “fair market value” but not referring to the Bankruptcy Code’s
more than 30 uses of the term “value”); id. at 550-51 (agreeing that fair market value was not the proper
test, but arguing that the actual price received was neither the only alternative test nor a plausible reading of
the statute).
620 Id. at 550 n.1 (noting that Congress rejected an amendment that would have allowed avoidance only if
the foreclosure sale was collusive); id. at 553-55 (elucidating the development of fraudulent transfer law in
the context of foreclosure sales; noting that the Bankruptcy Code had been amended to ensure that such
sales would be included; and arguing that if non-collusive sales were not covered, then the amendments
were superfluous).
621 Id. at 560-61 (arguing that bankruptcy courts are capable of determining reasonably equivalent value on
a case-by-case basis); id. at 562-63 (concluding that the plain meaning requires a judicial determination of
value, the courts can determine value, and the policies underlying bankruptcy law fully support judicial
valuation); id. at 563 (arguing that setting aside non-collusive foreclosure sales for low prices is consistent
with the policies of maximizing and equitably distributing assets to creditors, and providing a fresh start to
debtors, and that these policies apply without regard to the fact that state law does not allow a sale to be set
aside for price inadequacy); id. at 563 n.15 (criticizing the majority for failing to discuss bankruptcy
policy).
622 Id. at 562 (accusing the majority of finding the text to be ambiguous and open to policy-based
construction; noting that Justice Scalia had complained in his dissent in Dewsnup v. Timm , 502 U.S. 410
(1992), that the Court had supplied different meanings to the same terms, and accusing Justice Scalia of
doing the same, and worse, in BFP).
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In BFP, as in Kelly, the Justices split concerning the interaction between the
Bankruptcy Code and other law, and the proper degree of deference, if any, that
bankruptcy courts should accord to state or federal law, especially if that law protects
important governmental interests.624
Finally, California State Board of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc.,625 also
involved the application of non-bankruptcy law in the bankruptcy context.  The six-
Justice majority resolved a conflict among the circuits when it ruled that the states could
impose sales and use taxes on bankruptcy liquidation sales.626  These taxes applied
because “[n]othing in the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, or the
structure of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that Congress intended to exclude taxes on the
liquidation process from those taxes the States may impose on the bankruptcy estate.”627
The dissent did not challenge the majority’s reasoning.  Instead, it argued that the
bankruptcy court’s order prohibiting the state from collecting certain taxes was res
judicata because the state had allowed the order to become final and had then attempted
to collect the taxes and attack the order collaterally.628
4. The interpretive dispute cases
The final two major split decisions return to the pattern of cases in which the
Justices disagreed among themselves over interpretive method.
In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,629 the Court held that Bankruptcy
Code section 506(b) entitles non-consensual, oversecured creditors to receive post-
petition interest.
The Court viewed the case as one involving a “narrow statutory issue.”630  Often
cited, frequently with derision, as the case establishing a rigid, grammatical, plain
meaning rule for Bankruptcy Code interpretation, the Ron Pair decision ultimately turned
on the placement of a comma.
                                                                                                                                                
623 Id. at 567 n.19 (arguing that, where the Bankruptcy Code truly is silent or ambiguous, the Court should
not read it to depart from prior practice, but that the Court has never required Congress to provide clearer
evidence of its intent when the text is already clear);  id. at 565-69 (noting that Midlantic’s deference to
important state interests was over a vigorous dissent).
624 See supra  notes 431-40 and accompanying text.
625 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
626 Id. at 854.
627 Id. at 853.
628 See Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. at 854-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
629 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
630 Id. at 237.
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Section 506(b) provides that “there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim,
interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the
agreement under which such claim arose.”631  Under this provision, only creditors who
hold consensual liens are entitled to receive fees, costs, and charges because only those
creditors are parties to “agreements.”  Because a comma appears after the phrase “interest
on such claim,” the Court concluded that interest was allowable without regard to
whether the creditor held a consensual lien under an agreement, or a non-consensual lien
without an agreement.632
The Court argued that this analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s grammatical
structure633 was the “natural reading,”634 “plain language,”635 and “natural
interpretation”636 of the statute. The Court based its analysis on a plain meaning canon,
which provides that:
[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the “rare
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” . . . In such cases,
the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.637
Ron Pair offered a restrictive statement of the plain-meaning rule and a sweeping
rejection of both legislative history and pre-Code practice.
The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of § 506(b) begins
where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.
. . . In this case it is also where the inquiry should end, for where, as here,
the statute’s language is plain, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms.” . . . The language before us expresses Congress’
intent . . . with sufficient precision so that reference to legislative history
and to pre-Code practice is hardly necessary. 638
Applying these interpretive directives, the Court concluded that its plain meaning,
grammatical analysis did “not conflict with any other section of the Code, or with any
                                                
631 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
632 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241-42.
633 Id.
634 Id. at 241.
635 Id. at 242.
636 Id. at 245.
637 Id. at 242-43.
638 Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
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important state or federal interest; nor is a contrary view suggested by the legislative
history.”639  Again, note the Court’s nod to competing state and federal interests.
The Court foreclosed any discussion of pre-Code practice with the comment that:
Congress worked on the formulation of the Code for nearly a decade.  It
was intended to modernize the bankruptcy laws, . . . and as a result made
significant changes in both the substantive and procedural laws of
bankruptcy. . . . In such a substantial overhaul of the system, it is not
appropriate or realistic to expect Congress to have explained with
particularity each step it took.  Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire
beyond the plain language of the statute.640
In an attempt to reconcile this interpretive approach with the interpretive approach
of recent cases, the Court argued that both Midlantic641 and Kelly642 had looked to pre-
Code practice only because the language in those cases had been open to interpretation;
the literal application of the statute in those cases would have produced a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters; the proposed plain meaning
interpretations in those cases would have placed bankruptcy law in clear conflict with
state or federal laws of great importance; and the pre-Code practice in those cases
“reflected policy considerations of great longevity and importance.”643  In Ron Pair, in
contrast, the majority reasoned that the language was clear, the result was not at odds
with the drafters’ intentions, and there were no important, conflicting state or federal
laws.644
Even though Ron Pair rejected pre-Code practice, the Court’s explanation
confirms the trend seen in earlier cases of deference to important, competing federal or
state interests.  The major cases in which the Court has deferred to such interests have
been widely split decisions in which the Justices disagreed over the results and the
reasoning. 645
Four dissenting Justices argued that the language was not clear, and that the
majority had improperly abandoned the pre-Code practice that the Court had established
in Midlantic.646
                                                
639 Id. at 243.
640 Id. at 240-41 (citations omitted).
641 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
642 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
643 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 245, 243-46.
644 Id. at 242; see also id. 246-49 (arguing that pre-Code practice was of little assistance anyway).
645 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994);  Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
646 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ.).
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First, the dissenters castigated the majority’s reliance on the comma.  They quoted
Justice Frankfurter’s classic statement that: “[t]he notion that because the words of a
statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification.”647
Second, the dissenters argued that “Midlantic counsels against inferring
congressional intent to change pre-Code bankruptcy law.”648  According to the dissenters,
even though the statutory language allowing abandonment was “unequivocal,” “[t]he rule
of Midlantic is that bankruptcy statutes will not be deemed to have changed pre-Code law
unless there is some indication that Congress thought that it was effecting such a
change.”649  This excerpt suggests that these Justices expect Congress to indicate in the
legislative history that it is changing pre-Code law.
The proper application of the pre-Code canon, according to the dissent, is for the
Court to determine whether there was a pre-Code practice,650 then “look for some indicia
that Congress knew it was changing pre-Code law.”651  Because the dissent found no
evidence that Congress knew it was changing the pre-Code practice of prohibiting
interest on non-consensual claims, the dissent would not have allowed a silent abrogation
of this pre-Code practice.652
The dissenters, in essence, took a neutral view of the pre-Code canon.  They
deemed it appropriate regardless of the nature of the underlying bankruptcy issue.  The
majority, in contrast, viewed the pre-Code canon as a device for allowing the Court to
defer to important non-bankruptcy interests.  The majority distinguished Ron Pair from
Midlantic almost exclusively on the basis that Midlantic involved a clash between
bankruptcy law and an important state or federal law interest, whereas Ron Pair
presented no such clash. 653  In Midlantic, the Court justified its deference to important
non-bankruptcy interests by reasoning that pre-Code practice had embodied such
deference.654  The Court followed this same approach in the Kelly majority655 and the
Davenport dissent.656
                                                
647 Id. at 249 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see
also id. at 249-51 (citing other Supreme Court cases that rejected simplistic, punctuation-based
interpretations).
648 Id. at 251.
649 Id. at 252.
650 Id. at 253.
651 Id. at 254.
652 Id.
653 See supra  notes 643-44 and accompanying text.
654 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1989).
655 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); supra  notes 643-44 and accompanying text.
656 See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 448-49 and accompanying text.
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Justice Blackmun wrote the Ron Pair majority, the Kelly majority, and the
Davenport dissent.  In the Ron Pair majority, he suggested that deference to pre-Code
practice would be appropriate not only when the Bankruptcy Code clashed with other
state or federal laws of great importance, but also when the Bankruptcy Code’s language
was not clear.  In practice, however, he embraced the plain language when no conflicting
laws were at stake (Ron Pair), but rejected apparently plain language in favor of pre-
Code practice when important, conflicting laws were at stake and pre-Code practice
justified deference to those conflicting laws (Kelly, Davenport dissent).  Similarly, the
two textualist Justices who joined Justice Blackmun’s Ron Pair majority opinion have
virtually never found ambiguity except when the Bankruptcy Code clashed with other
law.657
Finally, in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.
Partnership,658 the Court was asked to determine the scope of the Bankruptcy Rule
phrase “excusable neglect,” for purposes of allowing the late filing of a claim.659  Once
again, the Justices disagreed over interpretive method.
With the assistance of a collegiate dictionary, the majority defined the “ordinary
meaning” of the term “neglect” to include both careless omissions caused by negligence
within the party’s control and blameless omissions caused by intervening circumstances
beyond the party’s control. 660  The Court supported this “flexible” reading by reference to
the policies underlying chapter 11, the bankruptcy courts’ broad equitable powers,661 the
history of the relevant bankruptcy rules,662 and a review of the parallel federal rules.663
The Court then identified a list of equitable factors the Court would consider to
determine whether a party’s neglect was “excusable.”  These factors encompassed not
only the party’s conduct, but also the consequences of the delay in filing, such as
prejudice to the debtor and disruption of efficient judicial administration. 664
                                                
657 Compare Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411,
1424 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (finding no ambiguity in the complicated
cramdown provisions that have led to multiple circuit splits and three Supreme Court grants of certiorari);
with BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (per Scalia, J.) (deferring to state foreclosure
law).
658 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
659 Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) provides, in part, that “the court shall fix and for cause shown may extend
that time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3).
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) provides that “the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . .
on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).
660 See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 791 (9th ed. 1983)).
661 Id. at 389.
662 Id. at 389-92.
663 Id. at 392-95.
664 Id. at 395, 397-98.
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The dissent argued that the majority had “replace[d] the straightforward analysis
commended by the language of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) with a balancing test.”665
Bankruptcy Rule 9006 provides that a court “may” permit late filing if there is “excusable
neglect.”666  According to the dissent, this provision requires that the party first satisfy the
threshold standard of “excusable neglect.”  If this threshold has been satisfied, then the
court might or might not, in its discretion, allow the late filing.667  Judicial discretion
might include factors such as the consequences of the delay. 668  If, however, the threshold
of excusable neglect has not been satisfied, then the court has no basis for allowing the
filing, and the consequences of the delay are not relevant.
The dissent defined the phrase “excusable neglect” as a legal term of art.  It
referred to a law dictionary, rather than a collegiate dictionary, to determine the accepted
meaning of excusable neglect.669  It concluded that excusable neglect required that the
party’s actions be blameless.670  Using reasoning parallel to the pre-Code canon, the
dissent adopted this meaning because Congress did not indicate its intent to depart from
this established meaning. 671
Ron Pair and Pioneer are consistent with the pattern of cases in which the Justices
disagree over interpretive method.  In each case, the majority and dissent disagreed on
what it means for statutory language to be plain, and on where to look for guidance
concerning the meaning of the language.  Because both of these cases were decided by a
deeply divided Court, interpreters should be wary of relying too heavily on either case as
a predictor of the Court’s interpretive method in bankruptcy cases.  The Justices clearly
were not in accord on either the results or the interpretive methods in these two cases.  In
Ron Pair, only five Justices accepted the majority’s grammatical interpretation.
Moreover, although the Ron Pair majority applied a “plain meaning” rule, it based its
holding on presumed legislative intent, not linguistic meaning.  Although the majority
opinion did not rely upon pre-Code practice, its author, Justice Blackmun, has frequently
relied upon pre-Code practice to discern congressional intent, in appropriate cases.
Consequently, Ron Pair can hardly be considered a shining beacon of textualism.
The Pioneer majority also searched for congressional intent.  It found intent,
however, by examining statutory language, policy, equitable powers, and history.
Although it is difficult to reconcile Pioneer’s flexible method with Ron Pair’s restrictive
                                                
665 See Pioneer, 501 U.S. at 399 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.); id. at
409 (arguing that the majority’s conclusion was inconsistent with plain language and judicial economy); id.
at 399 (applying a “straightforward analysis,” of the “plain language,” to discern “plain meaning”); id. at
403 (arguing that any other reading is unnatural); id. at 404, 408 (applying plain language).
666 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).
667 See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 399 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
668 Id. at 399-402.
669 Id. at 402-03 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990)).
670 Id.
671 Id. at 403.
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method, four Justices (Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, and Blackmun) joined both majority
opinions.  Justice O’Connor wrote both the pre-Code practice oriented dissent in Ron
Pair and the arguably more textual dissent in Pioneer.  From an interpretive method
perspective, perhaps the most principled Justices in these cases were Justice Stevens, who
joined the more flexible opinion in each case, as we would expect, and Justice Scalia,
who joined the more textual opinion in each case, as we would expect.
5. Summary of the major split decisions
The interpretive approaches the Court applied in the major split decisions should
be discounted, to some degree, because the Justices disagreed so strongly over
interpretive method.  These cases, however, are extraordinarily important because they
reveal the parameters of the Justices’ internecine disputes over interpretive method.
The major split decisions reflect three distinct interpretive patterns. First, the
Justices split widely on constitutional questions. Secondly, the Justices split widely in
cases in which the Bankruptcy Code came into conflict with other federal or state laws,
particularly when those laws protect important governmental interests.  In these cases, the
Justices disagree among themselves concerning the interaction among three fundamental
interpretive guides: the plain meaning canon, the pre-Code practice canon, and the
emerging “canon” of deference to important federal or state laws or governmental
interests.
Third, the major split cases that did not involve constitutional questions or clashes
with other law (i.e., Ron Pair and Pioneer) continued the strong trend of cases in which
the Justices disagreed over interpretive method, particularly concerning the scope and
application of the plain meaning rule.
Part IV examines each of these trends in greater detail.
IV. INTERPRETIVE METHOD AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Does the Court apply the same interpretive method in every Bankruptcy Code
case?  The answer is “no.”  Nevertheless, the Court’s Bankruptcy Code decisions reveal
several strong interpretive patterns.  Part IV.A summarizes these patterns.  Part IV.B
considers what these patterns suggest for interpreters, bankruptcy practitioners,
bankruptcy judges, and scholars of interpretive theory.
A. Patterns That Emerge From the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Code Decisions
Scholars of the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence generally agree that the Court
has not demonstrated any particular bankruptcy ideology, nor much of a sense that it even
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understands or cares about the Bankruptcy Code.672  Some have argued that the Court’s
decisions are driven by results;673 others have argued that the decisions are driven by
interpretive method, albeit an incoherent method.674
Scholars who have examined the Supreme Court’s interpretive methods in
bankruptcy cases have concluded either that the Court has shifted towards textualism,675
has pulled away from textualism,676 has employed no consistent, coherent interpretive
method,677 or has employed whatever method allows the Court to reach its desired
result.678  Critics have castigated the Court for employing textualism;679 for failing to
employ textualism;680 for ignoring congressional intent;681 and for failing to develop a
coherent bankruptcy ideology. 682
Although these studies may seem to be inconsistent, most are accurate, as far as
they go.  They are limited, however, by two factors.  First, they examine only limited
                                                
672 See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 7, at 6; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 825, 827.
673 See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 7, at 6, 111; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 826; Tabb, supra note 7, at
550-52, 556-58, 570-75.
674 See, e.g., Bottrell, supra  note 55, at 201 (arguing that the Court consistently uses textualism); Cuevas,
supra  note 55, at 438; Weinsch, supra  note 7, at 1832, 1839-51 (arguing that the Court applied textualism,
retreated to pre-Code practice, then returned to textualism)
675 See, e.g., Bottrell, supra  note 55, at 201 (arguing that the Court consistently uses textualism); Carroll,
supra  note 8, at 144-45, 212-15; Cuevas, supra  note 55, at 438; Lawless, supra note 7, at 6; Tabb &
Lawless, supra note 7, at 879-81; Rasmussen, supra  note 50; Weinsch, supra  note 7, at 1832, 1839-51
(arguing that the Court applied textualism, retreated to pre-Code practice, then returned to textualism).
676 See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 7, at 110; Weinsch, supra  note 7, at 1839-51.
677 See, e.g., Kelch, supra  note 7, at 291, 293-300 (“[T]he discomfort felt concerning the direction of
bankruptcy jurisprudence in the Supreme Court results not from any one theory [of interpretation]
propounded by the Court, but, rather, results from the lack of any universal theory, plain-meaning or
otherwise.”); Klee & Merola, supra  note 7, at 2; Lawless, supra note 7, at 91-95, 107-08; Rasmussen,
supra  note 50, at 553-64; Tabb, supra  note 7, at 570-75.
678 See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 7, at 550-52 (describing the Court’s bankruptcy opinions as a microcosm of
the justices’ political leanings; arguing that the Court follows a hierarchy of values, which are sometimes
obscured by uneven rules of construction).
679 See, e.g., Cuevas, supra  note 55, at 473-87; Cuevas, supra  note 8; Klee & Merola, supra  note 7; Lam,
supra note 8; Lawless, supra  note 7, at 100-06; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 827; Tabb, supra  note 7,
at 570-75.
680 See, e.g., Carroll, supra  note 8, at 212-15; Kelch, supra  note 7, at 291-92, 301-38; Rasmussen, supra
note 50.  See also  Botrell, supra  note 55, at 201 (predicting that the Court will construe all bankruptcy
cases using textualism); Cuevas, supra  note 55, at 448-73, 487-93 (explaining when to use textualism);
Weinsch, supra  note 7, at 1854-62 (explaining why the Court uses textualism in bankruptcy cases).
681 See, e.g., Klee & Merola, supra  note 7.
682 See, e.g., Klee & Merola, supra  note 7, at 1; Lawless, supra note 7; Tabb & Lawless, supra  note 7, at
827, 881-85.
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groups of the Court’s opinions.683  During any several-year period, the Court may,
indeed, have seemed to move toward or away from textualism or to apply an incoherent
interpretive method.  Second, they focus only on the interpretive methods the Court
employed in its majority opinions.
In this comprehensive study of all of the Court’s Bankruptcy Code decisions, I
have sought to determine the extent to which interpretive method has been a driving force
in the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence.  This study was rooted in the
hypothesis that interpreters could learn at least as much, if not more, about the Court’s
interpretive method by considering the types of issues that caused the Justices to agree
and disagree among themselves, as they could learn by examining only the Court’s
majority opinions.  To test this hypothesis, this study focused not simply on the Court’s
majority opinions, but rather on the extent to which disputes over interpretive method
caused Justices to diverge from the majority and write separate concurring or dissenting
opinions.
This study has revealed several strong patterns woven throughout the Court’s
bankruptcy decisions.  These patterns emerge when we examine the (i) varied interpretive
tools and canons the majority, concurring, and dissenting Justices have employed in the
Court’s unanimous and split decisions (Part IV.A.1), and (ii) patterns of disputes among
the Justices (Part IV.A.2).
1. Patterns that emerge from the Supreme Court’s split and non-split
Bankruptcy Code decisions
The Court has decided forty-eight Bankruptcy Code cases.684  Seven presented
constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions (subpart 1.a.).  Of the remaining forty-one
cases, fourteen were unanimous (subpart 1.b.).  In twenty of the twenty-seven non-
unanimous cases, Justices wrote separately because they disagreed with the majority’s
interpretive method (subpart 1.c.).  Two of the seven remaining cases involved tensions
between the Bankruptcy Code and other law (subpart 1.d.).  Three involved governmental
claims or enforcement proceedings (subpart 1.e.).  The final two cases presented disputes
concerning the application of the law to the facts (subpart 1.f.)
                                                
683 See, e.g., Botrell, supra  note 55 (reviewing cases decided in 1991 and 1992); Carroll, supra  note 8
(reviewing cases decided between 1989 and 1992); Cuevas, supra  note 55 (reviewing cases decided by the
Rehnquist Court up to 1992); Klee & Merola, supra  note 7 (reviewing cases decided between 1981 and
1987); Lawless, supra  note 7 (reviewing cases decided in the 1991 through 1995 Terms); Markell, supra
note 7 (reviewing cases decided in the 1990 through 1993 Terms); Tabb, supra  note 7 (reviewing cases
decided in the 1981 through 1986 Terms); Tabb & Lawless, supra  note 7 (reviewing cases decided in the
1986 through 1990 Terms); Weinsch, supra  note 7 (reviewing cases decided prior to 1992).
684 See Appendix I, post.
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a. The constitutional and quasi-constitutional question cases
Seven of these cases involved constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions.685
These cases reveal nothing about the Court’s methods for interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code, itself.686
Interestingly, however, these cases represent an inordinately large percentage of
the Court’s major split decisions.687  Three of the seven constitutional questions (43%)
caused major splits among the Justices.  Five (71%) caused either minor or major splits
among the Justices.  Six (86%) caused Justices to diverge from the majority opinion (in
dissenting or concurring opinions).  Only one of the seven cases resulted in a completely
unanimous opinion (14%) and only two resulted in opinions in which the Justices all
agreed on the result (29%).
In contrast, of the forty-one non-constitutional cases, only six (15%) caused major
splits among the Justices.  Only nineteen (46%) caused either minor or major splits
among the Justices.  Twenty-seven (66%) caused Justices to diverge from the majority
opinion.  Fourteen of the forty-one non-constitutional cases resulted in unanimous
opinions (34%), and twenty-two resulted in opinions in which all of the Justices agreed
on the result (54%).688
In other words, the Justices disagreed among themselves more widely when they
considered bankruptcy-related constitutional questions than when they interpreted the
Bankruptcy Code.
b. The unanimous cases
                                                
685 See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995); Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990);
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance,
492 U.S. 96 (1989); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
(1982). See also Appendices III, VI, post.
686 Whether one might discern in these opinions any insights concerning the Court’s views of the role of
bankruptcy law in the constitutional scheme is beyond the scope of this article.
687 See Appendix III, post.
688 See Appendix III, post.
Viewed another way, of the Court’s fifteen unanimous Bankruptcy Code decisions, only one
presented a constitutional question (6.66%).  Similarly, of the Court’s nine unanimous with concurrence
cases, only one presented a constitutional question (11.11%).  Thus, constitutional questions resulted in an
aggregate of only two of the twenty-four non-split decisions (8.33%).  Two of the fifteen minor splits
presented constitutional questions (13.33%).  Three of the nine major splits presented constitutional
questions (33.33%). Thus, constitutional questions resulted in an aggregate of five of the twenty-four split
decisions (20.83%).
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Of the forty-one non-constitutional cases, fourteen were unanimous.689  The
unanimous opinions appear to have employed three distinct interpretive methods.
Four of these cases relied only on the text of the statute.690  All four of these cases
were decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court, and three of these cases were written
by the Court’s leading textualists, Justices Scalia and Thomas.691  In two of these four
cases, however, the Court primarily interpreted a statute other than the Bankruptcy
Code.692  If these cases were excluded, only two, unanimous, textualist Bankruptcy Code
opinions would remain (one written by Justice Scalia, one written by Justice Thomas).693
Ten of the fourteen unanimous opinions relied upon more than the text.  Five of
these opinions relied upon the text, structure, and history. 694  The Court decided one of
these cases before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and four after he joined the Court.695
The other five cases deferred to pre-Code practice.696  The Court decided one of these
cases before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and four after he joined the Court.697
Even if one argued that some of these ten cases were “primarily” textual, and that
analysis of “structure” is a holistic way of considering the text, references to history
(whether legislative history or broad pre-Code history) remove these cases from the
textual fold.  Moreover, many of these cases considered structure in a substantive way,
which included the broad design, object, and policy of the statute.  These cannot be
categorized together with the narrow, linguistic, holistic analysis favored by textualists.
                                                
689 See Appendix III, post.  Of the fifteen unanimous cases, one raised a constitutional question.  The other
fourteen involved Bankruptcy Code interpretation questions.
690 See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993); Holywell Corp.
v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32
(1991); see also supra  Part  III.B.3.b.
691 Justice Thomas wrote Rake and Holywell; Justice Scalia wrote Strumpf.
692 These are MCorp  and Holywell.
693 These are Rake (per Thomas, J.) and Strumpf (per Scalia, J.).
694 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998);
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); see supra  Parts III.B.3.c, III.B.2.
695 The Court decided Weintraub before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and Kawaauhau, Fink , Johnson ,
and Grogan after Justice Scalia joined the Court.
696 See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); Norwest
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983); see supra
Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.d.
697 The Court decided Whiting Pools before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and Cohen, Noland, Ahlers and
Timbers after Justice Scalia joined the Court.
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Viewed from the perspective of the Court’s unanimous cases, the much-discussed
trend toward textualism is weak, at best.  Although Justices Scalia and Thomas clearly
favor textualism, 698 textualism rarely draws unanimous support among the Justices.
Instead, the unanimous opinions identify three basic elements of Bankruptcy
Code interpretation – the text, structure (linguistic and substantive), and history
(including legislative history, broad history, and pre-Code practice).  None of these
fourteen unanimous cases, however, applied a canon of deference to important federal,
state, or governmental interests.  Cases involving such interests tend to create rifts among
the Justices.
Because the unanimous cases provide little guidance concerning when the Court
will chose one interpretive method over another, we next consider whether disputes
among the Justices provide any insight into this question.
c. The interpretive dispute cases
In the twenty-seven remaining non-constitutional, non-unanimous cases, one or
more Justices wrote a separate opinion. 699 Disagreements among the Justices over
interpretive method caused the separate opinions in at least twenty of these twenty-seven
cases, that is, seventy-four percent of the cases in which one or more Justices wrote a
separate opinion. 700  The conclusion that interpretive method lies at the heart of disputes
among the Justices in Bankruptcy Code cases is inescapable.
Interestingly, before Justice Scalia joined the Court, only two Bankruptcy Code
cases were decided in which a Justice wrote separately to criticize the majority’s
interpretive method.701  After Justice Scalia joined the Court, Justices wrote separately to
                                                
698 See Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post; infra Part IV.A.1.c.2, IV.A.2.
699 In eight of these cases, one or more justices concurred; in nineteen, one of more justices dissented.  See
Appendix III, post.
700 See Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411
(1999); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,
516 U.S. 124 (1995); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); Nobelman v. American Sav.
Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380
(1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249
(1992); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S.
157 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53
(1990); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of
Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982).
The separate opinions in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 456 U.S. 513 (1984) also arguably apply
different interpretive methods; however, the foregoing list is limited to those cases in which the separate
opinions clearly reflect interpretive disputes.
701 See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Central Trust
Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982).
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criticize the majority’s interpretive methods in at least eighteen of the Court’s forty
bankruptcy cases.702
What do these cases tell us, if anything, about the Court’s interpretive method?
1. The Justices care about method
First, the Court’s Bankruptcy Code cases reveal that the Justices care about
interpretive method.  This observation is clear from the large numbers of separate
opinions in which the Justices criticize the majority’s interpretive methods.  It is
highlighted when individual Justices struggle to define a coherent interpretive method for
the Bankruptcy Code,703 and lament that other Justices’ opinions impair interpretive
coherence.704  Justices Blackmun, Scalia, Stevens, Thomas, and O’Connor have more
actively sought to define a desirable Bankruptcy Code interpretive method than have the
other Justices.705
The problem is not that the Justices have no interest in employing a consistent
interpretive method.  They likely would prefer nothing more.  The Justices are not
bankruptcy experts and show little desire to become bankruptcy experts.  They are forced
to review bankruptcy cases because there is no other forum for resolving splits among the
circuit courts of appeal.  These splits, which are the single largest source of Supreme
                                                                                                                                                
702 The pre-Justice Scalia interpretive disputes represent 25% of the cases decided before Justice Scalia
joined the Court.  The interpretive dispute cases decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court represent 45%
of the cases decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court.  If we exclude the constitutional cases from this
calculation, we discover that justices wrote separately because of disputes over interpretative method in six
of the eight non-constitutional concurrences (75%), and six of the seven non-constitutional concurrences
after Justice Scalia joined the Court  (85.7%).  Similarly, justices wrote separately because of interpretive
disputes in fourteen of the nineteen aggregate non-constitutional dissents (74.7%), and twelve of the sixteen
non-constitutional dissents after Justice Scalia joined the Court (75%), and two of the three non-
constitutional dissents before Justice Scalia joined the Court (66.7%).  See Appendix III, post.
703 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411,
1424 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (quoted supra  text accompanying note 542);
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.) (quoted supra text accompanying
notes 487-88); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417, 433-34 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 504); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.) (quoted supra  text accompanying note 448); United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-43 (1989) (per Blackmun, J.) (quoted supra  text
accompanying notes 637-40); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249-54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoted supra text
accompanying notes 647-51).
704 See, e.g., LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (quoted supra  text
accompanying note 542; criticizing the majority’s interpretive method); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 422-23
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted supra text accompanying notes 498-99; castigating the Court for applying a
“one-subsection-at-a-time” approach); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoted supra text accompanying note 322; castigating the Court for applying divergent
interpretive methods); Davenport, 495 U.S. at 565 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.)
(quoted supra  text accompanying note 448, criticizing the Court’s interpretive method).
705 See supra  notes 703, 704.
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Court bankruptcy cases, often arise from the circuit courts’ use of conflicting interpretive
methods.706  Although bankruptcy experts might prefer that the Court take a substantive,
policy-oriented view of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court likely would prefer simply to
view the Bankruptcy Code as a statute subject to accepted interpretive rules.  Many of the
Justices are striving to achieve just this goal.  The analysis in Part III of this article
reveals that most of the Justices decide bankruptcy cases based upon principles of
statutory interpretation, rather than substantive bankruptcy policy.  The problem is that
the Justices disagree among themselves concerning what those interpretive rules should
be.
The Justices have been unable to convince each other of the wisdom of their
varied interpretive approaches.  Let us consider the status of the Justices’ efforts to define
the parameters of the three interpretive elements identified in the unanimous opinions:
text, structure, and history.
2. The statutory text
All of the Justices agree that, in some cases, the text alone answers the
interpretive question.  Different Justices, however, hold different views concerning when
the text alone is determinative.707
As previously noted, the Court issued four unanimous textual opinions.708
Appendix VI reveals that, in eleven other cases, the Court issued a primarily textual
majority opinion, but one or more Justices responded with a separate, non-textual
concurrence or dissent.709  In other words, the Court decided fifteen of its forty-one non-
constitutional cases by textual opinions (37%) and twenty-six by non-textual opinions
(63%).  In eight of the fifteen textual opinions, either Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas
wrote the majority opinion. 710  Justice Blackmun wrote two of the seven remaining
                                                
706 See Appendix II, post; see, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
707 See Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
708 See supra  note 690.
709 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,
516 U.S. 124 (1995); Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503
U.S. 393 (1992); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U.S. 638 (1992); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991);
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enters .,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S.
354 (1982); see also  Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
710 See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) (per Scalia, J.); Things Remembered, 516 U.S. 124
(per Thomas, J.); Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324 (per Thomas, J.); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (per
Thomas, J.); Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (per Thomas, J.); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992) (per
Thomas, J.); Taylor, 503 U.S. 638 (per Thomas, J.); Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (per Scalia, J.).
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textual majority opinions.711  No other Justice wrote more than one textual majority
opinion. 712
In eight of the twenty-six cases decided by non-textual majority opinions (31%),
one or more Justices wrote a textual concurrence or dissent.713  Justice Scalia wrote four
of these separate, textual opinions (one of which Justice Souter joined), Justice Thomas
wrote two (one of which Justice Scalia joined), Justice O’Connor wrote one (which
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter joined), and Justice Marshall wrote one (which
Justice Stevens joined).714
These cases reflect a substantial number of textual majority opinions and separate
opinions, despite the very limited numbers of bankruptcy cases in which the Justices have
unanimously applied textual interpretation.  These cases also confirm that Justices Scalia
and Thomas have written most of the textual opinions, and that textual interpretation has
significantly impaired the Court’s ability to reach accord in bankruptcy cases.
Three issues drive the Justices’ disputes concerning the application of textual
interpretation.  First, what degree of inexactitude is required to trigger consultation of
sources other than the text?  Will the Court limit its inquiry to the text if the language is
clear, unambiguous, plain, free of a scrivener’s error, or consistent with the drafters’
intent?  Second, how does the Court determine whether the language is, in fact, plain (or
unambiguous, et cetera)?  Third, if the language meets whatever clarity test the Court
applies, is the interpreter prohibited from looking beyond the text, discouraged from
looking beyond the text, or encouraged to look beyond the text but cautioned that little
weight will be given to sources that contradict the text?
Let us consider how the interpretive guidelines advocated by different Justices
answer these three questions.
First, the formalists search for the meaning of the text rather than the intentions of
the drafters.  Consistent with this narrow focus, they employ interpretive rules that are
designed to squeeze as much meaning as possible from the words, in order to obviate any
need to look beyond the words.  They prohibit interpreters from considering sources other
                                                
711 See Toibb, 501 U.S. 157; Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 235.
712 See Rash , 520 U.S. 953 (per Ginsburg, J.); Barnhill, 503 U.S. 393 (per Rehnquist, C.J.); Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (per Stevens, J.); Davenport, 495
U.S. 552 (per Marshall, J.); Geiger, 454 U.S. 354 (per curiam).
713 See Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring joined by Scalia, J.); United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah,
Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 215 n.†, 229 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Scalia, J.,
declining to join part of the opinion); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507
U.S. 380, 399 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter, & Thomas, JJ.); Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.); Patterson v. Shumate, 504
U.S. 753, 766 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.)
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp ., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), is excluded because, although both the
majority and dissent claim to have applied plain meaning, each considered sources other than the text.  See
supra notes 606-23.
714 See supra  note 713.
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than the text unless the text is ambiguous, they require a high level of ambiguity, and they
rarely find ambiguity.  More specifically, Justice Thomas employs a prohibitive test.  He
will not look beyond the language if the language is “clear” or “unambiguous.”715  Justice
Scalia also employs a prohibitive test.  He will not look beyond the language unless there
is a “scrivener’s error” that produces “an absurd result.”716  Justice Scalia’s test, on its
face, appears to be more restrictive than Justice Thomas’s test.717  Justices Thomas and
Scalia are far less willing to find ambiguity than are the other Justices.718
Second, at the other end of the spectrum, Justice Stevens searches for
congressional intent or statutory purpose. To ensure that the apparent meaning of the text
accurately conveys such intents or purposes, he encourages the Court to consider sources
other than the text if the statute contains “some uncertainty.”719  He will find “sufficient
ambiguity” to consult sources other than the text720 far more readily than will Justices
Thomas and Scalia.  Moreover, Justice Stevens seems to advocate a permissive test under
which the Court may consult non-textual sources even when the language is “plain.”  In
those cases, however, the party encouraging the Court to adopt a meaning contrary to the
plain text will carry an “exceptionally heavy” burden. 721
The other Justice’s views lay somewhere between these two extremes.  Like
Justice Stevens, they generally claim to be searching for congressional intent or statutory
purpose.  They are more willing than Justice Stevens, however, to apply a plain meaning
rule.  Such a rule presumes that the plain text accurately conveys Congress’s intent and
prohibits examination of other sources if the language is plain.  Nevertheless, they are
more reluctant than Justices Thomas and Scalia to find (or force) a “plain” meaning when
                                                
715 See, e.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993) (per Thomas, J.) (reasoning that, if the language is
clear, the courts’ sole function is to enforce the text); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
254 (1992) (reasoning that, if the language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete).  See also Central
Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1982) (per curiam)
(reasoning that, if the language is plain, the courts’ sole function is to enforce the text).
716 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
717 This test seems to require more than mere ambiguity.  It clearly requires more than merely “some
uncertainty.”  Cf. infra note 719.
718 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411,
1426 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (finding the language to be plain even though the
new value question has caused wide splits among the circuit courts, the Court has granted certiorari in three
new value cases, and the Court has never definitively resolved the new value question).
719 See Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (urging the
Court to consider legislative history whenever there is “some uncertainty” about the meaning).
720See Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (consulting
legislative history to resolve a textual anomaly); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 167 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the use of the word “only” introduced “sufficient ambiguity” to look beyond the
text); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 360 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
721 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1991); see also Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,
760-65 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.) (applying the Wolas “heavy burden” test).
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the language is the subject of serious dispute (among the Justices, the advocates, or the
lower courts).  Some of the Justices are particularly reluctant to find plain meaning to be
determinative if the text conflicts with established judicial practices.  Consequently, the
Court’s opinions that rely solely upon the Bankruptcy Code’s text typically are the
product of a voting block comprising the two textualist Justices, who rarely look beyond
the text, and several legal process Justices, who embrace a plain meaning rule in their
search for intent or purpose.  For example, three of the sitting Justices (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy) joined the textual opinion in United States v.
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.722  The late Justice Blackmun wrote Ron Pair.  Justice White,
who also joined the Ron Pair majority, is no longer on the Court.  Arguably, the three
remaining Ron Pair majority Justices together with Justice Thomas (who later joined the
Court) create a textualist block that would prohibit the Court from looking beyond the
text except in the “rare” case in which “literal” application of the language will produce a
result “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.”723  Justice Blackmun,
however, also wrote decidedly non-textual opinions, including two of the Court’s
strongest pre-Code practice opinions,724 one of which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy also joined.725  These opinions urge the Court to be chary of finding the text to
be plain if the text seems to be inconsistent with established prior practices or policies.
Notice that Justice Blackmun’s “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters”
test in Ron Pair is not a textualist interpretive device; rather, it is device for discerning
congressional intent.  Cases such as this reflect that, although all of the Justices have
joined or written a “textual” opinion, the non-textualist Justices (i.e., all of the sitting
Justices except Justices Scalia and Thomas) typically have done so only when they are
convinced that the plain meaning accurately embodies Congress’s intent.
Similar incongruous results appear when we consider which Justices joined
textual and non-textual opinions in other cases.  For example, five Justices joined both
the heavily pre-Code majority in Kelly v. Robinson, in which the Court deferred to state
criminal restitution proceedings, and the anti-pre-Code majority in Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, in which the Court declined to defer to such
proceedings.726
The import of these cases is unclear.  Perhaps the incongruity arises simply
because cases that implicate pre-Code law or tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and
other law present more difficult interpretive issues.  The Justices’ comments on
                                                
722 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
723 Id. at 240-45.
724 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (per Blackmun, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy,
O’Connor, Stevens, & White, JJ.); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564-74
(1990) (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.); see also Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,
760-65 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.) (applying the Wolas “heavy burden” test).
725 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410.
726 See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36 (1986).  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Scalia, and White joined the majority
opinions in both Kelly and Davenport.  See supra note 447.
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interpretive method often address the relationship between the plain meaning canon and
the pre-Code canon. 727  Perhaps a solid core of Justices (i.e., Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
Stevens, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Blackmun and O’Connor) care more about
interpretive method than do the other Justices.  Perhaps the other Justices are more
willing to join an opinion if they agree with the result, even if they do not agree with the
method.  If this latter supposition is true, however, it is not clear what criteria those
Justices use to determine that the result is correct, if the criteria is not that the Court
applied the proper interpretive method.
Although many of the Court’s textual bankruptcy opinions embrace the
prohibitive test of the standard plain meaning rule, other opinions shy from this rule in
favor of two alternatives.  The first allows the Court to consult other sources, but subjects
the parties to a heavy burden to demonstrate that Congress intended a result other than
the result the language suggests.  The second, which presents the greatest area of discord,
urges the Court to be wary of finding the language to be plain if the language conflicts
with prior practice.  Parts IV.A.1.c.4 and IV.A.1.d examine the relationship between the
plain meaning rule and the pre-Code canon.
3. Structure and policy
The Court’s holistic (or structural) canons contain both linguistic and substantive
components.  Both components urge interpreters to examine the entire statute to
determine the meaning of a particular phrase.  Structural analysis presents an intriguing
challenge for textualists because it considers only internal sources of meaning – i.e., the
words of the statute.  Its broad examination of the text, however, raises questions
concerning how internal, textual “meaning” should be defined.  Textualists argue that
interpreters should not consult sources external to the statute (such as legislative history)
to discern congressional intent or statutory purpose because only the enacted text is law.
External sources, therefore, are not democratically legitimate sources of meaning.
Because structural analysis consults only internal sources of meaning, it obviates this
concern.  Structural analysis is a critical aspect of interpretation that holds great promise
for reconciling the tension between “text” and “policy,” particularly in the context of a
comprehensive statute such as the Bankruptcy Code.  To date, however, structural
analysis has received inadequate attention in the modern interpretative debate.
The linguistic component urges the Court to read words to mean the same thing
throughout the Bankruptcy Code.728  When Justice Thomas engages in holistic analysis,
he focuses primarily on this aspect of holistic interpretation. 729  This is consistent with a
formalist search for textual meaning.
                                                
727 See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417-20 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.); Pennsylvania Dep’t of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-43 (1989) (per Blackmun, J.).
728 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1993);
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992).
729 See, e.g., Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75.
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The substantive component contains two elements.  The narrower element
encourages the Court to consider the substantive effect, rather than just the language, of
related Bankruptcy Code provisions.730  Justice Scalia has employed this aspect of
holistic interpretation as well as the linguistic aspect of holistic interpretation. 731
Second, the broader element of the substantive holistic canon encourages the
Court to interpret the language in light of the Bankruptcy Code’s broader design, object,
and policy. 732  These two components of the substantive holistic canon suggest that
different levels of generality (i.e., the meaning or purpose of the section, the related group
of sections, and the Bankruptcy Code as a whole) are important and should be
harmonized.
The broader aspect of the substantive holistic canon also suggests that “policy” or
“purpose” is an integral part of the statute and that the contraposition of “text” and
“policy” is a false dichotomy.  The question is not whether to consider policy, but rather,
where to find it.  The canon suggests that the structure of the statute will reveal its
purposes and policies, even if the text does not expressly state those policies.
Consequently, interpreters need not consult “external” sources, such as legislative
history, to identify a statute’s policies.  Justices Thomas and Scalia have not advocated
this type of holistic analysis.  Justice Stevens, however, has.733
For example, consider the effect of a rule that instructs interpreters to apply the
Bankruptcy Code’s text but prohibits them from applying unexpressed “policies.”  One
might argue that such a rule prohibits the Court from considering the Bankruptcy Code’s
policies of rehabilitation or equitable distribution.  These policies, however, reveal
themselves throughout the language, structure, and design of the Bankruptcy Code,
although they are never expressly stated.
When an interpreter considers the discharge provisions or the very existence of
chapter 11, how can she help but see the fresh start policy at work?  The difference
between saying that (i) the text grants certain debtors a discharge, (ii) the text reveals a
congressional intent to grant certain debtors a discharge or fresh start, (iii) the purpose of
the discharge is to grant certain debtors a discharge or fresh start, and (iv) the Bankruptcy
Code embodies a fresh start “policy,” is semantic.  The same reasoning applies to the
“policy” of rehabilitating business debtors (expressed in the structure of chapter 11), the
“policy” of equitable distribution (expressed in the automatic stay, avoidance powers,
distribution provisions, et cetera), and the “policy” of maximizing value (expressed in
avoidance powers, executory contract powers, turnover provisions, et cetera).  Of course
each of these “policies” is subject to limitations; but those limitations are also found in
                                                                                                                                                
730 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 n.13 (1991); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
731 See, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Patterson, 504 U.S. at 766 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Timbers, 484 U.S. 365.
732 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 n.13.
733 Id.
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the Bankruptcy Code’s text and structure, such as the provisions prohibiting the discharge
of the debtor and of various debts in specified circumstances.734
Consequently, to argue that interpreters may only consult the text and may not
consider policy is incongruous.  The Bankruptcy Code’s policies reveal themselves to
anyone who reads the Bankruptcy Code’s text and listens closely enough to hear its
music.  Although bankruptcy experts intrinsically understand how the complicated
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code interact, the Supreme Court understands this
interaction only when bankruptcy experts clearly explain it to the Court in each case.
Absent such an explanation, the Court may be able to locate the use of similar terms
throughout the Bankruptcy Code, but bankruptcy experts cannot expect the Court to
employ thoughtful, substantive, structural analysis.
4. History, including legislative history and pre-Code
practice
The Court’s Bankruptcy Code opinions refer to two distinct aspects of the
statute’s history: legislative history, and broader Bankruptcy Code history.  This broader
history includes “pre-Code practice” and the development of bankruptcy doctrine over
time.
(a) Legislative history
A large number of the Court’s decisions have referred to legislative history, at
least in passing.735  Very few opinions, however, have engaged in a lengthy and pivotal
                                                
734 For example, the existence of chapter 11 signifies a policy of promoting reorganization.  Preference
avoidance maximizes the estate and fosters equitable distribution.  The assumption and rejection of
executory contracts fosters reorganization; assumption and assignment preserve value.  Provisions on
obtaining credit foster reorganization.  The automatic stay fosters the fresh start and reorganization, gives
the debtor a breathing spell, and prevents a race to the courthouse.  Discharge fosters the fresh start, but the
exceptions to discharge limit the fresh start to the debtors Congress has deemed unworthy of a fresh start,
for policy reasons.  Indeed, the overarching bankruptcy policies are so integrated throughout the
Bankruptcy Code that it is virtually impossible to identify a single section of the Bankruptcy Code that does
not “implement” one or more of these policies.  The Bankruptcy Code reflects numerous other, more
specific policies, as well.  For example, the priority provisions reflect congressional policy determinations
to favor certain debts (such as child support) over others.
735  See, e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539 (1996); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760-
62 & n.4 (1992); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78,
85-87 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 156-60 (1991); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496
U.S. 53, 57, 59 n.3, 61, 63-67 (1990); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
350-52 (1985); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 n.3, 280 & nn.6-8 (1985); NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 207-09
(1983); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 355-56
(1982).  In several other cases, the Court considered but rejected appeals to legislative history because the
history did not support the parties’ arguments, or was inconsistent with the text and broader history.  See,
e.g., Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411,1421
n.25 (1999); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211, 218-21 (1998); Noland, 517 U.S. 542; United
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analysis of legislative history. 736  In bankruptcy cases, the Court generally prefers to
engage in a tracing of the historical development of bankruptcy doctrines (through broad
history and pre-Code practice) rather than to rely upon isolated statements in the
legislative history. 737
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia has written concurring opinions objecting to the
use of legislative history in Bankruptcy Code interpretation.  These opinions, however,
found no joiners.738  Justice Stevens tends to consult legislative history to confirm textual
meaning even when other Justices find no need to consult sources other than the text.  He
wrote one concurring opinion objecting to the Court’s failure to examine legislative
history, but this concurrence went without joiners.739
Disputes over legislative history have not created the level of histrionics typically
seen in other fields of law.  In the bankruptcy context, at least, the tension between text
and pre-Code practice has apparently surpassed the tension between text and legislative
history as a flash point for interpretive disputes among the Justices.
(b) Broad history and pre-Code practice
Broad history and pre-Code practice play a significant role in Bankruptcy Code
interpretation.
In a significant number of the Court’s non-constitutional bankruptcy opinions, the
Court considered the broad history of the Bankruptcy Code provisions in issue, but did
not expressly refer or defer to pre-Code practice.740  In these cases, the Court typically
examined prior law, amendments, and judicial interpretations, and considered how the
relevant bankruptcy doctrine had developed over time.
In approximately one-fourth of the Court’s non-constitutional Bankruptcy Code
cases, the Court expressly considered pre-Code practice as part of its review of the
Bankruptcy Code’s history. 741  Five of these were unanimous decisions.742  In addition, in
                                                                                                                                                
Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988); cf. United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that consultation of legislative history was “hardly
necessary”).
736 But see Begier, 496 U.S. 53 (consulting the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and Internal
Revenue Code).
737 See, e.g., supra  Part III.B.3.c, d; infra Part IV.A.4.b.
738 See, e.g., Wolas, 502 U.S. at 163 (Scalia, J., concurring); Begier, 496 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J, concurring).
739 See, e.g., Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
740 See, e.g., Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995);
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
741 See Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1417-
19 (1999) (dictum); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998); United States v. Reorganized CF & I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 221 (1996); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539 (1996);
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417-20 (1992); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202-
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two cases in which the Court did not defer to pre-Code practice, dissenters argued that
Court should have deferred to pre-Code practice.743
Broad history and pre-Code practice appear to exist on a continuum of the same
line of interpretive inquiry.  An interpreter examines both as part of a progression that
considers the provisions of prior law (either the Bankruptcy Act or prior versions of the
Bankruptcy Code), judicial interpretations of those provisions, judicial doctrines created
to fill gaps in prior law, prior congressional action (including enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code and of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code), and judicial
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Justices disagree, however, concerning whether and when the Court should
consult broad history or pre-Code law. 744  These disputes are particularly evident in
tensions between the plain meaning canon and pre-Code practice.  Some Justices
discount the text if the text seems to be inconsistent with pre-Code practice and Congress
has not expressly stated in the legislative history that it intended to alter pre-Code
practice.745  Others consider pre-Code practice only if the text contains a gap or
ambiguity. 746
For example, in Kelly v. Robinson,747 the Court relied upon pre-Code practice to
defer to state criminal processes.748  In contrast, in Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare v. Davenport749 the Court embraced the same pre-Code canon that it had applied
in Kelly, but concluded that Congress had, indeed, evinced in the language an intent to
                                                                                                                                                
05 (1988); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs ., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-49 (1986); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494, 501 (1986); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208 (1983).
742 See Cohen, 523 U.S. 213; Noland, 517 U.S. 535; Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197; Timbers , 484 U.S. 365; Whiting
Pools, 462 U.S. 198.
743 See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 249-55 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
744 A comprehensive analysis of the Court’s approach to pre-Code practice is beyond the scope of this
article.
745 See, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410 (per Blackmun, J.); Davenport, 495 U.S. at 565 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249-55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
746 See, e.g., LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
747 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
748 Id.
749 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
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alter the pre-Code practice of deference to state criminal processes.750  Both cases were
decided over strident dissents.751
Similarly, in Dewsnup v. Timm,752 the majority rejected a seemingly “plain”
textual meaning because that meaning conflicted with pre-Code practice, and Congress
had not clearly evinced an intent to change pre-Code practice.753  The Dewsnup dissent
castigated the Court for deferring to pre-Code practice when the text was clear.754
These disputes have left the lower courts without adequate guidance concerning
the Court’s perspective on pre-Code practice.  A striking demonstration of this confusion
occurred in 1991 in the Fifth Circuit case of Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture).755  In Greystone, the
court was asked to consider whether the so-called “new value exception” to the “absolute
priority rule” had survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.756  When Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it modified the absolute priority rule, but made no express
mention of the exception.  In an opinion that relied on a perceived trend toward
textualism in the Supreme Court,757 the Fifth Circuit held that “[n]either in the Code’s
language, nor in the context of a previous, different reorganization law, nor in legislative
history, nor in policy is there room for a ‘new value exception’ to the absolute priority
rule now defined by § 1129(b)(2)(B).”758
Less than two months later, however, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Dewsnup,759 which relied heavily on pre-Code practice.  Within forty-three days after the
Court issued Dewsnup, the Fifth Circuit had received a petition for rehearing, granted it,
and issued a terse withdrawal of the portion of its Greystone opinion that had resolved the
absolute priority question. 760  Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly state the reason
                                                
750 Id.
751 See Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
752 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
753 Id.
754 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
755 Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture ( In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995
F.2d 1274 (1991), modified on reh’g , 995 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1992).
756 For a discussion of absolute priority and the new value exception, see supra notes 236-48, 520-34 and
accompanying text.
757 See Greystone, 948 F.2d at 1281-84 (original opinion prior to modification on rehearing) (issued
November 19, 1991).
758 Id. at 1284.
759 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (issued January 15, 1992).
760 Greystone, 995 F.2d 1274, modified on reh’g , 995 F.2d at 1284 (“In withdrawing this portion of the
panel opinion we emphasize that the bankruptcy court’s opinion on the ‘new value exception’ to the
113
for withdrawing the opinion, Judge Jones, the author of the original opinion, identified
Dewsnup as the culprit in her dissent from the rehearing.761  She noted that:
[h]ow one should approach issues of a statutory construction arising from
the Bankruptcy Code has been clouded, in my view, by Dewsnup v. Timm
[citation omitted].  Nevertheless, in reaffirming what I wrote about the
“new value exception” in Part IV of the original opinion, and therefore in
voting against a rehearing, I would hope to stand with Galileo, who,
rebuffed by a higher temporal authority, muttered under his breath, “Eppur
si muove.” (“And yet it moves.”).762
Eight years later, Justices Scalia and Thomas commented on Greystone in their
concurrence in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership.763  They noted that the interpretive confusion created by Dewsnup
apparently had prompted the Fifth Circuit to withdraw its decision on the new value
issue, and argued that the majority’s interpretive method in LaSalle “only thickens the
fog.”764
The relationship between plain meaning and pre-Code practice is complicated by
the fact that many of the clashes between these two canons have arisen when Bankruptcy
Code was in tension with other state or federal law. 765  Part IV.A.1.d considers the
Court’s use of the pre-Code practice canon to defer to important state or federal laws or
governmental interests.
(c) The interaction with other law cases
Finally, there are seven remaining non-constitutional, non-unanimous cases.766
Two of these cases involved a clash between the Bankruptcy Code and other law. 767
                                                                                                                                                
absolute priority rule has been vacated and we express no view whatsoever on that part of the bankruptcy
court’s opinion.”).
761 Id. at 1285 (Jones, J., dissenting) (voting against rehearing, reaffirming the original opinion, which she
had written, and arguing that Dewsnup had clouded the approach to statutory construction of the
Bankruptcy Code).
762 Id. at 1285 (Jones, J., dissenting).
763 Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1424
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).
764 Id. at 1426.
765 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
766 See United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996); Field v. Mans,
516 U.S. 59 (1995); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); United States v. Energy Resources Co.,
495 U.S. 545 (1990); California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989);
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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Three involved governmental tax claims or enforcement proceedings.768  Two involved
disputes concerning the application of the law to the facts.769
In addition to the two bankruptcy/other law cases that did not lead to interpretive
disputes, at least four of the Court’s interpretive dispute split decisions also involved
tensions between the bankruptcy and other law.770  Similarly, in addition to the three
governmental interest cases that did not lead to interpretive disputes, several of the cases
that did give rise to interpretive disputes also involved governmental tax claims and
enforcement proceedings.771  This Part will compare all of these interaction with other
law and governmental interest cases.
First, in the six cases in which the Bankruptcy Code came into tension with other
state or federal law, the Court resolved these tensions as follows:
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection772 presented a tension between the bankruptcy abandonment power
and environmental law.  The Court identified a pre-Code canon that limited the
abandonment power, and used the pre-Code canon to defer to environmental
law.773
Ohio v. Kovacs774 presented a tension between bankruptcy law and environmental
law.  The Court declined to defer to environmental law, and did not use a pre-
Code canon. 775
Kelly v. Robinson776 presented a tension between bankruptcy and criminal
restitution law.  The Court identified a pre-Code practice of deference to criminal
                                                                                                                                                
767 See Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (involving bankruptcy law versus environmental law); Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513
(involving bankruptcy law versus labor law).
768 See Reorganized CF & I, 518 U.S. 213 (involving the definition of excise tax and subordination of a tax
penalty); Energy Resources, 495 U.S. 545 (involving trust fund taxes); Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844
(involving state taxation of liquidation sales).
769 See Field, 516 U.S. 59; Farrey, 500 U.S. 291; Part IV.A.1.e.
770 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
771 See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991); Begier v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
772 Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494.
773 Id.
774 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
775 Id.
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processes, and applied the pre-Code canon to defer to state criminal restitution
law.777
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport778 presented a tension
between bankruptcy and criminal restitution law.  The Court declined to defer to
criminal restitution law.  The Court cited the pre-Code canon, but concluded that
Congress had evinced in the Bankruptcy Code’s language its intent to alter the
pre-Code practice of deference to state criminal processes.779
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco780 presented a tension between bankruptcy and labor
law.  The Court declined to defer to labor law, and did not identify any pre-Code
practice of deference to labor law. 781
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.782 presented a tension between bankruptcy
avoidance powers and state foreclosure law.  The Court, using reasoning
analogous to the pre-Code canon, found that the two bodies of law had coexisted
for centuries.  Therefore, the Court found that bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance
law could not be used to set aside a regularly conducted state foreclosure sale.783
These cases reveal a three-to-three split. Three common factors characterize the
three cases in which non-bankruptcy law trumped bankruptcy law. First, in each of these
cases, the Court relied heavily on a pre-Code practice of bankruptcy law deference to the
other law.784  In other words, the Court essentially assumed that Congress knew of this
deferential practice and intended to continue this practice.  This type of finding was
critical because each case presented a tension between bankruptcy law and state law. The
Supremacy Clause785 makes federal law superior to state law.  The Court, therefore, could
only defer to state law if the federal law, itself, embodied a policy or practice of
deference.  Each case preserved state law, despite the Bankruptcy Code. Second, in each
                                                                                                                                                
776 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
777 Id.
778 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
779 Id.
780 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
781 Id.
782 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
783 Id.
784 See BFP, 511 U.S. 531; Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
785 See U.S. CONST . art. VI.
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of these cases, the Court employed non-bankruptcy-centric reasoning.  Third, in each of
these cases, the Court’s holding favored a governmental entity. In Kelly, the Court
permitted the state to force a restitution order.786  In Midlantic, the Court prohibited the
trustee from abandoning polluted property.  Two state environmental agencies, that night
otherwise have incurred the costs of cleanup, had opposed abandonment.787  In BFP, the
Court’s refusal to set aside the foreclosure sale favored both the buyer (a private party)
and the federal governmental successor to the saving and loan association that had
conducted the foreclosure sale (the Resolution Trust Corporation).788
In contrast, in the three cases in which the Court held that bankruptcy law
trumped non-bankruptcy law, the Court employed bankruptcy-centric reasoning and
found no pre-Code practice of deference.789  In all three cases, the Court ruled against a
governmental entity.
For example, compare Bildisco and Midlantic.  In Bildisco, bankruptcy policy,
supported by an arguably plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code, overcame labor law
policy.  In Midlantic, environmental policy, incorporated through a pre-Code canon,
overcame an arguably plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code.  Bildisco allowed a debtor
to modify a union contract without complying with labor law.  Midlantic allowed a
debtor to abandon property only if it first complied with environmental law.  The
Bankruptcy Code allowed rejection of contracts without an express exception for union
contracts,790 just as the Bankruptcy Code allowed abandonment of property without an
express exception for polluted property. 791  The only significant distinction between these
cases is that, in Midlantic, the Court identified a pre-Code practice of deference to
environmental law.  In other words, according to the Court, deference to environmental
law was codified as a limitation on the abandonment power.  In contrast, the concept of
rejecting contracts was codified without a policy of deference to labor law. 792
                                                
786 Kelly, 479 U.S. 531.
787 Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494.
788 BFP, 511 U.S. 531.
789 See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S.
274 (1985); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
Similarly, in those cases that implicated state law, but in which the Court found no direct conflict
between the Bankruptcy Code and state law and no important state interest, the Court uniformly
subordinated the state law to the Bankruptcy Code.  See Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211
(1998) (state law grace period for perfection of security interests versus Bankruptcy Code grace period for
avoiding preferential perfection); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (state spendthrift trust law
implicated in legislative history of exclusion from debtors’ estate of beneficial interests in certain trusts);
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (state law definition of exempt property versus Bankruptcy Code lien
avoidance provision). None of these cases involved governmental entities.
790 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994); cf. id. § 1113 (enacted after Bildisco).
791 Id. § 554.
792 After Bildisco, however, Congress promptly amended the Bankruptcy Code to add special rules for the
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994).
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Unfortunately, no easy formula exists by which interpreters can determine
whether the Court will discover a pre-Code practice of deference to other laws.
Following the Court’s approach in Kelly and Midlantic, one might search pre-Code
bankruptcy cases for judicial expressions of a policy of deference.  This approach would
not, however, have enabled an interpreter to predict the result in BFP, in which the Court
deferred to state foreclosure law simply because such law had co-existed for centuries
with fraudulent transfer law.  Bankruptcy law and labor law have also co-existed, yet the
Court in Bildisco declined to defer to labor law.  These interpretive problems arise
because the Justices hold conflicting views concerning the role of pre-Code practices in
Bankruptcy Code interpretation and concerning how to reconcile the Bankruptcy Code
with other state or federal law.  The challenge of discerning the Justices’ views on these
interpretive issues is further complicated by the fact that some Justices who generally
reject appeals to pre-Code practice (notably Justices Scalia and Thomas),793 will go to
interpretive extremes to defer to state law. 794  This deference apparently is rooted in
some ill-defined, unarticulated, and doctrinally suspect notion of federalism.
The cases in which the Court considered a governmental tax claim or enforcement
proceeding arguably show more consistent interpretive patterns.  Although some
commentators have suggested that the Court defers unreasonably to governmental claims,
the cases suggest a coherent jurisprudence.
The government won all three of the cases in which the debtor argued that
bankruptcy law exempted the estate from compliance with governmental enforcement
proceedings, and the one case in which the debtor sought to recover trust fund tax
payments that the debtor could not have recovered out of bankruptcy. 795  The government
also won the two cases in which the debtor sought to subordinate governmental tax
claims.796  The government was not, however, exempt from the Bankruptcy Code’s
turnover provision. 797  Similarly, in one case, the Court held that the government’s
interest in designating payments as non-trust-fund taxes did not overcome the debtor’s
interest in designating payments as trust fund taxes.798  These cases suggest that the
Bankruptcy Code does not exempt the estate from complying with governmental
                                                
793 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, Ltd., 119 S. Ct.
1411 (1999).
794  See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
795 See Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992) (holding that bankruptcy did not exempt the trustee of
a reorganization trust from filing returns and paying taxes); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v.
MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that the stay did not bar a Federal Reserve Board
enforcement proceeding against debtor bank holding company); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S.
53 (1990) (holding that the debtor could not recover as preferential transfers tax payments that had been
made from trust funds); California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989)
(holding that bankruptcy did not exempt the estate from state taxes on liquidation sales).
796 See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of
Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
797 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
798 See United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
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enforcement proceedings, and that the government’s status as tax collector neither
exempts it from Bankruptcy Code rules (such as turnover) nor subjects it to special
burdens (such as equitable subordination).
(d) The application of the law cases
Only two of the cases in which Justices wrote separate opinions involved neither
constitutional questions, nor conflicts with non-bankruptcy law, nor interpretive
disputes.799  In both of these cases, Justices wrote separately because they questioned the
application of the law to the facts.800
In summary, the Court’s Bankruptcy Code cases reveal that interpretive disputes
drive most of the Court’s separate opinions.  Interpretive disputes among the Justices in
these cases have generally followed predictable patterns.  Part 2 summarizes these
patterns.
=S3
2. Patterns of disputes among the Justices @
First, although no single Justice has consistently applied the same interpretive
method in each case, certain Justices favor textual interpretation while other Justices
favor more flexible interpretive methods.  Second, particular Justices disagree regularly
with the other Justices over interpretive method.
First, Appendix VI records the interpretive method used in each decision that each
Justice joined.801  Appendix VII, which summarizes the data from Appendix VI, reveals
each Justice’s rates of joining textual, non-textual, and pre-Code practice cases.802
Not surprisingly, Appendix VII shows that Justices Thomas and Scalia joined
textual opinions at a higher rate (60%), than any other Justice.  Justice Souter (at 50%)
was not far behind.803
At the other end of the spectrum, Justices Stevens (15%) and Brennan (14%)
joined textual opinions far less frequently than the other Justices.  Former Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Ginsburg, Marshall, and Powell joined textual opinions in 17-21% of
the cases in which they participated.804
                                                
799 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
800 See Farrey, 500 U.S. at 301-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Farrey, 500 U.S. at 300 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
declining to join a portion of the opinion); Field, 516 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Field, 516 U.S.
at 79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
801 See Appendix VI, post.




In the center, leaning toward textualism, we find Justices Kennedy (42%) and
White (37%), and Chief Justice Rehnquist (37%).  Justices O’Connor (32%), Breyer
(30%) and Blackmun (29%) lean slightly further away from textualism.805
The Justices’ rates of joining opinions that defer to pre-Code practice reflect a
similar, but slightly less regular, pattern.
At the textualist end, Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Souter joined pre-Code
practice opinions in only 14-15% of the cases in which they participated.  Justice White
joined pre-Code practice opinions in 17% of his cases.  Former Chief Justice Burger did
not join any pre-Code practice opinions.806
Justices Powell, Ginsburg, Brennan, and Breyer joined pre-Code practice opinions
in 40-50% of the cases in which they participated.807
The six remaining Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O’Connor, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined pre-Code practice opinions in 20-
29% of the cases in which they participated.808
In summary, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter have generally joined textual,
anti-pre-Code practice opinions.  Justices Ginsburg, Powell, and Brennan have generally
joined non-textual, pre-Code practice opinions.  Justice Stevens is strongly non-textual,
but less strongly pre-Code practice oriented.  The remaining Justices fall in the center of
this spectrum.809
Although these data reveal individual Justices’ interpretive proclivities, they also
reflect that none of the Justices have joined exclusively textual or exclusively non-textual
opinions.  We can either accuse the Justices of interpretive dishonesty, or we can surmise
that even the textualists occasionally find enough ambiguity to consult sources other than
the text, and that even the non-textualists occasionally find the text to be so plain that no
reference to other sources is appropriate.  Some Justices clearly lean toward textualism
while others lean away from textualism.  The Justices’ varied interpretive preferences
clearly cause many of the Court’s split decisions in bankruptcy cases and contribute to
the sense that the Court has no coherent interpretive strategy.
Second, Appendix IV records whether each Justice joined a majority, concurring,
or dissenting opinion in each case.810  Appendix V, which summarizes the data from






810 See Appendix IV: Distribution of Justices’ Opinions in Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Cases
[hereinafter, “Appendix IV”], post.  The form of this Appendix is borrowed, with gratitude, and with
alterations, from Professors Tabb and Lawless.  See Tabb, supra  note 7, at 583; Tabb & Lawless, supra
note 7, at 892.
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Appendix IV, shows each Justice’s rate of dissent and divergence (i.e., joining a non-
majority opinion) in the Court’s Bankruptcy Code cases.811
Not surprisingly, Appendix V reveals that Justices Stevens and Scalia diverged
from the majority frequently.  Justice Scalia joined non-majority opinions in 25% of the
cases in which he participated.  Justice Stevens joined non-majority opinions 33% of his
cases.  Justice Ginsburg is the only other sitting Justice who diverged from the majority
opinion in more than 25% of the cases in which she participated.  The retired Justices
who joined non-majority opinions in more than 25% of the cases in which they
participated are Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall.812
At the other end of the spectrum, Former Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Powell, Kennedy, and Thomas diverged from the majority in
fewer than 10% of the cases in which they participated.813
Filling in the center were Justices Souter, White, and O’Connor, who diverged
from the majority in 13-18% of their cases.814
A review of the Court’s separate opinions demonstrates that Justices Scalia and
Stevens not only joined separate opinions more frequently than most of the other Justices,
but that they also typically authored those separate opinions.  Consider the cases in which
only one Justice wrote a separate opinion (concurrence or dissent).
After Justice Scalia joined the Court,815 the Court issued ten cases in which a
single Justice diverged from the majority’s opinion. 816  In eight of these cases, the lone
Justice was Justice Scalia or Stevens.817  In the other two cases, Justice Thomas
dissented, in part, from a Justice Souter opinion and Justice Blackmun dissented from a
Justice White opinion. 818
                                                
811 See Appendix V: Supreme Court Justices’ Dissent and Divergence Rates in Bankruptcy Code Cases




815 Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, there was only one case in which a single justice wrote a separate
opinion.  See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (Justice O’Connor joined the majority but also wrote a
separate concurrence).
816 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (per Ginsburg, J., with Stevens, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996) (per Souter,
J., with Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S.
324 (1993) (per Thomas, J., with Stevens, J., concurring); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (per
Blackmun, J., with Scalia, J., concurring); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (per Thomas,
J., with Stevens, J., dissenting); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (per Scalia, J., with Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (per Blackmun, J., with Stevens, J., dissenting); Union
Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991) (per Stevens, J., with Scalia, J., concurring); Begier v. Internal
Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990) (per Marshall, J., with Scalia, J. concurring); United States v. Energy
Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990) (per White, J., with Blackmun, J., dissenting).
817 See supra  note 816 (Rash, Nobelman, Patterson, Taylor, Owen, Toibb, Wolas, Begier).
818 See supra  note 816 (Reorganized CF&I, Energy Resources).
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A similar pattern emerges from the cases in which two Justices wrote or joined
separate opinions.
Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, the Court issued only one seven-to-two
decision. 819  Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, which Justice Marshall joined.820
After Justice Scalia joined the Court, the Court issued seven seven-to-two
decisions.821  In four of these, either Justice Scalia or Justice Stevens wrote the dissent.822
In two, either Justice Stevens or Justice Scalia joined a dissent that another Justice
wrote.823  In the seventh case, Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent, which Justice O’Connor
joined.824  In an eighth case, Justice Stevens dissented and Justices Scalia and Thomas
concurred.825
The cases in which three or four Justices diverged from the majority, which often
involved constitutional questions or tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and other law
rather than pure interpretive disputes, do not reflect such a clear pattern of divergence.826
                                                                                                                                                
819 See Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982)
(per curiam).
820 See Geiger, 454 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
821 See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg,
J.); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 79 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); Barnhill v. Johnson,
503 U.S. 393, 403 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S.
410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S.
30, 39 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.)
822 See supra  note 821 (Celotex, Barnhill, Dewsnup, Nordic Village).
823 See supra  note 821 (Field, Kelly).
824 See supra  note 821 (Davenport).
825 See Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1411,
1424, 1426 (1999).
826 See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 131 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by
Stevens, J.); Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.)
(presenting a jurisdictional question); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring), Germain, 503 U.S. at 256 (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by White &
Blackmun, JJ.) (presenting a jurisdictional question); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 301 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.) (presenting a dispute over application of the law);
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Granfinanciera , 492 U.S. at 71
(White, J., dissenting), Granfinanciera , 492 U.S. at 91 (Blackmun, J, dissenting, joined by O’Connor, J.)
(presenting a constitutional question); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96,
105 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring), Hoffman, 492
U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at
111 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (presenting a constitutional question); Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined
by O’Connor, J.); Marathon, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Marathon, 458 U.S. at 92 (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. & Powell, J.) (presenting a constitutional question); United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.)
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In summary, the Justices disagree among themselves concerning what interpretive
method is proper for the Bankruptcy Code.  Most apparently, Justice Stevens favors more
flexible interpretation, while Justices Scalia and Thomas favor textual interpretation.  The
other Justices tend to be less textual than Justices Thomas and Scalia but also less flexible
than Justice Stevens.  The Justices struggle not only to determine when textual
interpretation resolves a case, but also when the Court should consult and defer to pre-
Code laws or practices.  As a result of these interpretive disputes among the Justices, the
Court does not act as a body when it interprets Bankruptcy Code cases.  Consequently, it
often appears to be shifting between competing interpretive methods.
B. Advice for Courts, Advocates, and Interpreters
How can this study help interpreters achieve greater certainty during this time of
upheaval in interpretive theory?
First, an understanding of the Court’s interpretive methods should help
interpreters predict the Court’s rulings in future cases.  Predictability is important not
only for advocates who argue before the Court but also for lower courts, advocates who
argue before the lower courts, and attorneys who counsel clients concerning how to
proceed in the face of open bankruptcy law questions.  The Court’s opinions provide
these players not only with substantive rules of law, but also with guidance concerning
how the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy Code.  The interpretive methods the Court
employs are inextricable from the Court’s rationale. Consequently, when lower courts
reach conflicting rulings by applying different interpretive methods (such as text versus
legislative history), an examination of the Court’s interpretive approach in bankruptcy
cases may help predict which of the lower court decisions will be overruled.  Of course,
the lower courts cannot always follow the interpretive approach that the Court’s
bankruptcy decisions seem to suggest.  For example, even if a bankruptcy judge
concludes that the Court would not rely heavily upon legislative history, the judge may
be bound by a circuit precedent that relies heavily on legislative history.
Second, this study should allow interpreters to determine whether deficiencies in
the Court’s interpretive approach have resulted in either “bad” decisions or split
decisions.  Whether an interpreter sees deficiencies will depend upon her perspective.
For example, a bankruptcy expert may argue that the Court has issued “bad” decisions or
split decisions because some Justices failed to appreciate the unique characteristics and
structure of the Bankruptcy Code.  An interpretive theory expert may argue that the Court
has issued “bad” decisions or split decisions because some Justices employed interpretive
methods that violate basic precepts of interpretive theory.  However one might define
errors in the Court’s Bankruptcy Code decisions, this study invites critics to open a two-
way dialogue with the Court.  One aspect of this dialogue, obviously, lies in the Court’s
                                                                                                                                                
(presenting a constitutional question); but see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 399 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter & Thomas, JJ.)
(presenting an interpretive dispute); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 249 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (presenting an interpretive dispute).
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guidance to lower courts and interpreters concerning how to interpret the Bankruptcy
Code.  The other aspect lies in critics’ response.  If interpreters understand how the Court
interprets bankruptcy cases, and see flaws in the Court’s approach, those interpreters have
an opportunity to improve the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence by communicating their
concerns to the Court.  For example, critics can write law review articles that comment
on the Court’s interpretive deficiencies.  Critics can also attempt to obviate bad decisions
in future cases by writing amicus briefs that explain to the Court (for example) how the
Bankruptcy Code’s substantive structure mandates a certain result or how interpretive
theory mandates a certain result.
This study has revealed that text, structure, and history are relevant to Bankruptcy
Code interpretation.
First, the Justices disagree concerning when to look beyond the text.  Cases in
which one or more Justices insist that the meaning is plain and that no other sources
should be examined usually split the Court.  In contrast, cases in which the Court
confirms apparent textual meaning through an analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s
structure and the development of bankruptcy doctrine over time, more often result in
unanimous or near-unanimous opinions.  Consequently, interpreters are well-advised to
consider the text in the context of the Bankruptcy Code’s structure and the development
of bankruptcy doctrine.
Second, as for structure, the Court’s jurisprudence is not yet adequately
developed.  The Court’s bankruptcy opinions show an interest in structural analysis, but
do have always display a sophisticated understanding of the substantive interactions
among different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Even the textualist Justices are
willing to consider the Bankruptcy Code’s structure, as part of their holistic interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code, although Justice Thomas tends to focus almost exclusively on
linguistic structure.  The Justices will consider the Bankruptcy Code’s design, if they
perceive that design within the Bankruptcy Code’s language.  They are less willing to
consider unsupported appeals to “good policy.”  Consequently, interpreters should locate
bankruptcy “policy” not in external pronouncements, but rather, in the substantive
structure of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Court’s most thoughtful decisions understand the
substantive structure, or music, of the Bankruptcy Code.  Some of these opinions have
benefited from the guidance of briefs submitted by leading bankruptcy luminaries.827
Several of the opinions in which the Court failed to engage in a thoughtful analysis of the
substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code were decided without the benefit of such
input.828
Third, as for history, the Court’s Bankruptcy Code opinions (particularly those
decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court) generally disfavor a detailed parsing of
legislative history.  They do, however, often engage in a thoughtful analysis of how the
                                                
827 See, for example, the Court’s unanimous opinions in United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (some of the bankruptcy experts on the briefs or otherwise involved
were A. Bruce Schimberg, J. Ronald Trost, Shalom L. Kohn, Frank R. Kennedy, Thomas H. Jackson,
Harvey R. Miller, Martin Bienenstock, Richard Levin, Kenneth N. Klee, and Raymond T. Nimmer), and
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (some of the bankruptcy experts
on the briefs were David A. Epstein and David F. Heroy).
828 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (no nationally recognized
bankruptcy experts on the briefs).
124
Bankruptcy Code’s current text and structure are consistent with the development of
bankruptcy doctrine over time.
As for the pre-Code canon, its future is unclear.  Many cases consider pre-Code
practice as a part of the Bankruptcy Code’s broad history.  It is clear from the Court’s
Bankruptcy Code opinions that pre-Code practices are most relevant when the
Bankruptcy Code’s text is ambiguous, the pre-Code practices were well-established, and
the Bankruptcy Code has not obviously and significantly altered those practices.  The
complicated relationship between the plain meaning rule, pre-Code practice, and
“policies” of deference to state and federal law or important governmental interests,
however, seriously cloud attempts to define a coherent pattern in the Court’s pre-Code
jurisprudence.  The Court’s seemingly inconsistent decisions in this area may also have
been affected by federalism concerns and state’s interests philosophy of some of the more
conservative Justices.
In summary, interpreters seeking to understand the Court’s likely ruling in future
cases would be well-advised to engage in a thoughtful analysis of the text and structure of
the Bankruptcy Code.  They should also examine the development of bankruptcy
doctrine, including pre-Code practices, but they should be cautious about relying heavily
on pre-Code practices if those practices were not well-established or the Bankruptcy
Code seems to have altered those practices.  In those situations, interpreters must
examine the substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code to determine how the
Bankruptcy Code modified pre-Code practices.  Interpreters should consult legislative
history to enhance their understanding of the development of bankruptcy doctrine;
however, they should be chary of relying heavily on detailed analyses of specific
statements in the legislative history.  Finally, although the Court frequently refers to
bankruptcy policy, its recent Bankruptcy Code opinions generally mention policy only in
a supporting role, usually refer only to bankruptcy’s two over-arching policies (fresh
start/rehabilitation and equitable distribution), and often ground those policies in the
Bankruptcy Code’s structure.
Advocates, lower court judges, and bankruptcy scholars can, and should, help the
Court better understand the music of the Bankruptcy Code.  They can accomplish this
through thoughtfully written briefs, opinions, and law review articles that place the text
of disputed Bankruptcy Code provisions in the context of the linguistic and substantive
structure of the Bankruptcy Code.  They should also place the text in the context of the
development of bankruptcy doctrine over time.  When bankruptcy judges write
bankruptcy opinions, particularly concerning controversial bankruptcy issues, they are
encouraged to elaborate each of these elements (text, context, development of bankruptcy
doctrine).  Bankruptcy judges have a profound depth of understanding of the Bankruptcy
Code.  Even if they believe that the text answers a question, they can educate the higher
courts, which lack such expertise, by explaining why the text is consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code’s linguistic and substantive structure and with the development of
bankruptcy doctrine over time.
Finally, the bankruptcy bar (which includes several official organizations of
diverse groups of bankruptcy attorneys) should consider becoming more involved in
Supreme Court bankruptcy cases (for example, by submitting amicus briefs).
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has demonstrated that the Court does not apply a single interpretive
method in its Bankruptcy Code cases.  Nevertheless, this study reveals several strong
interpretive patterns that should guide interpreters.  Interpreters should study these
patterns to enhance their understanding of the Court’s interpretive methods.  Advocates,
judges, and scholars who study these patterns and address the varied elements of
bankruptcy interpretation in their briefs, opinions, and scholarly works can help the Court
better understand the music of the Bankruptcy Code.
Having identified the Court’s current interpretive practices, we must next consider
whether the Court’s somewhat inconsistent group of interpretive practices provides a
desirable method of Bankruptcy Code interpretation.  This can be done by considering
what interpretive methods seem well-suited to a complex statute with the unique
characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code, and by determining whether either the Court’s
current practices or practically desirable practices satisfy the complicated requirements of
interpretive theory.
